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ABSTRACT
Rage in the City o f Angels: the Historical Development
o f the Skinhead Subculture in Los Angeles
by
Pete Simi
Dr. Barbara Brents and Dr. Simon Gottschalk, Examination Committee Chair(s)
Professor(s) o f Sociology
University of Nevada-Las Vegas

This study examines the historical development o f the racist skinhead subculture in
Los Angeles. The skinhead subculture is a highly diverse network o f gangs that has
experienced significant changes over the last twenty-five years. 1 use an in-depth case study
approach that relies upon extensive observation o f and interviews with current and former
skinheads to explain how and why L.A. skinhead gangs have changed over time. I argue
that the Los Angeles skinhead subculture has moved through three phases of
organizational emphasis which 1 characterize respectively as social, political, and economic
oriented gangs. My aim is to analyze how skinheads have absorbed differing and almost
contradictory elements since emerging in Los Angeles. In doing so, I show the plasticity and
flexibility o f skinhead gangs as they adapt and respond to wider social changes and thus
challenge previous scholarship that view gang subcultures as relatively static, unchanging
phenomena.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
This study is about youthful rebels and street gangs, specifically the stylistic innova
tion, social protest, and organized crime among racist skinheads in Los Angeles that has
occurred over the past twenty-five years'. I argue that the Los Angeles skinhead subculture
has moved through three phases o f organizational emphasis which I characterize respec
tively as social, political, economic oriented gangs. My aim is to analyze how this subcul
ture has absorbed differing and almost contradictory elements since it emerged in the
United States during the late 1970s. In doing so, I show the plasticity and flexibility of
skinhead gangs as they adapt and respond to wider social changes and thus challenge
previous scholarship that view gang subcultures as relatively static, unchanging phenom
ena.
I use an in-depth case study approach to understand and explain how and why L.A.
skinhead gangs have changed over time^. Some scholars have argued that skinheads are a
largely homogenous group attempting to create a fixed identity. I disagree. The racist
skinhead subculture is a highly diverse network o f gangs that has gone through significant
changes since its emergence in Los Angeles in 1978. To describe these changes, I present
this case as an analytic chronology, tracing three episodes: the initial formation o f social
gangs, gang politicization, and the emergence of criminal gang syndicates. Social gangs are
primarily organized around fraternal relations among gang members and conflict between
other gangs. Social gangs are involved in non-specialized criminal activities (e.g. vandalism,
fighting, and petty theft). Political gangs are organized around an explicit political ideology
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and engage in a variety of political activity. Compared to the petty criminal activity of
social gangs, the crimes o f political gangs are inspired by an explicit and organized racist
political agenda. For economic gangs, the racist political agenda is secondary to the primary
aim o f profit-oriented criminal enterprise and members view themselves as business
entrepreneurs (see Padilla 1992).
To be clear, however, these phases are neither neat nor homogeneous developments
that result from consensus toward change within the broader skinhead subculture. Instead,
there are internal struggles between gangs and their members, on-going conflict with
outside authorities, and cooperation with other deviant subcultures. Conflicts and coali
tions shape these phases o f development, making them highly dynamic, complex, overlap
ping, and, thus difficult to describe. I hope to capture this dynamism, especially the ebb
and flow o f groups into and out o f the successive phases o f subcultural change.
The question who are the skinheads has been too often met with pat responses that
conceal more than they reveal. One typical response to this question often posits that
skinheads are simply another sector o f the white supremacy movement. The problem with
this approach is that it ignores the specific dimensions o f skinheads that analytically set
them apart from the wider white supremacy movement. Skinheads are characterized by
members’ youthfulness and distinguish themselves with specific styles (e.g. shaved heads,
military flight jackets. Doctor Marten steel-toed work boots, and tattoos). Prior studies
(Dobratz and Shanks-Meüe 1997; Hamm 1993; Moore 1993) reveal that the links forged
between skinheads and adult white supremacist organizations (e.g. White Aryan Resis
tance) were one o f the most important developments in the skinhead subculture. Yet, there
has been little effort among social scientists to analyze exacdy how these links were
formed or whether these relationships are tightly or loosely coupled and how these rela
tionships have changed over time. There is a need for inductive research that is sensitive to
skinhead development and does not assume that transitional phases are inevitable thereby
making explanation unnecessary. This dissertation takes an inductive approach and relies
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upon ethnographic techniques to analyze the historical development o f the skinhead
subculture.

Theoretical Considerations of the Case
The case o f skinheads raises a number o f important theoretical questions pertaining to
the development of subcultural formations and the processes that strengthen and weaken
them. How did racism become central to a group’s collective identity? What are the effects
of subcultural schisms? Why do some gangs gain an increased sense o f political awareness,
while others develop a “hedonistic” economic orientation? Lastly, skinheads force us to ask
questions about the relationship between gangs, subcultures, and social movements. For
example, when do these phenomena begin to overlap with one another and what causes
this type of convergence.
Scholars know little about the changes in gang subcultures over time because research
using a longitudinal perspective is rare (Short 1990), and while, gang researchers have
identified different types o f gangs, they have been less interested in analyzing the diversity
existent within a gang subculture (for the few exceptions see Brotherton forthcoming;
Venkatesh 2000; Schneider 1999; Moore 1991). N ot only have researchers been especially
neglectful o f how street gangs become politicized (Brotherton 1999), the question of gang
politicization also directly confronts the criminological tendency toward static conceptions.
Ignoring how gangs develop and unfold over time leads to a view o f them as static and
homogeneous (Moore 1994), and reflects our disciplinary bias toward discovering “like
ness” and persistent patterns over time. While these endeavors are certainly valuable, they
can also restrict our awareness o f diversity and dynamism within complex social phenom
ena like street gangs. The ephemeral is often ignored while stability or permanence is
privileged in explanations. For example, researchers often neglect that most street gangs
either fail to exist much longer than initial formation, or experience significant changes
over time (Klein 1995). Instead, we are typically provided with stagnant conceptualization
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and an over-reliance upon discrete analytic boundaries for explanations. Recently, the life
course theorist Robert Sampson advanced such an argument about criminological theory:
“Most criminological theory is static in logic and handicapped by a focus on (allegedly)
fixed explanatory categories, thereby failing to address the processes and dynamics leading
to criminal events” (2000:711). The problem, according to Sampson, is not just an over
reliance upon cross-sectional data, but a neglect o f how social processes lead to develop
ment, mutation, and transformation o f phenomena over time.
Although theoretical abstractions that neatly categorize (and, thus, oversimplify) the
skinheads are easy enough to conceive, I chose a different tactic. I could easily talk about a
growing alienation from a world no longer “familiar” or the political economy o f latecapitaHsm putting the “squeeze” on the middle and lower classes, it is more insightful to
reconstruct the emergence o f the skinhead subculture from the vantage point o f the actual
participants. Ultimately, empirically-driven work that is sensitive to within-group difference
and developmental change over time is what helps “improve theories” (Lofland 1993) by
directing attention to the “unfolding o f social action, processes, and change within both
individuals and communities (Sampson 2000:713).
The case o f the skinheads also reveals that ephemerality and longevity are not neces
sarily mutually exclusive, and that subcultures can exhibit a great degree o f transience and
continuity. The dynamism o f social action tells us about the importance of opportunities
for spontaneous and often short-lived experimentation, yet we also know that too much
flexibility is not conducive to organizational development. As Tarrow (1998) puts it.
The problem for [movements]...is to create organizational models that are
sufficiently robust to structure sustained relations with opponents, but are
flexible enough to permit the informal connections that link people and
networks to one another to aggregate and coordinate contention. (P. 124)
Finally, skinheads also illustrate that, in contrast to overly-structural views that reduce
gang subcultures to mere reflections o f the economy or culture, these subcultures are also
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collectives o f individuals who are not only influenced by their environment, but who also
shape it.

Situating the Case
The white supremacy movement (WSM) is generally portrayed as a “fragmented,
decentralized, and often sectarian network” (Burris, Smith, and Strahm 2000: 218) of
overlapping groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, Christian Identity sects, and neo-Nazis
(Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997). The Klan is the oldest and, historically, the most
influential organization in the WSM, with roots dating to late-nineteenth century Recon
struction. In the 1920s, Klan membership expanded to a high o f between 1.5 and 5 million
followers o f the group’s anti-immigrant, anti-Catholic, social purity ideals (MaClean 1994;
Moore 1991; Chalmers 1968; Jackson 1967). The civil rights movement o f the 1960s
sparked another wave o f Klan activism and violence (Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997;
Chalmers 1987; Wade 1987), which gave way to (mostly failed) attempts at creating a more
polished, legitimate, politically viable Klan in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., Klan leader David
Duke’s entry into electoral politics). The roots o f Christian Identity sects can be traced
back to nineteenth century British Israeksm, which claimed that the “true” Israelites were
Anglo-Saxons. The Americanized version that emerged in the early twentieth century
contends that Jews are the literal children o f Satan, African-Americans are “preAdamic”— ’’mudpeople” (Barkun 1994), while Anglo Christians are God’s chosen race.
The neo-Nazi branch o f the WSM is rooted in the 1950s American Nazi Party, which
organized around Adolf Hitler’s racial purity ideals. As Burris, Smith, and Strahm (2000:
218) point out, umbrella groups such as the Aryan Nation (AN) have led to a synthesis o f
Nazi symbols and ideology, along with Christian Identity theology.
Although variations in beliefs exist among different sectors o f the WSM, there is
widespread agreement regarding the belief in “white power” and the commitment to
defend the “white race” from “genocide”. The source o f this perceived genocide is the
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Zionist Occupational Government (ZOG), a worldwide Jewish conspiracy that aims to
mongrelize the races and create a one-world government (Ferber 1998). According to the
white supremacist perspective, Z O G ’s influence is evident in everything from the lenient
U.S. domestic policy regarding “illegal immigration” to affirmative action (i.e. “reverse
racism”) to the liberal promotion o f abortion that is disproportionately used against white
babies (i.e. “white genocide”). The ZO G rhetoric was developed and disseminated during
the late 1970s and early 1980s by several American racist organizations. Since then, it has
profoundly affected the white supremacy movement, offering activists across the globe a
common vocabulary (Fangen 1998; Kaplan and Bjorgo 1998; Loowe 1998)^.
While the context o f this study is the western urban (and suburban) metropolis o f Los
Angeles from the “Reagan-era” to the present (1978-2002), I also extend the analysis to
make some sense o f the racial conflict that besieges all regions o f the US. I am neither
evaluating the morality o f the skinhead subculture, nor am I evaluating whether skinheads
were justified in forming such a subculture^. Skinheads themselves feel justified in their
beliefs and actions. Some skinheads articulate this justification on the grounds that forming
these gangs was the only response possible, a kind o f “last resort” to defend themselves
against “non-white” street gangs. Others justify the formation o f skinhead gangs not only
as a necessity, but as part o f a humanitarian (read “white race”) service that will one day
be rewarded with honor. In this sense, anything less than skinhead participation is unthink
able. What interests me then is what led to their emergence and how skinhead organiza
tions have changed over time.
Skinheads have received significant attention from the media and “watchdog” organi
zations, but little from sociological research (for exceptions see Blazak 2001; Blazak and
Wooden 2001; Wood 1999; Baron 1997; Moore 1993; Hamm 1993)®. Although these
previous studies offer important insight, they suffer from a number o f weaknesses. First,
they tend to be cross-sectional and treat participation as a static variable^. Second, when
they address issues o f subcultural emergence, they focus at a broad national level, leaving
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local nuances unexamined. This macro type o f approach makes it difficult to examine the
changes in the skinhead subculture. In contrast, I utilize a longitudinal design that allows
for the exploration o f social processes facilitating different trajectories in skinhead devel
opment and the effects these will have on the future o f the skinhead subculture. Further, I
selected a limited geographic locale to enable an in-depth examination o f skinhead emer
gence and development.
According to some observers, the first American youth movement to espouse a Nazi
ideology emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s (SPLC 1991; ADL 1989). Unlike
earlier rebellious youth like the longhaired hippies of the 1960s who preached “free-love”
or the mohawked punks o f the 1970s screaming anarchy, skinheads gained a reputation
(aside from shaved heads) for their hateful ideology, and unprovoked bias-motivated
violence. Consequently they quickly became one o f America’s most feared “folk devils”
(Cohen 1980). The media and watchdog organizations (e.g. Anti-Defamation League,
Southern Poverty Law Center) have focused on promoting the sensational aspects o f the
skinheads without providing in-depth and thorough analyses (Blee 2002; Moore 1993). For
example, skinheads have been portrayed as “neo-Nazis” and “little Hiders spewing hateful
venom” (for similar points see Blee 2002; Aho 1990); and while these characterizations
may accurately describe some segments o f the skinhead subculture, they have simulta
neously skewed our perceptions o f skinheads, and represented them as a homogenous and
unchanging group. As a result, we miss the processes that influence subcultural emergence
and trajectories toward the embracing o f fascist politics, and also profit-oriented criminal
activity with litde commitment to political ideology. Assigning loaded and defamatory
labels allows us to dismiss populations as undeserving o f systematic and careful investiga
tion (Aho 1990). Terms such as “neo-Nazi” have a strong connotation, that when used
without cate, lose significance. The implications for misusing these terms are far-reaching,
requiring various segments o f the population to reconsider their discursive strategies. The
label “haters,” “fanatics,” and “thugs” also dismiss the elements o f rationality that make
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racist views seem plausible given a specific set o f conditions. This study attempts to
understand the organization o f racism among skinheads gangs without simply dismissing
these individuals as pathological and unfit for scholarly attention.
In light o f the relatively little social scientific research on skinheads, I found insight in
the studies examining the biographical consequences o f political activism (Sherkat and
Blocker 1997; Braungart and Braungart 1990; McAdam 1989, 1988; Whalen and Flacks
1989; Fendrich and Lovoy 1988; Demartini 1985). In contrast to the portrayals o f 60s
activists that suggested a “seU-out” or “Big Chill” thesis, these studies found that political
attitudes remain consistent, and although the level o f political activism declines, many
channel their activism in more institutional directions (e.g. working in the social service
sector). However, this research relied almost exclusively upon left-wing youthful activists
as subjects. Accordingly, I wanted to analyze whether similar outcomes hold for activists
on the “far right,” specifically among racist skinheads. The emergence o f skinheads in the
U.S. during the late 1970s meant that more than twenty years had elapsed since the
subculture’s “early risers.” By studying the lives o f some o f the “early” racist skinheads, I
hoped to identify how skinhead participation affected their later adult lives. How many had
moved onto more “conventional” lives? How many were still active participants? What
was the nature o f their participation? How many had long since moved on, but remained
faithful to the skinhead ideology? These initial questions motivated my research.
To answer them, I began thinking about how one might find the subjects who could
provide this type o f information. This is no easy task, as a national directory o f U.S.
skinheads does not exist. I used snowball-sampling techniques in the Los Angeles area
where the largest number o f skinheads exist (Moore 1993; ADL 1989), and I was hoping to
discover the “original skinhead group” in the U.S., an organized cadre o f activists who
would provide the answers to all my questions (and even better yet, a membership roster
dating back to the beginning). It did not take long for me to realize that skinheads are not
easy to research. They are often transient, and participation is fluid. To make matters even
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more complicated, skinheads often have multiple memberships, lack group-specific loyalty,
and in some cases maintain an “independent” status by abstaining from any formal organi
zational affiliation. Because o f such diversity and seeming “incoherence,” I realized that it
would be necessary to first analyze the emergence, genesis, and current trends existing in
the wider skinhead subculture before examining the individual career paths o f skinheads.
Unlike the middle-class white youths who participated in the Civil Rights Movement
during the 1960s (McAdam 1988), skinheads are not active on behalf o f an identified
disaffected population, but rather see themselves as the disenfranchised. In light o f their
predominantly male status, middle-class background, and white skin, this perception is
difficult for many to understand. The lack o f correspondence with traditional categories o f
those who have experienced “injustice” requires that skinheads accomplish a significant
amount o f “ideological work” (Berger 1981) to help define their feelings o f dispossession.
By framing themselves as “working-class,” white kids who are the “new minority” they tap
into the cultural heritage o f working and minority populations’ efforts toward social
justice. In this sense, skinheads illustrate the elasticity o f identities built around feelings of
disaffection firom the status quo.
Developing racist youth gangs in one o f the world’s most diverse areas present many
challenges. In the city o f Los Angeles alone, more than 10,000 gang members have report
edly been identified, o f which the vast majority is classified as “minority” populations
(Klein 1995). During the last twenty years, skinheads have not only faced hostility from
opposing subcultures, but also law enforcement, schools, watchdog organizations and
general community efforts (e.g. the creation o f community-based human rights commis
sions). As I illustrate in chapter 5, these constraints limited skinhead politicization and
hampered building the kind o f coherent movement student activists o f the 1960s and
1970s developed. Instead, skinheads are an amalgam o f “subterranean” (Matza and Sykes
1961) elements including cultural/stylistic, political, and criminal currents that not only
reflect “warring” factions, but also unexpected alliances. Individual skinheads often inte

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

10

grate seemingly unrelated subcultural currents by submerging themselves within various
smaller skinhead cliques that often have different and even competing value orientations.
These cliques are neither wholly distinct nor completely integrated with each other. There
are important overlaps, but not always a shared correspondence. For example, a skinhead
may emphasize a political ideology and maintain a formal affiliation with an organization
that promotes racial separatism and political revolution, while simultaneously maintaining
close ties with organizations that, although racist, are otherwise a-political and more
interested in profit-motivated criminal operations. At times, while these high levels o f
diversity lead to internal conflicts and rivalries, they also provide a mechanism for highly
flexible relationships and multiple forms o f skinhead participation. Skinhead participants
often have widely varying orientations ranging from economic goals surrounding drug sales
to political goals inspired by white separatism, and in some cases, strict adherence to neoNazism. These orientations constitute a skinhead continuum, where divergent ends are
connected by a web o f interlocking associations. What is surprising about these relation
ships is that they often exist in contradiction to stated rhetorical claims by skinhead organi
zations and organizational leaders. However, instead o f weakening ideological bases, these
relationships often help diminish existing isolation between skinhead gangs.

Historical Context
Before examining the skinheads, it is critical to familiarize ourselves with the historical
context from which this youth subculture emerged. The remainder o f this chapter discusses
the diverse social forces that these youths faced in a volatile and ever-changing world.
These changes included economic, political, cultund, and demographic ones, some o f
which I discuss within a national context and others as specific to the Los Angeles area.
This discussion is not meant to suggest a causal link between social changes and the
emergence o f the skinheads, but rather provides readers with a sense o f the social and
political landscape that skinheads inhabit. Understanding the landscape that preceded the
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emergence of skinheads helps prevent viewing them as a “foreign” aberration that had no
roots in the local or national culture. My argument is that skinheads (and gang subcultures
generally) are a response to external conditions; sometimes skinheads mimic these environ
mental characteristics and sometimes they oppose them, but skinheads are never simply a
pure reflection o f the larger social structure (Brake 1985; Cohen 1972). Examining sur
rounding social conditions is not enough to understand skinheads; researchers must also
examine the internal structure o f skinhead gangs and skinheads’ perceptions o f the social
world.
The 1970s and 1980s were marked by important economic transformations. Manufac
turing declined while trade and budget deficits soared, shifting the U.S. from a creditor to a
debtor nation (Harvey 1989). Since the 1970s traditional manufacturing and other bluecollar labor jobs have been replaced by an ever-burgeoning service industry, thereby
producing underemployment (including part-time and temporary work) that is now ac
cepted as a by-product o f a supposedly “leaner” economic landscape (Gordon 1996;
Parker 1994; Harvey 1989). Labor unions have suffered serious setbacks, especially during
the Reagan administration, and continue to face a significantly “hostile” political environ
ment (HaU 1996). Additionally the 1980s and 1990s were marked by an unprecedented
increase in income disparity. Economic analysts contend that 39.3% o f America’s wealth is
now owned by one-half percent o f the American population. The wealthiest 20% o f
households own nearly 85% o f the nation’s total wealth (Center for Budget and Policy
Priorities 2001).
Workers and their families have felt the brunt of these changes. In the past 20 years,
Americans have added 335 hours a year to their workload - 350 hours a year more than
Europeans and 70 hours more than the Japanese (Intelligence Report 1999). Along with
added hours, workers made less in “real” wages. According to Gordon (1996) over the past
two decades, “real hourly take-home pay for production and non-supervisory workersrepresenting more than 80 percent o f all wage-and-salary employees-has declined by more
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than 10 percent” (4). While workers faced an erosion o f wages and a tenuous employment
landscape, children increasingly found themselves victimized by this “leaner” economy as
child poverty rates have soared since the early 1970s. In fact, between 1973 and 1994 the
poverty rate for all children in young families more than doubled (Epstein 1999). In 1999,
among children 18 and under, 19% lived below the “official poverty line” - the highest rate
in the “developed” world (Intelligence Report 1999). While minorities continue to be
disproportionately affected by economic troubles, the white middle-class and working-class
have been deeply affected by these economic transformations as well (Gordon 1996).
The uncertainty that marks adolescence is heightened during an age o f economic
insecurity. When young people face bleak economic prospects, hopelessness, frustration,
and anger are some responses. Skinheads, as well as other sectors of the white power
movement are influenced by the “booms and busts” o f our economic system, and many of
these racist activists indeed cite frustrations and concerns with the economy as one o f the
reasons that led to their involvement with “the movemenf ’ (Dobratz and Shanks-Meile
1997).
Along with economic transformations, the U.S. has been shaken by a number o f other
important political changes. Post World War II America witnessed the powerful expansion
o f the Civil Rights Movement and other ethnic pride movements, the emergence o f the
second wave o f the U.S. Feminist Movement, the Anti-War and Student Movements, the
Environmental Movement, the Gay and Lesbian Movement, and many others that actively
challenged the status quo and demand fair and equal treatment. Major legal and political
reforms occurred during this period which was also marked by the beginning and end of
the Vietnam War, and the resignation o f a President over something called Watergate.
In recent years many other emotionally charged social and political issues have cap
tured America’s attention including; “family breakdown,” “urban decay,” a panic-ridden
fear o f crime (especially minority street gangs), growth in international and increasingly
domestic terrorism, “assault” on the right to bear arms, “illegal” and legal immigration.
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affirmative action, abortion, and the “crisis” surrounding traditional notions o f masculinity
that is evidenced by the growing popularity o f narratives that instruct males to re-inscribe
“male supremacy” through hyper-masculine attitudes and practices (Gibson 1994).
By the end of the 1960s, with the assassinations of John Fitzgerald Kennedy, Malcolm
X, Robert Fitzgerald Kennedy, and Martin Luther King Jr., America was reeling from an
optimism turned sour and rocked by race riots across the country. At the dawn o f the
1980s, the social and political climate had increasingly turned hostile as the “Reagan
Revolution” began to sweep the nation. Faludi (1991), for example, comments that, “by
the mid 1980s as resistance to women’s rights acquired political and social acceptability it
passed into the popular culture” (Faludi 1991: xix). Further, frustration with welfare
“handouts” grew as Reagan and others called for a crackdown on “welfare queens” and
others who were undeserving and irresponsible (Faludi 1991). During the 1980s, the
general populace began referring to Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society” as the “great fail
ure,” culminating in the shift to dismantle much o f the existing social safety net. The rising
American intolemnce that marked the 1980s continued into the 1990s as a number o f anti
gay, anti-affirmative action, and anti-immigration initiatives were met with a significant
amount o f electoral success (Feagin and Vera 1995).
The last couple o f decades have seen a growing resentment; lack o f trust and an
overall dissatisfaction with the U.S. government, illustrating what Habermas (1975) has
called the “legitimation crisis” (Habermas 1975). Anti-tax sentiments and a “throw the
rascals out” perspective in the general populace paralleled much of the rage found among
skinheads whose emergence seems to articulate, above all else, discontent with the status
quo. There is a growing perception among the American populace that current transforma
tions are a clear indication that the “real” America is only a faded memory, and that having
lost their sovereignty, U.S. citizens are quickly becoming prisoners in a country no longer
their own (Gibson 1994).
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The Precedence o f Racial Conflict
in Southern California
My choice o f geographic area for the study o f a racist youth subculture is pardy moti
vated by the severe racial conflicts that have occurred in Southern California. During the
1920s and 1930s, the Ku Klux Klan used area suburbs as a “happy hunting ground”
(Chalmers 1976: 34) to keep out the “unwanted,” while in 1950s and 1960s an ardent
white supremacist chief o f police helped maintain the racial status quo (Davis 1990). In
addition, a history o f residential and school segregation, race riots, and minority street
gangs makes the study o f a racist youth subculture in Southern California that much more
compelling.
The sprawling suburban metropolis known as Los Angeles, where more than 14.5
million people reside (U.S. Census Bureau 1990) was at one time a “back country town”
(Davis 1990: 25). The early development o f southwestern California reads a little like a
soap opera filled with intrigue, conspiracy and plenty of skeletons in the closet (Reisner
1993; Walton 1992; Davis 1997, 1990; Fogelson 1967). As late as 1880, Los Angeles had
yet to b ^ n its unending sprawl across the western desert (the 187*. largest in the 1880
census) (Davis 1990). Less than four decades later Los Angeles was the largest city in the
west, with a population close to a mUlion. The growth spurt resulted from the importation
o f water, a federally subsidized harbor, oil discovery, and aggressive real estate develop
ment (Davis 1990). With Hollywood making Los Angeles “probably the most mediated
town in America, nearly unviewable save through the fictive script o f its mythologizers”
(Sorkin 1982: 8) and simultaneously erecting Los Angeles as our nation’s “cultural capital,”
it was the development o f a large-scale industrial sector that guaranteed Los Angeles’ place
among metropolitan giants (Soja 1995).
The history o f Los Angeles has been fundamentally shaped by the jagged edges of
race, leaving some to even use the metaphor o f fire to explain the role race has played
within this geographic context: “it’s the fire o f race, and it is still burning. The fifth fire has
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in fact burned from the beginning of CaHfomia’s recorded history...” (Wyatt 1997: 2).
However, we should resist seeing Los Angeles as an American anomaly, but instead as a
microcosm— a reflection o f America’s deepest dreams, fears, desires, angers, frustrations,
and fantasies.
During the 1860s and 1870s, Los Angeles stood out from the already lawless and
violent west, as racial terrorism and lynching were taken to new heights (Davis 1990).
During this period, Hispanics and Asians were the most likely targets, as white Angelinos
enforced puritanical and rigid racial priorities. A few decades later, the region would be
marked by the presence o f organized vigilantes known as the Ku Klux Klan (Chalmers
1976). During the 1920s, the Klan was readily aided by local communities as part o f the
efforts to drive blacks out o f residential areas (Bass 1960). Less that half-a-century later,
another set o f white vigilantes, sporting shaved heads would continue to roam the streets
o f Los Angeles, defending racial territories.
One can also detect a dear white hostility toward the presence of “non-whites” by
looking at Los Angeles’ history o f legislative decrees. In 1912, “the Shank Rule” (enacted
by city attorney John Shank) permitted saloons to charge blacks more money than whites
for a glass o f beer (Laslett 1996). By 1917, white Angelinos had established an official
system o f segregation with the use o f housing covenants, and in 1929, this system received
legal sanction from the California State Supreme Court who upheld a restrictive covenant
in L.A. to “keep West Slauson Avenue white” (Bass 1960). In fact, until the Supreme
Court’s 1948 decision against restrictive covenants and the 1950 repeal of California’s
Alien Land Law, segregation was legally endorsed throughout the state (and the country for
that matter).
In addition to the efforts o f groups like the Klan in the 1920s and 1930s, white racism
found an even more powerful proponent in the 1950s and 1960s: the Los Angeles Police
Chief (Davis 1990). A bastion o f white supremacy, the LAPD was under the leadership of
Chief William Parker who worked diligently to enforce his campaign against “race-mixing”
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(Spalding 1973). This campaign included nothing less than blockading the premier R&B
record store, barring white customers and telling them that “it was too dangerous to hang
around black neighborhoods” (Spalding 1973:7). In April o f 1962, the lA P D attacked a
Nation o f Islam Mosque killing one person and wounding six more, which served as an
important catalyst to the Watts “Rebellion/Riot” o f 1965 (Davis 1990). In addition, the
notorious Chief Parker consistently went “on-record” demonstrating without doubt the full
extent o f his racial views. Consider the following comments made during testimony before
the US Commission on Civil Rights in 1960:
...Parker characterized the lA P D as the real ‘embattled minority’ and
....the tensions between L.A.’s minority communities and the cops had
simply to do with the fact that Blacks and Latinos were statistically many
times more likely than whites to commit crimes...explaining that the people
who lived there [in East Los Angeles] were only one step removed from ‘the
wild tribes o f Mexico.’ (quoted in Davis 1990: P. 295)
or his comments to a 1965 television audience:
It is estimated that by 1970 45% of the metropolitan area o f Los Angeles
will be Negro; if you want any protection for your home and family.. .you’re
going to have to get in and support a strong police department. If you don’t
do that, come 1970, God help you. (quoted in Davis 1990: P. 320).
We should not be surprised that, within twenty years, groups of white youths envisioning
themselves as the real “embattled minorities” would organize in order to battle the incur
sion o f “non-white” immigrants and “minority” street gangs.
The startling practices o f the LAPD should not be viewed in isolation from the larger
white community’s antipathy toward blacks and Hispanics. This large-scale “white resis
tance” was clearly articulated in 1964 by the 75 per cent white vote for Proposition 14
which sought to repeal the Rumford Fair Housing Act (Davis 1990). This proposition
effectively dismantled attempts at ending residential segregation. Following the Supreme
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Court’s hallmark decision in 1954, as the desegregation of schools became a major issue
across the United States, one o f the eventual stumbling blocks to desegregation plans
(eventually known as “busing”) ripped at the seams o f many our nation’s towns and cities.
While Boston is one o f the most well known cases, a number o f other cities also faced this
issue. As a case in point, Los Angeles experienced a significant amount o f conflict sur
rounding plans to desegregate public schools through the implementation of busing pro
grams.
In 1978, following a fifteen-year legal battle, the courts ordered the Los Angeles School
District to begin busing in order to achieve racial balance. A year later, after heated con
flicts including a boycott initiated by parents in the L.A. School District, Judge Egly
endorsed a limited version o f busing for the Los Angeles School District
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1/21/79). In this version, most o f the busing was scheduled to take place between SouthCentral Los Angeles and the Valley, excluding Westside schools that had already sponsored
token integration.
In 1979, however, the court also began hearing testimony on a metropolitan school
integration plan that would have mandated busing throughout the entirety o f Los Angeles
County, as well as parts o f Orange and Ventura counties. Eventually, anti-busing activists
and a sudden switch by the Democratic Party establishment which reversed its position on
the busing issue squashed this proposal. Even with anti-busing victories, white flight
continued to the “outer valley” as white Angelinos attempted to create a fantasy o f subur
ban serenity. This flight was not only spurred by the desire to escape the pollution and
traffic, but also street gangs and street crime. In fact, a survey o f Santa Clarita’s residents
by its developer, the Newhall Land Company, found that one o f the primary reasons for
moving to Santa Clarita was “ ...escaping the L.A. school system....” [that was considered
to be a seedbed for street gangs and crime] (quoted in Davis 1990: P. 185)
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L A.: A State of Change
No other city in America may have experienced such great and rapid social change as
Los Angeles over the last three decades (Waldinger and Bozorgmehr 1996). In 1965,
Congress approved the Hart-CeUer Act revising the U.S.’s nadvist-inspired immigration
policies which limited non-European immigration. Unlike the early part of the 20* century
when most immigrants originated from eastern and southern Europe, beginning in the
1970s and 1980s, the majority o f immigrants arrived from Mexico, Central and South
America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Asia (Waldinger 1996).
These demographic changes in immigration patterns were mirrored in Los Angeles that,
for most o f its history, had attracted white and “native-born” migrants. In 1920, toward the
end o f the last “great migration,” only 17% o f Angelinos were born abroad, compared to
35% in New York City. However, by 1990, 33% o f those living in Los Angeles County
were foreign-bom immigrants. In addition to the wave o f “authorized” immigrants, unau
thorized migration also increased by more than 50% between 1980-1992 (Waldinger and
Bozorgmehr 1996). Like the reaction to busing, many “native” white Angelinos reacted
with great disdain to the changing demographic landscape o f southern California by desert
ing Los Angeles for greener (or whiter) pastures.
Over the last two decades, as “pro-American” sentiments have run at an almost
feverish pitch, “non-white” residents have increasingly found themselves targets o f anger,
frustration and violence across the nation (Feagin and Vera 1995). Violent crime, including
rioting, looting and street gangs, we are told, is a problem o f disenfranchised minority
communities. In addition to producing significant levels o f inter-group fear, these stereo
types also produce immense resentment and blame. Too many white youths learn that
crime is a “black problem” (Feagin and Vera 1995; Wellman 1993) and while most o f these
youths are only mildly influenced by these stereotypes, some carry them to a logical conclu
sion: “I f blacks and other nonwhites are the gangbangers, the rapists and the murderers,
then shouldn’t we do something about it?” However, few people are willing to have open
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find themselves marginalized for holding what seem like perfectly logical views. Instead,
complex depictions o f racism are exchanged for overly simplistic ones, leaving many youth
without the tutoring necessary to critically understand these issues.
In spite o f much o f the right-wing reactionary success during the 1980s and 1990s, the
winds have changed in matters o f open expressions o f racism. No longer “politically
correct,” much o f contemporary America has either embraced the rhetoric o f the “color
blind” society or multiculturalism (Gilroy 2001). Even conservatives, who do not typically
subscribe to multiculturalism, find themselves opting for “coded speech” (e.g. welfare
queen), paying lip service to the ideals o f an “inclusive society” (Bell 2001)^. Without a
doubt some people interpret these subtle, yet dramatic changes as some kind o f “hidden
agenda,” unsure about the existing normative guidelines. Skinheads came o f age during this
turbulent period and were the first generation to experience these significant cultural,
economic, political and demographic shifts.

The Organization o f the Study
Chapters 1, 2 and 3 provide a historical context for the topic, a review o f the street
gang and social movement literature, and the methodological design, while chapters 4, 5,
and 6 discuss the three specific phases o f the skinhead subculture that I identified. In one
sense, chapters 4, 5, and 6 are unique stories that “stand alone,” but they are also inter
connected, and, taken together, illustrate the unfolding o f an important, yet often over
looked social process: how the career o f gang subcultures develop. In each chapter, I argue
that to understand this process, we must remain attentive to the diverse strands that
constitute gang subcultures and avoid overestimating homogeneity.
In chapter four, I discuss the first phase of the skinhead subculture and their genesis
toward social gangs. The first phase began around 1978, lasted until about 1984, and was
initially characterized by stylistic experimentation. Stylistic innovation was quickly trans
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formed into social gangs bmlt around shared organizational names, ritual initiation rites
(e.g. jump-ins), fraternal relations, semi-hierarchical social roles, and non-specialized,
“garden-variety” delinquency (e.g. vandalism, under-age drinking, petty theft). At first, race
was only episodically important, as skinheads held a range of racial views.
In chapter five, I examine the second phase, the transition to political gangs, which
occurred between 1984 and 1994 as skinhead identity became increasingly anchored in
race. During this phase, shifting internal dynamics and budding relationships between
skinhead gangs and factions o f the white supremacist movement (e.g. the White Aryan
Resistance [WAR]) helped mobilize racism from episodic expressions into a dominant
discourse. Part o f what helped structure skinhead racism was their participation in white
supremacist political activism.
Yet, the move toward politicization is meant to describe a general shift in skinhead
subculture and it is not intended to describe a wholesale change that some researchers have
implied (c..f. Hamm 1993; Moore 1993). N ot aU skinhead gangs embraced a political
stance. There were outlying currents that embraced strident racism, but not political
activism. Others splintered and formed anti-racist gangs. StiU others were ambiguous about
race, favoring a “pro-American” ultra-nationalistic stance that often included racism, but
veered away from the trend toward neo-Nazism. Despite these outlying currents, the
period between 1984 and 1994 was most noted for an organizational growth surrounding
politicized skinhead gangs.
In chapter six, I present the third and most recent phase in the skinhead subculture:
economic gangs. The time-period o f this phase is the hardest to specify, but by the late
1990s, a clear shift o f emphasis toward economic g^ngs was evident. Economic gangs
combine aspects o f both social and political gangs. Although they are racist, their primary
interests surround profit-oriented criminal activity. I examine the change toward an eco
nomic emphasis by discussing three facilitating factors. Throughout this study, I argue that
changes in the skinhead subculmre have neither progressed in a continuous direction nor
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has it ever been completely dominated by one particular emphasis (although, as I argue
distinct developmental phases are apparent). There are distinct phases, but we should not
confuse this with the assumption that all skinhead gangs fit neatly into the same category.
During each o f the phases I identify, diversity remains a prominent characteristic. It is my
goal to explain why and how these phases occurred and the implications for the future of
skinhead subculture and, more generally, the implications for how we understand subcul
tural change.
In chapter 7 , 1 conclude by presenting a discussion about the future o f skinheads in
southern California. I also discuss how the skinhead case improves our theoretical under
standing o f gang subcultures, social movements, and racism.
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Notes
‘ N ot all skinheads are racist as there are various different types o f skinheads. I use the
generic term skinhead to refer to racist skinheads.
^ The Los Angeles area is a five-county region that includes Los Angeles, Orange, Ventura,
Riverside, and San Bernardino Counties (Waldinger and Bozorgmehr 1996). To avoid
repetition, I use the term Southern California interchangeably with Los Angeles.
^ The ZO G discourse is informed by an older anti-Semitic discourse rooted in texts such as
the Protocols o f the Elders o f Zion and then later in the United States by publications
such as Henry Ford’s the International Jew. The success of the ZO G discourse signaled a
change in the direction o f ideological (fissemination with America moving from importer to
exporter o f extreme right ideology.
* There is already ample efforts that examine the morality o f skinhead ideology and prac
tices such as bias-motivated violence, however, what is generally lacking are reasoned
attempts to understand the emergence and development o f skinheads.
^ In Europe, scholars have been much quicker to take skinheads seriously and begin study
ing the various facets o f the phenomena including processual factors (Bjorgo 1998, 1997;
Fangen 1998; Loow 1993; Heitmeyer 1993).
^ This problem is also true for gang research and criminological theory (Sampson 2001).
^ A number o f scholars have noted the transition from overt racism to a more “polite”
everyday, hidden racism (c.f. Feagin and Sykes 1994; Feagin and Vera 1995; Back and
Solomon 2001). However, this transition may be more apparent than real.
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW
I use insights derived from the study o f gangs, collective behavior and social move
ments to examine the development o f the skinhead subculture. Although I draw primarily
from the street gang literature, I also view concepts related to collective behavior and
social movements as effective and complementary tools that can improve our understand
ing o f gangs. Gang scholars have typically ignored dynamism and heterogeneity in gang
subcultures, while the scholarship in collective behavior and social movements has been
sensitive to the relationship between organizational formation, shared identities, and social
change.

Defining Gangs
Defining gangs is a difficult task. Arguably, the most significant obstacle to developing
a consistent definition o f gangs is the question of whether to include criminal activity as a
dimension. Proponents o f including crime argue that excluding this variable encourages
definitions which are too broad and unable to distinguish between benign “play groups”
and street gangs (Klein 1995). Those who favor exclusion argue that if criminal activity is
part o f the definitional criteria then measuring the level o f crime becomes problematic as it
is being used as both an independent and dependent variable (Short 1996a).
I define gangs as a group o f individuals bound together by common interests (some of
which are criminal), initiation rites, fraternal relations, and a symbolic collective marker
(i.e. gang name and individual nicknames). Gangs are also a type o f social organization,
but the degree o f organization (especially formality) varies greatly from one gang to an-
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other. Separate gang cliques that reside in the same locale, share important characteristics
(e.g. face or ethnicity), or generally identify themselves as part o f the same gang “family”
constitutes a gang subculture. Therefore, gangs are a special type o f subculture, consider
ing that many subcultures are primarily organized around leisure (e.g. basket weavers) and
have neither an explicit connection to crime nor politics. I view skinheads as forming a
network o f gangs as opposed to a “social movement” or “terrorists”. The concept o f gang
captures the skinheads’ non-political, local and autonomous origins. Further, the gang
concept also allows researchers to measure the process that led some skinheads to embrace
a political orientation as well as the process that led others to drift toward organized
criminal activity because it does not presuppose a particular orientation.
My approach is designed to determine the career o f the skinhead subculture. Goffman
(1961:127-28) refers to careers as “the regular sequence o f changes... [which] refer to any
social strand o f any person’s course through life.” Becker (1963:24) argues that the career
concept “refers to the sequence o f movements from one position to another in an occupa
tional system...” Becker also claims that “the model can be easily be transformed for use
in the study o f deviant careers...” (1963: 24). Similarly, I argue that the career concept can
provide important analytic purchase towards the understanding not only o f deviant indi
viduals, but also deviant subcultures. Yet, while the career concept has been used widely to
examine the individual trajectories o f criminals and other “deviant types,” (Sampson and
Laub 1993; Sampson and Lauritsen 1993; LuckenbiU and Best 1981), there has been little
effort to apply this concept to the changes that occur in gang subcultures (Short 1996b).
Like the gang concept, subculture has been defined in a number o f different ways.
Borrowing from Fine and Kleinman’s (1979) interactionist approach to subculture, I wiU
also approach subcultures as a network o f interlocking groups with varying degrees of
overlap that provide a common discourse and serve to define the spatial and ideational
boundaries that distinguish “in group/out group.” The skinheads are a network o f gangs
which taken together constimte a subculmre. Contrary to some depictions that tend to
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view subcultures as static entities. Fine and Kleinman argue they are best viewed as
creative social forms that are organized around negotiation and the spread o f cultural
information and practices (1979). Some versions o f subcultural theory (c.f. Hebdige 1979)
assume a distinction between the “authentic originals” of a subculture and “hangers-on”
(Wei-Teng Leong 1992; Clarke 1981). This distinction implies that subcultures are closed
entities, preventing the consideration o f processual factors related to affiliation and disaf
filiation and the back- and-forth interplay between these processes. Further, a closed view
o f subcultures ignores the varying degrees of commitment and participation in subcultural
formations. The image developed is one o f static and homogeneous subcultures where
membership and non-membership is clearly distinct.

Gang Theories
Traditionally, gangs have been seen as a response among the poor and new immigrants
who struggle to survive within a context o f an urbanizing “zone o f transition” (Thrasher
1927) and then more recently in de-industrialized areas facing persistent and pervasive
poverty (Moore 1991, 1978; Hagedorn 1988; Vigil 1988). In between Thrasher’s “ecologi
cal” approach o f the 1920s and the “underclass” thesis o f the 1980s, several important
theoretical developments occurred during the 1950s and 1960s. Albert Cohen (1955)
stressed that gangs were comprised of lower class youths blocked from status within the
larger society and explained them as collectivities: “actors to which individual human
beings or 'natural persons’ are related as ‘members’ ” (Cohen 1955: 9). Membership in
these collectivities provided “subcultural solutions to status problems” by creating oppor
tunities to achieve the status denied to them by the larger society (Cohen 1955: 65). While
Cohen stressed the importance o f non-utilitarian cultural goals, two other important gang
researchers o f that era, Cloward and Ohlin (1960), emphasized the role o f utilitarian
economic goals as well. From their perspective, limited economic opportunity structures
were the catalyst for the formation o f youth gangs. Reflecting their structural-functionalist
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framework, Cohen and Cloward and Ohlin assumed that a larger cultural consensus regard
ing values existed and in contrast. Miller (1958) saw gang youths as enacting a set of
normal lower-class values or “focal concerns” that reflected their social milieu. Gangs were
not reacting against a middle class “measuring rod,” but exaggerated the lower class em
phasis on excitement, trouble, toughness, autonomy, and fate (Miller 1958: 261-62). Most
of these theorists assumed that gangs were a lower-class phenomenon and that gang
culture was unchanging and highly durable over time, and these assumptions had a tremen
dous influence on how researchers continue to view gangs.

Diversity and Change within Gangs
We know a great deal about the relationship between gangs and criminal behavior and
the prevalence o f gang participation; however we know much less about how and why
gang subcultures change over time (Moore 1991; Short 1996b). While a number of gang
typologies exist (Sanchez-Jankowski 1991; Fagan 1990; Cohen 1955; Cloward and Ohlin
1960; Thrasher 1927), less attention has been given to the diversity existent within a gang
subculture. The few exceptions to these omissions discuss how the profitability surround
ing the drug-trade has transformed gangs, creating an economic emphasis and greater levels
o f violence (see Venkatesh 2000; Brotherton 1999; Schneider 1999; Padilla 1992; Moore
1991). Overall, the issues o f change and diversity remain under-studied and as Short
(2003: np) notes, “changes in gang subcultures have not been well documented and a
greater number o f studies are needed”' .
A paucity o f longitudinal studies and subcultural theories emphasizing the unchanging
and closed nature o f these groupings has perpetuated the perception o f gang subcultures as
static and homogeneous (Moore 1994)^. As SanchezJankowski (1991) has argued, “a large
number o f studies have used gangs as an independent variable to explain crime and delin
quency patterns and thus focused more on the consequences o f gang actions rather than
the internal structure and the social dynamics o f the organization itself” (327). Similarly,
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Hagedorn (1988) notes that most current research no longer focuses on how gangs arise
within a particular community context and how they function within those social environ
ments; instead, the fundamental question has become, ‘why are gang members delinquent?
These arguments bear resemblance to Sampson’s (2000) recent critique o f the broader area
o f criminological theory where he advocates that researchers employ greater sensitivity to
the significant changes that occur during an individuals’ life course. I would add that we
should be equally sensitive to the changes that occur within a subculture over the course
o f time.
Moore (1991) indicates, “what anybody ‘knows’ about a gang in any given year-even a
gang member’s knowledge-may in certain specifics be out o f date the very next year.” Klein
(1995, 1971) claims that gangs have always been more diverse than portrayed by either the
media or the limited academic studies of this issue. Short (1996a: xiv) contends that, “little
scholarly attention has been devoted to how these diverse and changing collective forms
o f youth organization and behavior relate to one another.” Ignoring these processes leads
to a view o f gangs as static and homogeneous (Moore 1994) and reflect our disciplinary
bias toward discovering “likeness” and persistent patterns over time. While valuable, these
works may also restrict our awareness of diversity and dynamism within social phenomena.
O n the other hand, acknowledging that gangs change is only the first step in explaining
how and why these changes occurred, which is precisely the goal o f my study.
Gang researchers have been especially neglectful o f how street gangs become politi
cized (Brotherton 1999). If, as Moore (1978: 36) argues gangs are “symbolic challenges to
the world,” then why do some gangs translate symbolic challenges into material practices
intended to produce social change? My proposal to analyze the political dimensions of
gangs does not hinge upon a romanticized notion o f gangs or the process o f politicization.
Instead, I view politicization as one o f many possible phases in the career o f a gang sub
culture. To understand politicization we should neither treat gang transformation as inher
ently positive nor treat gang members as “political heroes”. Some researchers concluded
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that earliet gangs, despite rhetoric to the contrary, were simply not well organized and did
not constitute a group seeking large-scale change (Short and Strodtbeck 1976; Klein 1971).
However, there is evidence that some important exceptions to these claims exist. For
example, in the late 1960s several local African-American gangs helped form Los Angeles’
first chapter o f the Black Panthers who professed a revolutionary agenda (Davis 1990).
Former members o f the Black Liberation Army, a revolutionary Black Nationalist organi
zation, formed the Black Guerrilla Family, the largest African-American prison gang in
California. (Parenti 2002)^. Another gang who temporarily evolved into a political organi
zation during the late 1960s was Chicago’s largest street gang, the Vice Lords (Dawley
1992). These exceptions suggest that street gangs possess a wide-range o f variations in
group formation and structure, from a-political to revolutionary and from tightwing to
leftwing can be found among gangs (Knox 2000).
To understand the process o f gang politicization, I borrow concepts from the social
movements scholarship. Social movements are defined as a “collectivity acting with some
degree o f organization and continuity outside of institutional channels for the purpose of
promoting or resisting change in the group, society, or world order o f which it is a part”
(Snow and McAdam 1998: xviii). Social movements depend upon subcultures to provide a
base o f participants and spaces where activists can learn movement beliefs, rituals, and
build ties with other participants. The process by which subcultures are dynamically af
fected by social forces in terms o f shifting attitudes and increasing involvement in political
activity is politicization (Langton 1969). A key element in politicization is the building o f
collective identity, which Taylor and Whittier (1992: 105) define as “the shared definition
o f the group that derives from members’ common interests, experiences, and solidarity.”
Recent efforts in the area o f social movements have emphasized that creating and sustain
ing a collective identity is a cultural accomplishment (Melucci 1996, 1989; Taylor and
Whittier 1992). For example, Melucci (1989: 73-74) suggests that we re-think, “an exclu
sively political view centered on the instrumental dimension of action.” That gangs often
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crumble as quickly as they form underscores the importance o f creating collective identity.
The failure to create a collective identity leaves participants without the glue necessary to
bind them together. Although Albert Cohen (1955) stressed that gangs are above all else
“collectivities” more than five decades ago, neither he nor others have emphasized the
subcultural career trajectories that develop over time. Participants in gangs may be influ
enced by factors Hke “status frustration,” “blocked opportunity,” and a breakdown of
“social control,” but once involved group processes channel individual participants in
particular directions which in turn affects organizational emphases.

The Skinhead Literature
While some have viewed skinheads as a “delinquent subculture” characterized by fluid
membership, drug use, unstable leadership, and inter-gang rivalries (Blazak 2001; Blazak
and Wooden 2001; Etter 1999; McCurrie 1998; Baron 1997; Christensen 1994), skinheads
have been largely excluded from the conceptual framework of gangs. For example, Hamm
(1993) argues that it is a conceptual mistake to view skinheads as street gangs and instead
urges that we view them as an “international terrorist youth subculture” in light of their
ideological perspectives, overt racism, political violence, and international connections.
However, Hamm fails to develop his conceptual framework. In a similar vein, Klein
(1995) excludes skinheads from his examination o f street gangs because:
compared to street gangs which spend significant amounts o f time “hanging
out” on the streets, skinheads are “inside; they’re working on their materi
als; or if outside, they’re looking for a target, not just lounging
around...skinheads are focused, always planning...Skins prefer narrower
ranges of trouble. (P. 22)
Similarly, Moore (1993) argues that skinheads
are ordinarily informally structured, unlike more disciplined street gangs
with their Mafia-like positions o f power and specific function, they tend not
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to have clearly identifiable leaders who develop specific plans o f action to
be performed by a regulated skinhead membership. Skinhead groups are
often gangs only in the very loosest sense, and often seem more a collection
o f individuals who frequendy congregate with each other at some hangout
not exclusively theirs but at which they can display some unity and frater
nity.... (P. 75)
These arguments ignore that significant difference (e.g. racial/ethnic and regional) exist
between all gangs. Klein’s assumption that skinheads have greater focus is unfounded and
implies that skinheads constitute a homogenous subculture, while Moore’s statement that
gangs have highly structured organizations flies in the face of decades o f gang research
that suggests otherwise (PClein 1995; Moore 1991; Vigil 1988; Short and Strodbeck 1976).
Rather than trying to portray skinheads as highly focused or completely unorganized, I
propose that there is great diversity existing among racist skinheads. I consider the
skinheads as typically forming gangs immersed within a network that, in varying degrees,
emphasizes a racist ideology.
Social scientists have been slow to study skinheads. Although informative and useful,
much o f the available research is produced by journalists (e.g. Cooper 1989; Coplon 1988),
special interest groups (Anti-Defamation League, Southern Poverty Law Center) and law
enforcement (Etter 1999; McCurrie 1998; Christenson 1994). Findings from the small
amount o f academic literature often seem contradictory (Blazak 2001; Blazak and Wooden
2001; Hamm 1993; Moore 1993). For example, Blazak and Wooden claim that youths who
become racist skinheads experience high levels o f alienation, a finding not supported by
Hamm (1993) who found littie alienation among the skinheads he studied. Earlier aca
demic studies of the British skinheads (Brake 1985; Hebdige 1979; Clark 1976) tended to
focus exclusively upon style which they explained as an attempt to resolve a marginal
working-class status in a class-based society (Baron 1997). I agree with Dobratz and
Shanks-Meile (1997) when they contend that further research is needed to better under-
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stand the skinhead phenomena, and draw mote definitive conclusions. I also agree with
Spergel’s (1995: 66) assessment that “skinhead group structure and style fit the gang
pattern: a gang name, colors, tattooing, distinctive dress, drug use, and criminal behavior”.
Hamm’s (1993) American Skinheads is typically credited as the most thorough account
o f this phenomenon. Hamm’s primary purpose was to examine the origins o f the American
skinheads and to empirically test various criminological theories to assess their applicability
to the skinheads. Hamm’s research is a good starting point for a historical account, but
because he focuses upon the entire nation, local nuances are not examined. Hamm also
relies upon secondary sources produced by agencies that are neither historians nor social
scientists; and although reports from these “fact finders” are extremely useful, they are
subject to agency contamination (Baron 1997). Further, Hamm’s secondary sources are
limited to watchdog organizations, as he did not access data from law enforcement agen
cies. Finally, his interviews with skinheads approximated survey questionnaires and thus
were not well suited for eliciting historical data.
Three other studies on skinheads are also noteworthy. The first is Randy Blazak and
Wayne Wooden’s work in Renegade Kids, Suburban Outlaws (2001), which draws from Albert
Cohen (1955) and more recently Robert Agnew’s (1985) research on juvenile delinquency.
Blazak and Wooden argue that skinheads are a product o f “status frustration” where
“hostility expressed by these skinheads is a reflection o f their anomie...status frustration
was manipulated by right-wing groups who explained to teens why their father’s factory
was closed down, why feminists had so much power, why their suburban school was
becoming ‘less white’...” (152-53). According to this research, individuals experiencing
this kind o f alienation are able to find comfort in a collective that provides a medium and
scapegoats to express rage and indignation at decreasing prospects for the future. However,
status frustrations do not completely explain subcultural development and changing
organizational emphases.
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Using secondary sources and some primary interviews conducted with skinheads,
Moore’s (1993) Skinheads Shavedfor Rattle: A Cultural History of American Skinheads traces
the origins o f skinheads in the U.S., and seeks to describe and assess the components of
skinhead culture. He explores the relationship between the punk and skinhead subculmre,
the role o f violence, and growing affiliations with larger white supremacist organizations.
Although Moore’s account is informative, it suffers from several weaknesses. It is com
pletely unclear how Moore selected his sources of data and how much was gathered for
analysis. Further, Moore tends to assume characteristics such as violence, and as a result,
sheds little light on how these characteristics developed over time. His account dismisses
the nuance between “white pride” and “white power,” attributing this distinction to an
effort by skinheads to “counter-attack expectations o f them through offering counter
images, embracing the more acceptable sounding white pride instead of white power....”
(P. 16) Accordingly, his interpretation neglects the very real distinctions that skinheads
themselves draw between differing levels o f racism. At the same time, Moore (1993) also
notices that skinheads became increasingly political during the late 1980s:
skinheads were being actively courted and recruited by extremist hate
groups... Some skinheads themselves began for the first time actively
recruiting new members from the ranks o f high school students...to join at
least organized cadres supporting a specific political agenda....” (Pp. 14-15)
Although I largely agree with Moore’s contention, his discussion tells us little about the
specific process that led to these changes. Discussing the skinhead transition toward
politics without analyzing the mechanisms that generated it leads one to assume that this
transition was somehow inevitable.
Lastly, Anderson (2001) provides an ethnographic account o f the San Francisco
Skinheads. Based upon the fieldwork he conducted during the summer o f 1985, Anderson
analyzes how a local collection o f U.S. youths adapted a foreign British subcultural style.
Although Anderson’s findings are severely limited due to the short length of time in the
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field (3 months), his approach allows us to begin assessing the processes of emulation,
diffusion and domestic adaptations resulting from the significant gaps o f culture and space
between British and U.S. skinheads. For example, Anderson describes the San Francisco
Skins composing marching chants with slogans such as “Hail Reagan” as opposed to
British skinheads who were known to shout “Haü National Front”.
Research examining U.S. skinheads is primarily cross-sectional and discussions o f the
historical emergence of skinheads have focused on the national level. These cross-sec
tional and macro-level approaches are unable to assess changes over time and restrict the
depth o f analysis, leaving local differences within the subculture unexplored. In contrast, I
study the origin o f racist skinheads in a specific locale, using an in-depth case study ap
proach in order to identify how and why the skinhead subculture changes over time and the
continuous presence o f subcultural diversity.
Typically, skinhead research has tacitly assumed that racist skinheads are a homog
enous population who remain constant over time and differ little from group-to-group.
These studies assume the presence o f racism and violence rather than analyzing these
characteristics as cultural resources that arise through the course o f interactive and organi
zational processes. Further, little effort has been invested in studying skinheads as engaging
in “meaning-work,” struggling over the production o f ideas and meanings. It is much easier
to simply cast skinheads as “boneheads” or “idiots with ideology” than it is to treat them
as serious actors with sincere ideological convictions (as distasteful as they may be). I argue
that the racist skinhead phenomenon has undergone a number o f important alterations in
its relatively short history, and that such alterations attest to interpretive or “ideological
work” (Berger 1982) where actors amplify and extend current meanings; transform old
meanings; and generate new meanings (Snow and Benford 1992). In a recent article analyz
ing the “non-racist” and “indigenous” origins o f the skinheads. Wood (1999) argues that
typical accounts o f the emergence o f the skinhead subculture tend to ignore the diversity
existing within the subculture by overemphasizing skinhead racism. Similarly, I argue that
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not only is there a great deal o f diversity within the entire skinhead subculture, but that
even among racist skinheads there is significant variation, a point which is also typically
overlooked by academic research.
Historical accounts o f skinheads tend to either ignore the indigenous cultural basis
which helped spawn this “foreign” style (Wood 1999) or fail to offer an in-depth analysis
o f how indigenous sources led to the mobilization o f episodic racism existent within the
punk and early skinhead subculture and created an identity anchored in a racist worldview.
Some accounts claim that a few “idiots with ideology” (Hamm 1993) in San Francisco
were one o f the first skinhead gangs to emerge in the U.S. However, there is little attempt
to explain where these “idiots” came from or what types o f prior affiliations led these
youths to develop the San Francisco Skins. In other words, what is the subcultural milieu
from which skinheads emerged? Other treatments (Wood 1999) tend to dichotomize
skinheads as “non-racist” and “racist,” treating racism as a static unchanging phenomenon.
This type o f approach makes it difficult to assess how and why skinhead racism changes
over time. Further, treating racism as one-dimensional ignores the variance o f racial
ideology within the same individual, group and subculture.
The existence of skinhead racism cannot be assumed as much o f the literature does.
Some observers claim that American skinheads were already racist when they embraced
the skinhead style (Moore 1993). As Moore argues, “many Americans in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, and not all o f them young, thought and behaved like skinheads though they
did not adopt the skinhead style...” (Moore 1993: P. 71). While this may be true, this
conception leads to a static view o f skinhead racism, treating it as a constant in no need o f
further explanation. Moore ignores the continual changes and shifts that occur within a
subculture even one marked by open racism. We need to know more than the truism that
racist skinheads are racist; we need to know how consistent racism is among skinhead
gangs? Although some subcultural participants may enter as racists, racism wUl not neces
sarily constitute the overriding or binding characteristic o f that particular gang or the
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subculture as a whole. Other factors (e.g. specific organizational interests, etc) mediate
how influential these sentiments will be. To answer questions o f shifting subcultural
emphases, I trace the generation of these characteristics back to specific gangs and their
early roots as well as the diffusion that took place over time. If skinhead gangs shift over
time, what are the themes that are continuous and discontinuous? Skinheads form a
distinct subculture with specific “focal concerns,” yet not all participants experience this
unity in the same way or to the same degree. Instead, skinheads are a subculture composed
o f a patchwork o f different factions, which emphasize some interests and concerns more
than others.

Conceptual Roadmap
My framework for understanding the skinhead subculture is inspired by prior sociologi
cal studies o f gangs (see Schneider 1999; Padilla 1992; Moore 1991; Hagedorn 1988).
Since their bkth, skinhead gangs have moved through three phases which are characterized
by different organizational emphases (social, political, and economic). These phases are
dynamic and complex making them difficult to describe. On one hand, skinhead gangs
noticeably changed through the successive phases that I describe. O n the other hand, not
aU gangs followed the same pattern in the same way. Some clearly shifted to the next
organizational phase, others retained much o f the prior organizational focus, and others
moved back and forth between the two. My aim is to capture this dynamism, especially the
ebb and flow o f groups into and out o f the successive phases o f subcultural change. To
understand this process, I am sensitive to the multiplicity o f gang types that co-exist and
sometimes co-mingle as well as the multiple directions that can occur within gang develop
ment. These phases are neither neat nor homogeneous developments that result from
subcultural consensus. Instead, internal struggle among participants, conflicts with social
control agents, and sometimes cooperation with other deviant subcultures characterize the
processes that shape these phases o f development.
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Social gangs mark the first phase in the early formation of skinheads, which began
around 1978 and lasted until about 1984. While stylistic experimentation fueled this early
development, these were not simply kids hanging out at the local mall trying on the newest
“rebel” fashion. Many were building an identity around a shared organizational name,
initiation rites (e.g. jump-ins) that had long been a part o f the gang culture (Vigil 1988),
semi-hierarchical social roles, and non-specialized, “garden-variety” delinquency (e.g.
vandalism, under-age drinking, petty theft) (Schneider 1999; Klein 1995, 1971). These
early skinhead gangs bonded through shared interests (Miller 1978) that included styles
such as Doctor Martin boots, blue jeans, and military-style flight jackets, specialized or
“slang” language such as “skin chicks” (i.e. female skinheads), “bro” (i.e. brother), “firms”
(i.e. specific gangs), practices that included the delinquent activities mentioned above, but
also attending music shows and aggressive dancing, and maybe, most importantly, fighting,
an ideology that stressed masculinity, partying, and defending local territories. Shared
interests expressed through style, music, and argot provided participants with a common
language. This common language was increased in meaning when shared interests were
translated into the desire to defend specific social spaces (e.g. neighborhoods, parks, music
clubs). According to Schneider (1999), protecting turf and engaging in a pattern o f conflict
separate many youth formations from gangs. Defending turf, honor, and racial/ethnic pride
helps gang members construct a framework for understanding their world by identifying
“enemies” and crystallizing core values. From the beginning, whiteness was important to
skinhead identity but not their raison d^etre. Race became the core organizing principle
only after they began developing close ties with domestic and international adult white
supremacist organizations. In the earliest phase, gang members held a range o f racial views,
but one o f the most salient revolved around the perception that white youth were increas
ingly victimized by a host o f social forces, such as minority street gangs, educational
curriculums characterizing whites as historical “villains,” and changing demographics that
would eventually make whites a minority.
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The transition to political gangs occurred between 1984 and 1994 as skinhead identity
became increasingly anchored in race. During this phase, shifting internal dynamics and
budding relationships between skinhead gangs and factions of the white supremacist
movement (e.g. the White Aryan Resistance [WAR]) helped mobilize a racism that had
previously been episodic and relatively unfocused. While earlier skinhead gangs expressed
racism, it was not tightly coupled to a political movement’s ideology. What helped struc
ture sldnhead racism was their participation in white supremacist political activism.
Skinheads began to channel racist sentiments in an organized fashion that made sense
within the framework provided by white supremacist activists. Political gangs developed as
members constructed a powerful racist ideology that, at least partially, included neoNazism and that introduced political currents beyond the neighborhood, township, or city.
For instance, while social gangs were mobilizing around boundary-crossing at the local
level (i.e. a member of a rival gang entering their turf), political gangs were mobilizing
around the Z O G discourse, a discourse which explained grievances as orchestrated by a
world-wide Jewish conspiracy. These changes were part o f the politicization process, which
entails adopting new political beliefs, a new discourse, and participating in various types of
political activism (e.g. marches, leafleting, and rallies). Politicization also diminished the
importance o f previous interests such as territoriality by introducing relatively abstract
notions o f space (e.g. state power as opposed the neighborhood) (Brotherton 1999).
Yet, the move toward politicization describes a general shift in skinhead subculture and
it is not intended to describe a wholesale change that researchers have implied (c..f. Hamm
1993; Moore 1993). N ot all skinhead gangs embraced a political stance. There were outly
ing currents that embraced strident racism, but not political activism. Others splintered and
formed anti-racist gangs. Still others were ambiguous about race, favoring a “pro-Ameri
can” ultra-nationalistic stance that often included racism, but veered away from the trend
toward neo-Nazism. Despite these diverse currents, the period between 1984 and 1994
was most associated with an organizational growth surrounding politicized skinhead gangs.
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By the late 1980s, racist skinheads’ highly visible political activism was drawing notori
ety and repression. Around the epicenters for skinhead activity (e.g. Huntington Beach),
police departments and other community organizations (e.g. the Orange County Human
Rights Commission) began paying more attention to these gangs. Surveillance and arrests
were forcing skinheads to curtail their activities. In response to these efforts, some white
supremacist organizations began advocating covert resistance strategies as a way to deflect
social control agents. Many skinheads were questioning the effectiveness of public-level
activism and opted for less organized or easily traceable affiliations. The result has not
necessarily meant a de-politicization, but rather a de-emphasis on highly visible political
activity. This de-emphasis helped create subcultural space for another current to emerge.
Economic gangs are the third phase in skinhead subculmre development. The timeperiod o f this phase is the hardest to specify, but by the late 1990s, a clear shift o f empha
sis toward economic gangs was evident. These gangs were also racist but their primary
interests surrounded profit-oriented criminal activity. They did not participate in political
activism nor were they as well connected to the white supremacist movement as earlier
political gangs. The relationship between racism and criminal activity ranged depending
upon the specific organization and other factors like the surrounding community. This
change in emphasis was facilitated by three factors.
The first factor, the shift from public protest to less visible activism, created the
perception among law enforcement that political skinhead gangs no longer existed and thus
only economic skinhead gangs appeared active. Further, with political skinheads desiring a
quieter existence, there was a coalescence of interests between economic and political
gangs. Both emphasized secrecy to avoid social control and this survival interest reduced
the social and ideational distance between economic and political gangs.
Increasing rates o f skinhead incarceration is the second factor explaining this change.
In the late 1980s, law enforcement agencies stepped up their efforts to halt skinhead
activities and disband their gangs. This campaign was largely successful and resulted in the
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incarceration o f a significant portion of skinheads for a wide-range o f offenses. Incarcera
tion helped forge new organizational ties with the most powerful and notorious white
prison gang in the United States, the Aryan Brotherhood (AB). The AB’s origins date back
to California’s San Quentin State Prison in the 1960s. The AB is a racist prison gang, but
their first objective is maintaining a high status in the prison system. This has meant,
paradoxically, cultivating an alliance with the Mexican Mafia prison gang in order to gain
power against the Black Guerilla Family prison gang. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the
AB began recruiting young white inmates from the California Youth Authority to assist
with their criminal operations, which included the distribution o f methamphetamine.
These recruiting efforts grew during the 1990s as greater numbers o f skinheads were
incarcerated. Since then, two skinhead gangs, the Nazi Lowriders (NLR) and Public Enemy
Number One (PENI) have developed close working relationships with the AB. Skinheads’
relationship with the AB is comparable to their earlier relationship with WAR. Both the AB
and WAR provided skinhead gangs with important network links that influenced their
organizational emphases. However, while WAR preached political sophistication in the
sense of adopting a global outlook and organization, the AB preached economic sophisti
cation, with an emphasis upon participation in the highly profitable methamphetamine
trade.
The third factor that led to the rise o f economic gangs results from the skinheads’
paradoxical relationship with methamphetamine. Traditionally, many skinheads have been
anti-drug (not withstanding their notoriously large amounts o f alcohol consumption). Yet,
some gangs are either ambivalent or unopposed to certain drugs. Although skinheads’
involvement in the distribution o f methamphetamine grew as ties with the AB developed,
there is a subcultural precedence linking skinheads to this drug. The use o f methamphet
amine has never been as prevalent as alcohol, but some skinheads have used (and sold) this
drug since the beginning o f the subculture in Los Angeles during the early 1980s. The
selection o f methamphetamine may reflect a subcultural homology between skinhead
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culture (e.g. aggression, ruggedness, and fast-paced living style) and the typical psychophysiological effects o f methamphetamine consumption. The pre-existing subcultural
connection to methamphetamine, the AB’s mentoring, and the potential for high profits led
some skinhead gangs to establish themselves as significant “players” in the methamphet
amine trade. These skinhead gangs continued along this criminal current, forging ties with
the infamous Hells’ Angeles motorcycle gang and even doing business (trading metham
phetamine for guns) with Asian gangs in Southern California.
Although skinhead gangs in Southern California have developed a predominant focus
on economic gain, significant subcultural diversity continues. Like previous phases that I
identified, not aU skinhead gangs developed an economic interest. Some retained a political
orientation, and others periodically moved between the two emphases. StUl others rejected
both the overt political stance (because it was typically associated with neo-Nazism) and
the economic orientation, (because it is typically associated with criminal enterprise), and
are instead best characterized as skinheads who advocate cultural style. Changes in the
skinhead subculture have neither progressed in a continuous direction nor has it ever been
completely dominated by one particular emphasis (although, as I argue, distinct develop
mental phases are apparent). Although there are distinct phases, we should not confuse
these phases with the assumption that all skinhead gangs fit neatly into the same category.
During each o f the phases I identify, diversity remains a prominent characteristic. It is my
goal to explain why and how these phases occurred, their implications for the future o f the
skinhead subculture and, more generally, their implications for our understanding of
subcultural change.
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Notes
’ Personal Communication with the author, 2/23/03.
^ Studies that exemplify this problem include: Millet 1958; Cohen 1955; see also Hall and
Jefferson 1976; Hebdige 1979 for treatments o f British working-class youth subcultures
which also suffer from these biases.
^ The Black GuerrUla Family (BGF) is typicaUy found in adult prisons, but has also been
reported as active in jails, and in juvenile correctional institutions. While it was founded in
the California prison system, the BGF has been reported in a number o f other states
(Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, Texas, Washington,
and Wisconsin). TTie written constitution o f the BGF consists o f 16 pages o f single spaced
typed text. This is one o f the few gang constitutions that clearly indicates an intent to
engage in armed conflict (Knox 2002).
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CHAPTER 3

METHODS
In December 1996,1 obtained approval from the Office of Sponsored Programs to
conduct research with members o f the white supremacy movement. Following the Chicago
School tradition, I used a multi-method case study approach (see Denzin 1978)' to develop
an in-depth understanding o f a population whose public perception tends to be more
informed by sensational media depictions than by the systematic collection and analysis of
empirical evidence. I combined structured and unstructured interviews, participant obser
vation, and archival research to study the subcultural development o f racist skinheads in
Los Angeles. I selected this location as it is thought to have the largest number of
skinheads in the United States and was the site of one o f the earliest formations o f U.S.
skinheads (Moore 1993; ADL 1989).
As I explained in chapter 2, existing skinhead research is primarily cross-sectional and
treats subcultural participation as a static variable (Blazak and Wooden 2001; Hamm
1993), which makes it difficult to examine processes o f subcultural change. In contrast, I
use a developmental perspective (Schneider 1999; Moore 1991; Hagedorn 1988) that
allows for the exploration o f the career trajectories o f gang subcultures.
In his study o f the skinhead subculture. Wood’s (1999: 133) correctly points out that
“the history o f a subculture cannot adequately be gleaned from interviews with current
[italics mine] subcultural members.” He proposes that researchers examine the “traces” or
artifacts left behind such as song lyrics, subcultural magazines, and other primary resources.
While this type o f evidence is a useful tool. Wood neglects the importance o f interviews
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with “old-timers” who may or may not still be active participants in the subculture. These
“old heads” (Brotherton 1999) provide the researcher with an invaluable source o f infor
mation that primary documents alone cannot. Subcultural documents are often created at
the pinnacle o f participation, by members who are experiencing a “high” (McAdam 1988)
resulting from their involvement. These experiences alter their perceptions and affect the
construction o f these subcultural texts, which makes research that relies solely on them
problematic (Blee 1996).
Skinhead history is hard to track, partly because many o f the best “skinhead historians”
are law enforcement and “watchdog” organizations, neither of which adheres to the same
methodological standards as the social scientist. There are indications that some research
findings from law enforcement and watchdog organizations suffer from agency contamina
tion and thus lack both reliability and validity (Baron 1997). To overcome these weak
nesses and gain a thorough and rich history o f the skinhead subculture, I used multiple
sources o f data, double-checked findings, and searched for “negative” evidence that would
add complexity or question existing findings. Theses procedures, referred to as “triangula
tion,” are used to reduce the likelihood o f misinterpretation (Altheide and Johnson 1994;
Huberman and Miles 1994; Denzin 1978). Triangulation is based upon the notion that “no
single method can ever completely reveal all the relevant features o f empirical reality
necessary for testing or developing a theory” (Denzin 1978; 28).
My research also relies upon the “case study” strategy (Stake 1994; Feagin, Orum, and
Sjoberg 1991; Ying 1989). A case is a phenomenon occurring in a bounded context (i.e. the
unit o f analysis) and attention is given to a vaguely defined temporal, social, and physical
boundary (Stake 1994). My case represents each o f these three dimensions: temporal
(between 1978 and 2002); social (skinhead subculture); and physical (Los Angeles). I aim
to provide an in-depth and rich examination o f the particularities o f this case as well as use
it to illustrate several characteristics about broader features of gang subcultures and their
developmental processes. Thus my level of analysis combines what others refer to as an
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“intrinsic” and a “instrumental” case study (Stake 1994: 237). The former refers to re
search that concentrates on the specifics o f a given case, and the latter refers to studies
that use a case to represent certain features or to refine theory.
To analyze this case, I completed 127 interviews and more than 1000 hours o f partici
pant observation with skinheads across the Los Angeles area. The latter method was
critical to assess the current trends within this subculture. The sample o f skinheads I
interviewed was predominantly white males (94% were male, while 6% were female). This
male over-representation is not surprising as the skinhead subculture is a predominantly
male one (Blee 2001). That all o f my interviewees were “white” should also not come as a
surprise, given the skinhead emphasis upon racism. However, despite the importance o f a
racist ideology, skinhead racism is not always a completely totalizing worldview. For
example, two o f my interviewees had surnames that were racially/ethnically ambiguous
(i.e. “Diaz”). Both claim that their lineage is Spanish and not Mexican, thereby making
them appropriately “Aryan”. Yet, one o f these skinheads also indicated that, as a child,
other children and some family members refereed to him as a “spic”. Relying on secondary
sources, I also found through secondary sources that one o f my interviewees had Native
American lineage on his mothers’ side o f the family while another skinhead fathered a
“mixed-race” baby with an Arab-American woman. The skinhead’s relationship with the
Arab-American woman occurred during a period o f time when his participation in the
skinhead subculture had dissipated. Since the birth of his child, the skinhead’s level of
involvement has increased, and he now plays in a white power band popular among
skinheads across the globe. Nonetheless, he maintains regular contact (although secret)
with his child and his child’s “non-white” mother. In terms of social class, no clear patterns
existed among the skinheads I interviewed. This is also not surprising considering the
cross-section o f social classes represented in the larger skinhead subculture (Anderson
2001; Hamml993). The majority (N = ll) o f respondents described their parents class
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standing as “middle-class,” while three skinheads described it as “upper-middle class,” and
six respondents described their parents class standing as “working-class”.
I also conducted archival research, including the analysis o f watchdog organizations’
official reports, newspaper accounts, court documents, and various types o f documentary
evidence that law enforcement officials provided (e.g. letters written by skinheads, video
taped interviews of skinheads conducted by law enforcement personnel). Newspaper
articles on the skinheads were drawn primarily from the Los Angeles Limes, the Orange County
Roister, the Los Angeles Weekly, and the San Bernardino Tribune. I selected these articles
through a structured, exhaustive search o f the Lexus-Nexus data-base and microfilm
indexes o f the Los Angeles Times to 1980 using the search terms: skinhead, neo-Nazi, white
supremacy, white power, hate- (including hate-crime, hate group, etc.)^. With the assistance
of research staff, I accessed each o f the Southern Poverty Law Center and Anti-Defama
tion League’s publications that discussed skinheads. From the analysis o f each o f these
secondary documents, I developed a list o f skinhead court cases on file in southern Califor
nia. This list allowed me request these court documents and examine them for any perti
nent information that would shed light on the skinhead subculture.
I analyzed this data to gain a better understanding o f the emergence o f the skinhead
subculture and its development. These documents provided crucial pieces o f information
that would otherwise be difficult to obtain. These included descriptions o f important
events (e.g. pieces o f group history), demographic information, and descriptions of
skinheads’ lives.
Two potential problems arise when sampling a secretive population such as the
skinheads. The first is to focus upon leaders at the exclusion of rank and file participants,
and the second is to over-sample participants who remain highly active as opposed to those
whose participation has dissipated over the years. Both tendencies are problematic as rankand-file participants and individuals whose participation dissipated over time may have
fundamentally different perspectives o f the skinhead subculture than either core members
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or participants who have remained active. I resolved these problems by using a multi
dimensional approach that relied upon a variety of data sources thereby allowing me to
identify a full-range of skinhead participants. I primarily relied upon a “snowball” sampling
strategy where a researcher collects data on a few members of the target population and
asks those individuals to provide information needed to locate other members o f the
population (Babbie 1998). Additionally, I also utilized the “reputational” method, which, in
this case, entailed asking informants to generate names of skinheads and descriptions of
their participation. I supplemented this technique by providing informants with names of
persons identified as skinheads by secondary sources and asked these informants about
their knowledge o f this person (e.g. “have you ever heard of Billy Banks?”). Finally, I used
secondary sources, such as newspaper accounts, to identify individual participants. These
strategies are commonly used by researchers who study hidden and hard-to-reach popula
tions (Becker 1966).
The decision to interview non-skinhead, racist leaders such as Tom Metzger and
Richard Butler was motivated by my analysis of secondary documents which highlighted
their role in recognizing the importance o f skinheads and attempting to recruit them. Since
both Metzger and Butler are relatively widely known public figures, it was easy to contact
them. Contacting individual skinheads, however, was much more difficult. During a field
visit to the Aryan Nations in the summer o f 1999,1 met a “white power” music producer
with contacts among skinheads in the United States who agreed to refer me to several key
skinhead leaders in Southern California. Once I established these contacts, I was able to
secure additional referrals to a greater number o f skinheads in the area, some o f whom
played a relatively peripheral role. Simultaneously I began conducting field visits in the Los
Angeles area in order to observe the contemporary skinhead subculture and to cultivate
relationships with “old heads” knowledgeable about the history o f the skinhead subculture.
To provide a more thorough disclosure o f my methods, the following section discusses
some of the “tools” I used during fieldwork with Southern California skinheads.
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Interviews
I used interviews as the primary source o f data for this study, and participant observa
tion and archival research as supplemental techniques (Lofland and Lofland 1995). The
interviews were primarily unstructured and typically occurred in people’s homes or in
public settings (e.g. restaurants etc.). Unstructured interviewing is open-ended, allowing
subjects to respond without having to choose between fixed categories (Fontana and Frey
1994). I also used “oral histories,” “life histories,” and “ethnographic interviewing”
(Fontana and Frey 1994; Blee 1993; Douglas 1985; Spradley 1979). Spradley (1979)
summarizes “the ethnographic interview” as a “series of friendly conversations into which
the researcher slowly introduces new elements to assist informants to respond as infor
mants” (Spradley 1979: 31).
It includes: 1) giving informant an explanation o f the research (multiple times); 2)
expressing cultural ignorance; 3) asking initial question and re-state as needed; 4) express
ing interest during informant responses whenever possible; 5) Re-stating informant re
sponses using their words; 6) breaking up informant responses to “grand” questions by
asking more specific questions regarding aspects o f informant’s response; 7) asking de
scriptive, structural and contrast questions; 8) creating hypothetical situations; 9) when
ending the interview, expressing interest, stating that you have much more to learn,
identifing topics not covered, and establishing the next interview (summarized from
Spradley 1979: 31-33).
For the sake o f consistency I use the term “life history,” to designate a technique which
allows researchers to collect information that is not necessarily recorded in written docu
ments, information which has often been used to reach ignored, oppressed, and forgotten
groups (Fontana and Frey 1994). As, Blee (1993) contends, “oral histories can tap into the
complexity o f political experiences and beliefs more direcdy than can documentary
sources” (Blee 1993: 599). Because racists and other “far” right groups typically espouse
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beliefs that are an anathema to historians and other social scientists, there has been little
attention paid to their Hfe stories (Blee 1993).
The life-history interview “presents the experiences and definitions held by one person,
one group, or one organization as this person, group, or organization interprets those
experiences” (Denzin 1978: 215). To gain a thorough Hfe history, researchers often conduct
a series o f interviews with the same respondent and use various types o f techniques
ranging from standardized close-ended survey instruments to open-ended and unstructured
questions. One o f the objectives o f the Ufe-history method is to derive the sequencing of
an individual’s Hfe. Shaw (1966) suggests using a “Hfe history guide” to increase the level
o f organization during the process o f data coUection.
A key component o f the Hfe-history technique is the use of multiple interview sessions
with the same respondent. Using multiple sessions aHows the researcher to conduct pre
liminary data analysis in order to assess which issues need further investigation or clarifica
tion during the foUow-up sessions. One o f the central techniques o f verification when
conducting Hfe-history interviews is triangulation (Denzin 1978). The use o f multiple
sources of data such as verifying interviews through official records, newspaper accounts
and interviews with peers, family members, and other acquaintances is critical to assessing
the vaHdity o f Hfe history interviews. Using a checkHst to help guide and provide a loose
structure to the interviews (Shaw 1966), I would typicaUy ask subjects how they “discov
ered” the skinhead subculture, their previous subcultural affiHations, motivations for
participating in the skinhead subculture, degree and quaHty of participation, subjects’
perspectives as to why skinheads emerged, and changed.
My interviewees included key skinhead leaders who were essential in the initial forma
tion o f various skinhead groups, more peripheral rank-and-file members, “non-skinhead”
racist leaders (e.g. Tom Metzger and Richard Butler) who were among the first to promote
the importance o f the skinheads to the larger white supremacist movement, law enforce
ment officers who have expertise about Southern CaHfornia skinheads, and investigative
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researchers from “watchdog” organizations (e.g. Anti-Defamation League and Simon
Wiesenthal Center) (see Appendix 1 for further description of the interview subjects).

Participant Observation
My visits in the field ranged from several hour meetings to one-week visits where I
stayed in the homes o f skinhead members and accompanied them to various social/
recreational activities (parties, concerts, dinner etc.). Gold (1958) distinguishes between
four “positions” a researcher can occupy in the field: 1) the complete participant role; 2)
participant-as-observer role; 3) the observer-as-participant role; and 4) the complete
observer role (Gold 1958). The role that the researcher assumes results from the stage of
the research process, and the relationship between the researcher and subjects in the
various settings (Adler and Adler 1994; 1987). I assumed each o f these roles in varying
degrees, sliding between participant as observer and observer as participant most of the
time.
Various fieldwork roles emerge in different stages of fieldwork. Shaffir and Stebbins
(1991:7) outline what they refer to as the “four stages” o f fieldwork: 1.) entering the field;
2.) learning how to play one’s role while there; 3.) maintaining and surviving the several
kinds o f relations that emerge; 4.) leaving the field.
Getting in is the process o f negotiating entry into the research setting. Access to a
research setting varies significantly and corresponds to an “investigator’s relationship to the
setting, the ascriptive categories o f the researcher and researched and the specific nature
o f the setting” (Shaffir and Stebbins 1991: 25). Many researchers correctly argue that
gaining access is a process that is best understood as occurring throughout the research
study (Burgess 1991; Fontana 1977; Geer 1970). In my case, one o f the most important
initial factors that assisted in my “successful” entry was simply “race.” Had I not been
‘Svhite,” initial entry would have been difficult.
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Learning roles in the field includes observing and beginning to appreciate the distinc
tive meanings and rules o f behavior among subjects (Matza 1969). Gaining trust and
establishing rapport are crucial to building an understanding from “within” (Shaffir and
Stebbins 1991). During the course o f my fieldwork, I familiarized myself with “white
power” music (a genre I had previously never listened to), as it is important to skinheads.
Another important aspect of “learning the ropes” is assuming various research roles (Adler
and Adler 1994). Here I struggled trying to decide when to participate and when to step
back and observe. There are a variety o f perspectives about the fieldworker’s role, ranging
from the prescription that fieldworkers remain detached and distant (Richardson 1991;
Gordon 1987) to “becoming the phenomenon” (Mehan and Wood 1975). I tended to
utilize a pragmatic and situational “fly by the seat o f my pants” approach. At times, I
remained distant and quiet, sometimes listening attentively and observing closely, some
times withdrawing and wishing I were somewhere else. At other times, I actively partici
pated, feeling enjoyment and comradeship with those around me. As some observers point
out, the researcher does not only determine this uneasy balance, but it is determined for
him or her by the demands and expectations o f the researched (Shaffir and Stebbins 1991;
Emerson 1983). All these issues continued to play important roles in “maintaining rela
tions” during fieldwork.
Leaving the field is often seen as the “final act,” but has not received nearly as much
attention in the ethnographic literature as gaining entry (Shaffir and Stebbins 1991). Be
cause I did not permanently live with any o f these skinheads, my fieldwork was marked by
continual entry and exit. This made rapport much more difficult to attain and maintain, as
it was not possible for me to visit them on a daily or even weekly basis. At the same time,
this mode o f participation facilitated leaving the field, as it was always a continuous and
expected part o f the research process.
While participant observation may sound easy - “just hanging out” - it is in fact, a
complicated process that is often emotionally, physically and psychologically overwhelming
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(Lofland and Lofland 1995; Sharriff and Stebbins 1991; Van Maanen 1988; Johnson 1975).
A fieldworker must, in a relatively short amount of time, become acquainted with the field.
This includes learning members’ speech (or argot), dress codes, and other formal and
informal “rules o f living” as well as the “tacit knowledge” of the people studied (Altheide
and Johnson 1994). Tense, despondent, awkward, anxious, scared, shocked, amazed, angry,
and sad were all feelings I experienced at one time or another during fieldwork. I often felt
like a “creep,” “stranger,” “outsider,” “spy” “mark” and “convert” as well as feeling un
wanted, ignored, and barely tolerated (Lofland and Lofland 1995; Sharriff and Stebbins
1991; Van Maanen 1988; Wax 1971).
N ot only is participant observation akin to an emotional “roller-coaster,” it is also
intellectually taxing. Participant observation requires the researcher to listen closely to
what people say observe what they do, and keep careful notes during and following field
visits. I recorded direct quotes when possible, compiled summaries o f conversations when
direct quotes escaped my memory after leaving the field, and recorded detailed “thick”
descriptions o f my surroundings (Lofland and Lofland 1995; Van Maanen 1988; Johnson
1975).
Beyond emotional, psychological and physical stress, participant observation also poses
a number o f situational challenges. One that I faced during my fieldwork was consuming
large amounts o f alcohol. Certainly, memory after drinking bouts becomes problematic, but
as alcohol is a great comfort and a social lubricant in otherwise uncomfortable surround
ings, my consumption increased noticeably. Sharing “vices” is also an important strategy to
gain trust and improve rapport (Fine 1993; Wax 1971). Since drinking beer was an impor
tant recreational activity invested with ritual-like importance, abstaining from this practice
would have lessened my legitimacy and hampered establishing rapport.
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Data Management and Interpretation
To better clarify my approach, I will now discuss some of the conventional criteria for
evaluating qualitative data. The “objectivist” perspective typically applies four criteria to
scientific inquiry: 1) internal validity: the degree to which results correctly “fit” the phe
nomenon; 2) external validity: the degree to which results can be generalized to other
settings; 3) reliability: the extent to which findings can be replicated or reproduced by
another researcher; and 4) objectivity: the extent to which results are free from bias (sum
marized from Guba and Lincoln 1994).
Throughout this project, I utilized an inductive post-positivistic approach to gather,
manage, and analyze data (Altheide and Johnson 1994; Miles and Huberman 1994).
Shortly after beginning my fieldwork, I began developing files to manage my data. My
fieldnotes were filled with chronologically ordered descriptions o f the people and sur
roundings, their interactions with each other and myself. As accurately as possible, I
recorded direct observations (using quotes to distinguish verbatim accounts from those
paraphrased) (Lofland and Lofland 1995). While writing fieldnotes, I also developed
interpretive notes o f my impressions (margin notes) such as possible themes or patterns in
what I was observing (Huberman and Miles 1994).
Later, after conducting more interviews and spending more time in the field “mucking
around,” I started to develop relatively abstract categories for analysis or analytical notes
(e.g. phases o f subcultural development, identity formation etc.) (Lofland and Lofland
1995; Huberman and Miles 1994). This included comparing and contrasting themes, noting
relations between them, and moving back and forth between first-level data and general
categories (Huberman and Miles 1994; Strauss and Corbin 1994). Through this process, I
was able to generate a model describing the various phases of the skinhead subculture
career. This included distinguishing the dominant emphases that mark each o f these
phases.
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E th ics and th e F ield w o rk P rocess

Any research project must consider a number o f ethical issues, and these were espe
cially difficult in light o f the beliefs and practices o f those I studied in this project. If the
use o f deception is one o f the “thorny” ethical issues that fieldworkers must confront, I am
afraid I am guilty o f using a considerable amount o f it. Although I did not pursue a “deep
cover” strategy (Fine 1980) where subjects are completely unaware o f a researcher’s “true”
identity, I often “passed” myself off as more sympathetic than I really was. Worse yet, I
was acutely aware o f tacitly encouraging destructive beliefs and practices that I find
reprehensible.
As with the debates surrounding the appropriate distance fieldworkers should establish
with their subjects, the use of deception is also strongly contested. For some, the use of
deception in research is always unacceptable and should be stricdy avoided (Bulmer 1982;
Erickson 1967). On the other hand. Jack Douglas (1976) developed what is sometimes
referred to as “investigative fieldwork,” an approach that emphasizes the necessity and
importance o f deception to accomplish worthwhile fieldwork (Douglas 1976). Mitchell
(1993) emphasizes the role deception plays in the everyday world and its inevitable use,
especially as a research practice. As Roth (1970) correctly points out, during fieldwork, it is
often impractical and presumptuous to announce one’s status as a researcher (Roth 1970).
Others advocate a more situational approach to the use o f deception (and ethics more
generally). Denzin (1989) summarizes his debate most succinctly by suggesting that, “No
single set o f ethical standards can be developed, because each situation encountered
requires a different ethical stance” (Denzin 1989: 261).
I hope that the reader does not expect any ethical resolution because I have not found
one (nor do I think one necessarily exists). I concur with Denzin (1989) that ethics are far
too complicated to establish “hard and fast” rules. While I would never try to hurt a re
search subject (physically psychologically, or emotionally) the possibility always remains
that I have done so. I have thought o f these issues often, and am in frequent dialogue with
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others and myself about how a researcher might handle these difficulties. At times, I
maintained ethical guidelines, and at others, I know I violated them. At times, I verbally
espoused beliefs that were contrary to my values; I laughed, smiled, and nodded in affirma
tion to words that were repugnant to me. For example, in situations where I listened to a
person discuss how “white men don’t have any civil rights” I would nod (as I usually do
while listening to another person speak) and say things like “uh-uh” and “yep”.
George Marcus (1994) refers to “messy texts,” which characterize a “new” genre of
ethnographic writing that is purposefully reluctant, uncertain, ambiguous, sensitive and
“open” to multiple readings and interpretations. However, messy texts say as much about
ethics as they do about writing. Can an uncertain, ambiguous, reluctant, sensitive, and
“open,” ethnographer ever really adhere to a more definitive ethical approach? The efforts
to legislate and institutionalize norms governing research are based upon the premise that a
researcher “controls” and “commands” her/his “field”. While this assumption may apply to
the laboratory, it is grossly inaccurate in the “real world”. My field experiences (as I think
most do) problematize this assumption o f control. While I do not promote an “anything
goes ethics,” I believe we need a continual dialogue addressing concerns, rather than
“absolutist” policies (often engineered by bureaucrats seeking to avoid possible litigation)
which ignore the real concrete, unpredictable, difficult and sometimes urgent ethical
dilemmas that field researchers face on a day-to-day basis.
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N o te s

' For a complete discussion o f the Chicago School’s methodological strategies see Denzin
1978. My approach was most influenced by Shaw’s (1966) life history technique in the Jack
Roller.
^ 1987 is the first time the term skinhead is used by the Los Angeles Times, thus newspa
pers provided litde assistance gathering data regarding the early years of the skinhead
subculture.
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CHAPTER 4

INITIAL FORMATION
Where did the skinheads come from? What interests and grievances motivated the first
skinheads? Were there any significant changes in the skinhead subculture during this phase
o f development? This chapter provides tentative answers to these questions. I argue that
skinheads emerged through a combination of two forces: (1) changes indigenous to the
American punk subculture and (2) the cultural diffusion o f the skinhead style from Britain
to North America. I trace how these forces helped produce the skinhead subculture and I
also trace the evolution o f skinheads starting as individuals primarily concerned with style
to the formation o f social gangs. What started as primarily stylistic experimentation among
some segments o f the Los Angeles punk scene, eventually “blossomed” into loosely
organized gangs.
This chapter confirms Wood’s (1999: 132 and 137) claims about the indigenous origins
o f the skinheads; however, I dispute his contention that these origins were “nonracist” and
am most skeptical about his characterization o f the Hardcore punk trend as “a nonracist
youth phenomenon.” I find that although Hardcore may not have been dominated by neoNazism, racist elements existed and served as important reference points that later
skinheads drew and extended upon. Most importantly, this chapter describes the early
genesis o f the skinhead subculture. Skinhead origins resembled a collage o f elements
leading to various subcultural trajectories. These trajectories included struggles and tension
resulting in several different factions.

56
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Several southern California youth subcultures played an important role in the initial
formation o f skinhead gangs, but none more important than the punks. Once certain
dynamics were present within the punk subculture, the eventual transition from punk to
skinhead became possible. According to Moore (1993), punk rock provided the subcultural
foundation for skinhead development. In southern California, most o f the skinheads that
emerged in the 1980s trace their roots to the punk scene. Once they emerged, Los Angeles
skinheads were akin to social gangs (Schneider 1999) primarily based upon fraternal
relations, stylistic interests, and cafeteria-type delinquency (e.g. non-specialized violations
that included graffiti, fighting, under-age drinking, theft etc.). As skinhead gangs devel
oped, “racial territoriality” became a “focal concern” (Miller 1958), marking one o f the
most important changes in the subcultural career of the skinheads. However, indigenous
developments were not the only influence on skinhead formation. The skinheads were also
influenced by the international cultural diffusion that originated in the U.K. Through
various forms o f communication (album covers, music ‘zines, “tales” passed on from those
who visited Britain), elements o f southern California punk culture began emulating these
“foreign” and “exotic” styles (Wood 1999; Hamm 1993).

Indigenous Sources o f the Skinhead Subculture
in Southern California
No other subculture played as important a role in the emergence o f skinheads as the
punks. As Moore (1993) points out, to understand the formation o f skinheads one first
begin with the punks. The punks bear the closest relation to the skinheads, a slightly
distant and sometimes hostile first cousin. Punk came of age during the hard times of
economic recession and in the wake o f a litany o f youth-based political movements'. In
one sense, punk can be seen as a rejection o f left-wing political movements, in favor o f a
dystopian vision and an ideology that rejected aU types o f formalisms (Marcus 1989).
Extending upon the Hippie rejection o f structured politics, punk replaced the easy-going
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passivity associated with the “counter-culture” with unstructured rage that sought to
attack everything that represented the mainstream status quo. Punk identity in the U.S. was
less class-based than in Britain, but it maintained a strong sense o f anxiety in relation to a
rapidly changing world. For example. Southern California punk bands like Hermosa
Beach’s, Black Flag, expressed this anxiety about changing demographics with their song
White Minority-. “Gonna be a white minority. All the rest will be the majority. Gonna feel
inferiority.” Black Flag illustrated an immediate awareness of social changes that was
expressed through unorganized anger. There was little sense of the larger political economy
which was helping generate these demographic shifts or any endorsement o f a specific and
organized political agenda (i.e. neither fascist nor socialist). The original southern Califor
nia punk scene was based around the Hollywood area and its participants were older and
“artsy,” although this changed as younger and aggressive suburbanites were drawn to the
scene (Spitz and Muller 2001).

Hardcore and Punk Gangs
By the late 1970s, southern California punk starting getting “hardcore” (Spitz and
Mullen 2001), which signaled a more aggressive and suburban trend in the scene. Hardcore
referred to a faster style o f music and a more physically aggressive attitude, which was
expressed through random violence directed at other punks during music shows (especially
in the “pit”). Hardcore attracted a very diverse crowd; gangsters, punks, skinheads, surfers
and Stoners all came together to form a volatile and often violent mix (Blush 2001).
Hardcore was also influential in expanding the boundaries of punk and transcending from
“performance art” to “real” physical violence. As one observer explained, in the old days,
“people [were] pretending that they were violent but they were only playacting.. .when that
happens you’re eventually gonna have someone who comes along and says, ‘Gee, guess
what. I’m really violent. I ’ll show you how to really beat up someone’” (Spitz and Mullen
2001: 223). For some o f the “old-time” punks, this rigid adherence to a new more aggres-
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sive style m ean t a departure fro m the n o n -c o n fo r m ist spirit that had b een th e co re o f pun k

culture. However, for the younger suburban kids, hardcore aggressiveness provided an
important security device from those antagonistic toward punk culture:
Around that time [late 1970s] there were a lot o f kids [punks] who were
getting seriously fucked up by these long-haired redneck hicks in their 4x4
vehicles, real Lynyrd Skynyrd kind o f guys. They were going to punk shows
and hiding out in the parking lot and ambushing us, and I think a couple of
people died...nobody was doing anything about it. No disrespect against
the Hollywood party punks...but they just weren’t prepared to defend us
out in the ‘burbs where kids were getting beaten on all the time...(quoted in
Spitz and Mullen 2001: P. 192)
Hardcore was most noted for its aggressiveness, but it also marked other changes in the
punk subculture. Although Hardcore looked chaotic, it was a very conservative type of
music governed by a strict code o f what is and is not acceptable. This code covered
everything from song structure and lyrics, to behavior, dress, and politics. This new style of
punk fueled experimental forms o f organization that while retaining a strong anti-authori
tarian ethic began blending this with more rigid adherence to certain rituals and practices
(Blush 2001; Spitz and Mullen 2001).
The punk trend toward hardcore was not without its detractors nor did all of those
who favored a hard-edge music style appreciate the more aggressive posture or the cultural
changes that this new style signaled. Some punks felt disconnected from the hardcore
trend:
The Huntington Beach scene killed off the original open interpretation of
punk concept...no rules, no dogma, no stereotyping...DIY [Do It Yourself]
ideology...Once hardcore kicked in, there were very strict ways o f dressing
and weird codes of social behavior....” (quoted in Spitz and Mullen 2001:
P. 224)
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Nonetheless, the overall popularity of the hardcore punk style combined with the
adoption o f an exotic, hard-nosed, English subcultural form led to a fusion in youth
culture that helped generate the Los Angeles skinheads^. As a core member o f one o f the
first Los Angeles skinhead gangs described.
Hardcore and skinheads were definitely connected. Hardcore took punk to
a different level to a more extreme level, you could see it with the music the dress, that’s where there was a lot o f overlap between skinhead and
punk, and there was an overlap in members.... (Skinhead Interview n., 11/

20 / 02)
One historian o f punk also notes the stylistic connection between hardcore and
skinhead:
The rise o f Hardcore coincided with the rise o f Skinhead culture. In some
ways the scenes overlapped. Edgier HC [Hardcore] types adopted Skinhead
style. A shaved head provided the perfect fuck you to Hippies...Very few
embraced the style and remained unfazed by the politics. Some racists’
hatred was heartfelt; for others it was just a confrontational tool....(Blush
2001: P. 31)
As these quotes suggest, there was a stylistic and ideological overlap between Hardcore
and Skinheads as well as important organizational linkages.
Hardcore not only provided a faster sound, but also introduced Los Angeles punk to
loosely organized groups that were “gang-like” (Morash 1983). These were not the gangs
of urban folklore made notorious by the Los Angeks Limes and Hollywood (Moore 1991),
but o f a different sort. These gangs were not the product of poverty-stricken, de-industrial
ized areas in South-Central and East Los Angeles, but relatively affluent working and
middle-class ones across the San Fernando and San Gabriel VaUey, Orange County and the
South Bay. The leader of one o f these gangs known as “Vicious Circle” (VC) put it quite
eloquently when he described the emergence o f punk gangs:
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Clockwork fuckin’ Orange County...We were totally fucked up in the
head.. .We’d been getting our asses kicked by parents, by the schools, and
the police, and now it was like, ‘Fuck you, we’re monsters now, and you’re
fuckin’ gonna pay for it!...Vicious Circle was more like a gang than a band,
a brotherhood that just looked out for each other...VC [Vicious Circle] just
rounded up all these psychos and guys we grew up with and then punk
became a gang thing that everybody went with, the whole neighborhood
went with it

(quoted in Spitz and Mullen 2001: Pp. 226-227)

Aside from VC, several other punk gangs emerged across Los Angeles. In late 1981,
borrowing from the stylistic tradition o f Hispanic gangs known as the “cholo-style^ ” (Vigil
1988), a white gang from Long Beach mutated into the band Suicidal Tendencies (ST)’'.
The ringleader was vocalist Mike Muir and the Suicidais quickly built a reputation for
dominating punk shows with brute violence, stabbing and beating other punks into submis
sion (Blush 2001). During the 1970s and 1980s, other punk gangs included “The League”
which was formed in 1978 and “The Family/Circle One” (not to be confused with the
“Manson Family”), which was formed around 1980. The origins o f the League and the
Family were also seemingly innocuous; they were simply local punk bands and their closest
fans. At a time when two o f the largest African-American gangs, the Crips and Bloods were
monitoring their own functions in and around their “hoods,” the Family and the League
patrolled music shows, parties, dubs and any place where a fight could spark. They pro
vided their own style of security for punk shows that was similar to the role o f the Hell’s
Angels for many rock bands (e.g. the Rolling StoneS). As punk bands developed “followings,”
these heterogeneous networks quickly grew and were tied together by a common identity
built around the punk culture. According to one account “the Circle One concept ran along
the lines o f ‘a group bound together by common interests’ - ‘united as a whole, undi
vided’...” (Blush 2001: 98).
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Maybe the largest and most hated punk gang to emerge in Los Angeles was the L.A.
Death Squad (LADS). Late one night in 1980, following a fight at a Hollywood pizzeria
and liquor store, five youths organized the LADS. The next day they made armbands and
by 1982 were actively recruiting younger cohorts from across Los Angeles. During this
time, the LADS had also adopted a cholo-style. By the mid-1980s another LADS set
emerged “down south” in Orange County, but unlike their counterparts in L.A., the SouthSide LADS did not initially adopt the traditional Hispanic gang style. Instead, they favored
a skinhead style until 1989 when they eventually adopted the cholo style. Although the
South-Side LADS were not well versed in racial politics, many held racist beliefs. That is, it
would have been common for a LAD to view African-Americans as “niggers” or “people
you can’t trust,” but it would have been uncommon for a LAD to have contact or even
much familiarity with white supremacist organizations like the Ku Klux Klan. The relation
ship between the early South-Side LADS and skinheads is evident from a skinhead’s
recollection o f spending time with some South-Side LADS in juvenile hall:
Yeah, I was locked up with some LADS in La Habra [Orange County]. They
[LADS] were basically like skinheads, but they were punks, you know what
I m ean.. .they were shaving their head but it stilled hadn’t evolved into a
fascist thing, it was still not a serious political movement...they were
definitely white power, a white power street gang but not all the LADS
were Hke that. Some were just punk rockers, some were just a punk gang
(Skinhead Interview f , 7/13/99).
Another early skinhead discusses the intersections between hardcore, punk gangs,
skinheads and the genesis o f these formations:
...the big ‘Skinhead Army’ plan comprised skins, crewcuts, flattops, and we
decided we were just gonna eradicate this fucking hippie threat by any
means necessary ... within a couple o f weeks, Dana had control o f fuck,
maybe a hundred guys...and that’s where the hardcore shit really started. It

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

63

was just a self-defense thing at the beginning and then we totally fucking
took over.” (quoted in Spitz and Mullen 2001: P. 193)
In many ways, punk gang activity was similar to traditional gangs (e.g. non-specialized
delinquency, claiming “turf,” shared symbols and styles to assert membership). Punk gangs
were routinely engaged in conflict with the police and other youth subcultures; however,
they were relatively unorganized and despite efforts at staking territory, they were highly
transitory (Klein 1995; Short and Strotbeck 1976). A former punk gang member explained
the motivation for some o f these gangs: “A lot o f these [punk] gangs were about survival
too because a lot o f these people were street people. They totally rejected society and they
ended up on the streets o f L.A. so they aU banded together like a family” (Skinhead Inter
view f , 7/13/99). Several o f these punk gangs in Los Angeles were located in Hollywood,
which has historically attracted a large number o f runaways (Ruddick 1994) and they often
befriended these runaways by helping them survive on the streets.
Some members o f these punk gangs adopted Nazi symbols in part as an act o f defi
ance, but others wanted to express their rejection o f liberal multi-cultural rhetoric that
became increasingly popular during the 1980s within the mainstream of American political
culture (Bennett 1995). According to a long-time Nazi Punk who associated with the
League and the Family and later became a racist skinhead:
I don’t know if Circle One as a whole was a Nazi organization. It was just
the members that I knew and hung out with were definitely white power.
But I don’t know if the leadership was that way. But the band. Circle One,
if you listen to their lyrics, they’re very conservative. Their song Big Red
Machine is anti-Communist. And so, I think probably it isn’t a secret but
they didn’t do marches or flags...The ones that I knew all had swastika
tattoos. (Skinhead Interview f, 7/13/99)
By 1981, the League splintered into several other youth organizations after the stabbing
death of their principle leader. This was typical; punk gangs were highly transitory and
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organizationally unstable. With key punk gangs and the punk subculture fragmenting (Spitz
and Mullen 2001), a vacuum began developing in the arena of local youth culture. The
Hardcore style and punk gangs helped develop a precedent for an aggressive identity
within punk, encouraging some punks to extend upon these stylistic trends and coalesce
around the hyper-mascuhne, clean-cut, working-class identity offered by the skinhead style.
During this time, skinhead was mostly about style, an opportunity to embrace rugged
musical forms and a “foreign” (read seductive) subculture. Race was only implicidy impor
tant; in much the way that it was to the punks. The majority (but not aU) punks and
skinheads were white kids. Although pockets o f explicitly racist sentiments existed among
punks and the early skinheads, white power politics had yet to become a consistent point
o f convergence.

Punks and Racial Politics
“I ’m sorryfor something I didn’t do / lynched somebody but I don’t know who /
You blame mefor slavery / A hundredyears before I was born’’ (Minor Threat,
“Guilty o f Being White”)
The extent to which punkers’ self-consciously adopted a racist political identity is
subject to debate. Historians o f the punk subculture argue that, while punkers became
fascinated with the symbols o f Nazi Germany, they never adopted the politics o f the Nazi
ideology (Laing 1985; Hebdige 1979; Dancis 1978). According to Hebdige, “The signifier
(swastika) had been willfuUy detached from the concept (Nazism) ... [The swastika] was
exploited as an empty effect” (1979: 117). Hebdige (1979) and others strongly emphasize
the distinction between the appropriation o f symbols as a means to articulate a shock
value (i.e. the punk’s ideology o f “fuckyouism”) and an actual ideological and political
engagement with Nazism.
Although some punks detached the racist significance from the swastika, using it for
“shock value,” other punks articulated a “sincere” affinity for explicit racism and Nazi
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sympathies (Moore 1993). In fact, some skinheads became affiliated with the politics of
Nazism as punks long before they ever shaved their head. As Tom Metzger, founder o f the
White Aryan Resistance claims, “the punk rock scene was important for providing a racial
perspective, racialist punk rockers pre-dated skinheads in L.A.” (Tom Metzger Interview,
1/29/99). Similarly, a punk gang member notes the subcultural precedence for the forma
tion o f racist skinheads, “I f you look at early surfer history, like a lot of those guys from La
Jolla, they were really like Nazi punks who just happened to be surfers...there’s always
been this punk subculture in surfing....” (quoted in Spitz and Mullen 2001: P. 225)
If much o f this debate has centered on whether punks possessed actual Nazi affinities,
the problem with this question has been a tendency to treat Nazi sympathies synonymously
with racism. Equating racism with neo-Nazism has two polar effects. O n one hand, some
observers consider any example o f incongruence between Punk and Nazism as proof o f a
lack o f affinity (e.g. if we can’t convincingly demonstrate that punks consciously used
fascist symbols, then we can assume they were non-racist). On the other, in order to
demonstrate the pervasiveness o f punk racism, observers sometimes confuse any expres
sion o f racism as evidence o f Nazi sympathies. Treating the issue in this way ignores that
most racists are not Nazis (i.e. just because you are racist does not mean you are a Nazi) as
well as the fact that some people who tinker with Nazism are not committed racists. Some
argue that the punks who became skinheads had to undergo a “subcultural disengagement,”
or break from the punk scene before establishing a “racially oriented” skinhead identity
(Anderson 2001; Hamm 1993). The characterization of punk as “nonracist” and skinhead
as “racist” is overly simplistic and ignores how racist sentiments are transmitted and
solidified in changing subcultural forms. Racist skinheads were not so much the result o f a
“break” with punk, but more o f an extension and expansion of a complex system o f de
facto racism that permeated punk and early skinhead subcultures. While racism in the punk
subculture remained largely undeveloped and informal, punk was extremely important in
helping create a subcultural space for racist exposure, experimentation, and expression. The
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punk scene was important not simply as a point o f departure, but as site o f political
socialization. In this sense, the punk scene acted as a “cultural laboratory” for the
skinheads (Melucci 1996, 1989). One skinhead reflects on his exposure to white suprema
cist ideology and the primacy o f the punk subculture in his evolving “racial awareness”:
The first time I met Circle One was when I ran away from home to L.A. I
went to L.A. for maybe a month or two, just living with some punks. Circle
One took me in, they had a Circle One house. The first thing I remember
they gave me some white supremacist literature and set me up with some
friends and this was Hollywood, that’s how I first met them...(Skinhead
Interview b., 6/23/01).
Another skinhead explains how he learned about the racial aspects o f street culture
through his punk affiliation:
I had a girlfriend and one o f her friends was just getting out o f the ‘pen’
[penitentiary] and he was League and he moved in with me for a while, so
that’s how I started hanging around.. .he taught me a lot. N ot so much
about the political science o f racism, but the street aspects, you know, you
got your niggers here, your Mexicans here, how it works on the
street...(Skinhead Interview c., 5/29/00).
While this street philosophy was distinct from the structured racism that this latter
skinhead would ultimately learn, it provided an important foundation toward a thoroughly
racialized understanding o f the world. Far from a completely unorganized and incoherent
form o f racism, this street worldview recognized a system of racial status, characteristics,
and potential threat (e.g. if you want...go to the Mexicans, don’t do business with blacks
unless you have to; blacks will do this, while Mexicans will do this to you).
Nazi punks became pivotal to shaping the skinhead subculture toward an eventual
explicit embracing o f racist politics. These Nazi punks were “early risers” (Tarrow 1994)
who made opportunities for collective action visible that had otherwise not been evident.
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Many o f them helped skinhead gangs during fights with subcultural opponents and some
even helped with gang organization. Like the early skinhead gangs, most Nazi punks did
not, despite their name, embrace a structured fascist ideology, but instead articulated a
generic racism in response to their local experiences (neighborhood and school changes).
Nazi Punks were not a completely distinct type o f punk; they mingled freely and despite
their racist sentiments were undifferentiated from the larger punk subculture. A former
Nazi punk explains how they “fit” into the punk subculture:
Yeah people talked about Nazi Punks, but I don’t think it was very politi
cal, I think it was just, it’s hard to say. From one point o f view, it might
have been kind o f like the left commie faggot punks were just coming
down on us for being violent and not appreciating homos and not appreciat
ing nons [nonwhites] and stuff like that, so the just labeled us the Aryan
Mafia. But another aspect, too, there was a lot o f racism that was embed
ded into the movement into people like myself and with a lot o f other
people too that I knew...There was a point when a swastika went from just
being on a shirt with a bunch o f different symbols, early punk rock had
communist symbols, swastikas whatever, they used everything, it was big
mish-mosh and then yeah around 80-81, it went from that to where it
actually meant something because you had it by itself, then when you saw a
swastika on someone, it meant something (Skinhead Interview o., 10/12/

02).
This comment reveals that, while Nazi Punks were not especially active in racial
politics, they did provide an important example of explicit racism, and helped alter the
meaning o f previously ambiguous symbols. Nazi Punks thus helped shape the future
political direction that led to the development of racist skinhead gangs. Because the
skinhead style originated in England and provided a source of subcultural transmission, it
is important to briefly discuss the British origins o f the skinheads.
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T h e F oreign

Roots o f A m erica n Skinheads

The first wave o f British skinheads was one o f several working-class youth subcultures
that emerged in the post-World War II era, including the “teddys,” “rockers,” “mods,” and
“punks” (Hebdige 1979). Beginning in the rapidly deteriorating working-class neighbor
hoods o f London’s East End (Moore 1994), skinheads were initially characterized as an
attempt to “magically retrieve the sense o f community that the parent working-class
culture had lost” (Clarke 1976: 99). These first skinheads came o f age in the late 1960s at
the height o f various left-wing progressive and counter-cultural movements that were
sweeping the globe.
The early British skinheads were directly tied to specific neighborhoods (much like
many African-American and Hispanic gangs in the U.S.), class-conscious, and embraced
traditional notions o f masculinity. While they did not explicitly associate themselves with
Nazism, they were ardently nationalist in political orientation and fervently opposed to
foreign immigration, which was reflected by their affinity for violently attacking Pakistani
immigrants aka “Paki-bashing” (Hebdige 1979, Knight 1982). The first wave o f skinheads,
“were aware that they attended the worst schools, lived in the poorest districts, and had
the worst jobs with the smallest wages. They perceived hippies in the same way as they
viewed students, as idle layabouts living off the state” (Brake 1974: 188-190).
Although skinheads defined themselves along themes of nationalism, ultra-masculinity,
and working-class issues (e.g. lack o f economic opportunity, poor housing and neighbor
hood deterioration), they expressed political sentiments through stylistic imagery (Hebdige
1979). Toward this end, skinheads were described as creating a gross caricature o f the
working-class, “the look o f the cartoonist lumpen-worker” (Frith 1981: 219). Further, they
were not involved in traditional, organized political activities (e.g. unions, political parties,
marches etc.). However, some observers confuse a lack political involvement with a lack
of racist sentiments (c.f. Hebdige 1979; Cohen 1972). This is a mistake: “Paint House,”
one o f the first British skinhead gangs, listed, “Jews, young blacks, Pakistanis, and hippies”
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under their category “People on our Backs” (quoted in Moore 1993: 66). Clearly, many of
the early British skinhead gangs were racist; however, this racism was not as organized as
the Nazi ideology that developed later on. In this respect, the first wave o f British
skinheads o f the late 1960s resembled the first skinhead gangs in Los Angeles during the
early and mid 1980s. By the mid-1970s, the skinheads had all but vanished from the streets
o f England, giving way to other youth subcultural formations (e.g. the punks) (Knight
1982). The disappearance o f the skinheads was confirmed by the 1976 essay entitled,
“Beyond the Skinheads: Comments on the Emergence and Significance of the Glamrock
Cult,” which proclaimed that, “Students o f youth culture in Britain are agreed that the
skinheads are dead” (Taylor and Wall 1976: 43). By the mid 1970s, Britain witnessed the
emergence o f another youth subculture, the punks, who, Hke the earlier skinheads, were
responding to economic stagnation and declining employment opportunities. Bands like the
infamous Sex Pistols sang about “Anarchy in the U.K.” as part o f an assault on middle class
conventional values, as well as an expression o f deep frustration with a world that increas
ingly offered “no hope for your future.” However, punks did not share the skinheads’
puritanical adherence to an idealized vision o f the working-class or the desire to resurrect
an ultra-masculine ethos (Hebdige 1979). In spite o f their obituary, skinheads re-emerged
from the subcultural dustbin in the late 1970s and much o f this second wave tentatively
became associated with the U.K.’s extreme right-wing political party, the National Front
(N F )\
The British National Front (NF), saw the utility o f drawing disaffected skinhead youth
into their ranks. During the 1977 British elections, the NF actively recruited skinheads to
assist as security officers for National Front candidates (Anderson 2001). This recruitment
was the most important moment in politicizing British skinhead nationalism and anti
immigrant rhetoric. From this point forward, skinheads solidified a right-wing political
ideology. Just as important, they also developed an organizational affiliation that would
provide the foundation for the spread o f skinheads. British skinhead music became decid-
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edly more political and began to represent an identity based on racism. Veering away from
punk anarchism toward racist politics and a heavy metal hard rock sound, the British band
Skrewdriver hcc 2ime. the premier skinhead white power band (Moore 1993). Band founder
Ian Stuart Donaldson, became one o f the prime leaders developing connections with the
British National Front. Unlike the first wave o f skinheads which was confined to the U.K.,
this second wave spread beyond the British Isles and emerged in several other European
countries as well as North America.

More than Just a Shaved Head:
A Skinhead Identity Emerges
Although individual skinheads appeared on the American landscape in the late 1970s
(Moore 1993), these youths were submerged within the punk rock scene and a “skinhead
collective identity” had yet to form in any meaningful sense. In one form or another, most
o f the Southern California skinheads emerged from the punk subculture. These first
skinheads were experimenting with style and extending upon Hardcore punk trends. After
the splintering o f the League and several other punk gangs, local leaders from these organi
zations formed the first skinhead gang, the Northside Firm in late 1981 in Los Angeles
County. About a year later, the South Bay Skins (Los Angeles County), Fight For Freedom
(FFF) ^ a n Bernardino County), the Order Skins (Orange County) and the American Firm
(San Bernardino and Riverside Counties) were formed.
The first skinhead gangs were, as one early member put it, “identity groups;” skinhead
affiliation was represented through “identity markers” (shaved heads. Doctor Martin boots,
braces [suspenders], musical preferences, tattoos etc.). Adopting a “foreign” subcultural
style, early skinheads distinguished themselves from other youth subcultures and the
average or “square” adolescent. These skinheads began to consciously model themselves
after the British skinhead subculture that was now in its second wave. Music was central to
the global transmission o f the British skinhead style, and Los Angeles skinheads paid close
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attention to Britisli skinhead music bands like Sham 69, Skrewdriver, and the Pour Skins.
When naming the Northside Firm and the American Firm, Los Angeles skinheads were
inspired by their English counterparts who used the term firm on a regular basis. Early
skinhead identity was loose, unstructured, and dissolved quickly. Identity construction was
tied to social gatherings and specific spaces that were relatively unregulated, and allowing
for the innovation needed to create oppositional identities (Melucci 1996, 1989; Hirsch
1989). A long-time observer o f the skinhead culture explained the formation of skinhead
gangs as:
.. .pockets, it’s hard to describe, you get a few people from an area and a
few people from another. Huntington Beach had a core group that was
probably among the larger at the time and they jell around the core group
and go to crash pads here and go together and either party at that place or
go out some place. Another scenario is they would agree to meet at a
particular punk rock dance and develop ties during these events. (Law
Enforcement Interview d , 1/22/99)
Eventually, skinheads went from individual youths seeking an edgy, extreme style to
gangs organized around an ultra-aggressive posture. Skinhead gangs used ritual initiation
rites to establish membership, such as “jump-ins” (Vigil 1988) where a prospective
member’s “toughness” is “tested” by current members who encircle the new recruit and
beat him for at least 30 seconds and sometimes up to a couple minutes. Music, style,
drinking, fighting, and other non descript delinquent activity were the most prominent
interests o f these early skinheads. A skinhead in Los Angeles County describes the days, or
more importantly the nights, of skinhead gangs during the early 1980s,
at first mostly what we did was go to punk shows at the Olympic and fight,
heU we’d get into fifty fights a night three or four nights a week with any
body who wanted to try us ...N o we didn’t hang out with many skins in
O.C. (Orange County), we’d see 'em once in a while at shows and it’d be
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like Tiey bro, see ya around’ b u t that’s a b o u t it w e w eren ’t in regular co n ta ct

back then. (Skinhead Interview i., 7/16/99)
Despite the likely exaggeration o f the number o f fights per night, this comment reveals
several important characteristics about the early skinhead gangs. First, most violence was
not a product o f a specified political agenda; other subcultural participants provided
opportune targets who were often (although certainly not always) consensual participants
in the violence. Second, contact between skinhead gangs was minimal; these groups
included youths from a variety o f areas that coalesced around a specific locale (even if it
wasn’t where they lived) and began identifying with that group. Despite this varied geo
graphic distribution, neighborhood interests were important to the formation and persis
tence o f skinhead gangs.
Reflecting a tradition o f street gang culture that celebrates the marking o f turf,
skinhead gangs emulated these efforts albeit with much less success. The efforts to create a
“territorial imperative” could be seen in the choice o f skinhead gang names (e.g. Hunting
ton Beach Skins, Chino Hills Skins, South Bay Skins, Norwalk Skins etc.). They also
attempted to claim specific locations, such as parks by using graffiti “tags” and other more
physically aggressive means. Consider the following description (s) o f neighborhood “turf”
and the treatment o f perceived “outsiders” by Aaron, a Huntington Beach Skinhead:
INTERVIEWER: Do these names signify a territory they’re claiming or just
a name they’re claiming?
SKINHEAD: Yeah South Bay that’s over in L.A., Huntington that’s over in
Huntington, Chino Hills that’s over in Chino...
INTERVIEWER: In regards to territory if someone from a rival gang comes
into that territory do they protect that territory and how would they do that?
SKINHEAD: They tell 'em to leave only they wouldn’t do it that kindly
they’d usually beat that person up you know if it was someone from a gang
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we didn’t like say if a LAD member came into the territory in Huntington
Beach that LAD would get jumped. (Skinhead Interview h., 3/12/89)
and
One example was, one o f the parks in town for a while, the skinheads were
claiming it for territory and they’re just some regular kids [in the park], one
o f which had a plate in his head already. In the skinheads mind he commit
ted a serious trespass, in reality they [the regular kids] were unable to
protect themselves and they were easy targets so they [the skinheads]
stomped them pretty good. (Law Enforcement Interview d., 1/17/99)
These examples reveal that the skinheads resembled other street gangs in many ways,
including a penchant for expressive violence (Blee 2001; Yablonsky 1962) and a desire to
claim geographic areas as turf. Yet, another collective interest that would distinguish
skinheads was quickly gaining salience: the growing importance o f race to skinheads
signaled a change in the skinheads’ “racial formation” (Omi and Winnant 1994) from
episodic to consistent racism. This transition did not happen overnight, instead, it necessi
tated internal struggle that led to subcultural schism and conscious efforts to realize the
importance o f race.

Localized Skinhead Gangs: the Growing
Salience o f Racial Identities
During the 1980s racial, religious, nationalist, and cultural identities grew in impor
tance (Castells 1997; Bauman 1995). Skinheads embodied what CasteUs (1997) refers to as
“territorial identity” prevalent among new urban social formations. “ ...Suddenly defense
less against a global whirlwind, people stuck to themselves: whatever they had, and what
ever they were, became their identity...” (Castells 1997: 61). In a rapidly changing world
where traditional boundaries were increasingly obsolete, skinhead gangs began to embrace
race as an unshakeable marker. Race became their symbolic “el barrio,” although this type
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o f id en tity m arker d id n o t p hysically tie sk inh ead s to a particular “b lo c k o f street.” U sin g

race in this fashion provided greater physical mobility compared to traditional street gangs,
but also presented important dilemmas regarding recruitment and organizational bound
aries.
We don’t understand the skinheads’ organizational structure, a lot o f their
gangs pop up here one day, start recruiting, start to grow, commit a few
crimes and then they’re gone. This isn’t like other gangs we’re used to. They
don’t spend a lot o f time on the corner throwing signs or doing business.
They’re not as visible like that. They keep a pretty low profile for the most
part which helps them avoid us but they also have a hard time gaining
numbers, it’s hard for them to sustain their members or their stability. (Law
Enforcement Interview b., 3/29/99)
The result has been a curious mixture o f an identity grounded in a rigid adherence to a
racial epistemology, while simultaneously embracing a subculture that is highly flexible and
constantly changing. The remainder of this chapter will discuss the development of
skinhead racism.

Narratives o f Dispossession: Social Change
and Racial Conflict
Growing racialization was primarily catalyzed by skinhead grievances that were them
selves responses to changes occurring in the larger society. However, skinheads’ “folk
devil” (Cohen 1972) status has obscured some o f the motivating factors that led to their
increasing racialization, and has prevented a fuller understanding o f the effects o f these
external forces on skinheads’ racial sentiments. While research tends to portray skinheads
as dominated by violent and irrational tendencies (cf Hamm 1993; Moore 1993), skinhead
grievances and violence resemble a long tradition o f “normative” racial conflict in the U.S.
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Los Angeles skinhead gangs were reacting against a number o f trends they felt threat
ened by. First, increasing immigration was significantly altering California’s demographics.
Initially the skinhead response to these changes bore great resemblance to the kinds of
conflict that ethnic/racial migration spurred in New York and other large urban centers
only a few decades earlier (Schneider 1999; Suttles 1968). As Schneider explains regarding
New York gangs:
After World War II, the massive expansion o f African-American and Puerto
Rican communities redefined these conflicts, created unity among EuroAmerican groups around their “whiteness” and focused resentment on the
newcomers...while efforts by African-Americans to integrate New York’s
schools in the 1950s led to boycotts and threats of violence by EuroAmerican parents. (1999: P. 9)
Just a few decades later, a Huntington Beach Skinhead described in similar fashion the
conflict between skinheads and “nonwhites”:
The blacks we don’t like the blacks, we get along with some Chicanos, we
don’t like the Iranians the Pakistanis, Afghanistanis, we don’t like people these immigrants coming to our country that’s who we’re against...we didn’t
want them here, get them out if they moved into our neighborhood we
encouraged them to leave and they usually did...we would bum crosses uh
Molotov cocktails whatever it took. (Skinhead Interview h., 3/12/89,
[referring to the mid-1980s])
Other skinheads echo the effect o f immigration on skinhead formation:
Skinheads were generated by the third world immigration, the skinhead
movement is the voice from the street and trying to win their streets
back....(Skinhead Interview t., 1986)
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You had all these beaners and other muds coming in here and we didn’t
have a chance, jobs that should have been filled by white Americans were
getting taken away and given to illegals under the table....(Skinhead Inter
view i., 99)

[Orange County] was still predominandy white when I was a kid but my
parents moved out here in 73 from Chicago and it was pretty white you
know. It was right about the time they started shipping boat loads o f Viet
namese refugees over here and then the Hispanics, illegal aliens started
coming up in droves and you saw the neighborhoods, crime free white areas
go to non-white cesspools. (Skinhead Interview 1., 3/17/02)

These statements express the social and economic anxiety and the subsequent scape
goating that immigration waves often produce. Yet, skinhead perceptions o f this “social
problem” were not monolithic. The HB Skinhead expressed a certain level o f “tolerance”
for “some Chicanos,” while the American Front Skinhead puts Hispanics (“beaners”) at the
top o f his “shit list.” This reveals that skinhead ideology has important variations and is
not completely homogenous. In a city where Hispanic gangs greatly oumumber white ones,
those white gangs that “tolerate” Hispanics are far more likely to develop ties and even
alliances with a Hispanic gang. This interaction may eventually result in a “cross-over” of
membership. What is most curious about these types o f relationships is that they do not
necessarily spell an end to an allegiance to white supremacist beliefs.
For example, in the city and surrounding areas o f La Mirada (located in southern Los
Angeles County), the white supremacist skinhead gang. La Mirada Punk (LMP) began as a
multi-cultural gang (primarily white and Hispanic with a couple black members). However,
as racism became a stable feature o f the gang, the black members were purged (although
one who is in a leadership position remains), but Hispanic members were never removed.
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Today, LMP remains an active white supremacist gang with links to various other skinhead
gangs (some o f whom maintain a strict “whites only” policy of membership) and yet
retains one black leader and a membership that is 40 percent Hispanic (Law Enforcement
Interview i., 5/11/02).
Second, skinhead gangs provided refuge and protection from other subcultures. This
perceived need for protection also resulted from larger structural changes. Similar to
increasing immigration, skinhead gangs crystalized around the anxiety-provoking policies
surrounding busing, shifting neighborhood composition, and minority street gangs (see
Moore 1991). Each o f these were perceived to contribute toward heightened inter-racial
hostility and minority-generated aggression directed at white youths.
It’s first generation that’s really the first large scale generation that had to
grow up in these inner city schools. The gangs are beating them, robbing
them, raping them. The school authorities are making excuses but if the
whites turn around against the blacks or the Mexicans then it’s a hate crime.
So the white kids are saying shit, nowhere to urn, the parents wouldn’t even
listen to them, so they turned to people that would listen to them, cause we
were there. (Interview Tom Metzger 2/26/99)
Edward, a WAR Skin, offers his thoughts on the role of inter-racial conflict:
In my opinion non-white street gangs led to the rise of non-affiliated
(independent) skinheads. Many whites growing up in gang afflicted areas
become victims. After being victimized or feeling as if you are, it’s not a
huge step to begin to hate that tormentor and to soon begin to hate his
whole race....(Skinhead Interview n., 9/10/02)
This comment articulates sentiments widely shared among skinheads. Narratives depict
these threats in a range o f forms. Some o f these stories use direct personal experience to
illustrate how these threats immediately affected their safety and health, while others
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express these threats in relatively abstract terms. The former uses a “victim” status to help
explain the necessity o f skinhead gangs. From this vantage point, skinheads may be per
ceived as not only necessary, but a rational response to an environment that violates white
youths on the basis o f skin color. For example.
It sucked [living in South Gate, L.A. County], virtually every day I would
get in a fight. There was a group o f Mexicans in the neighborhood that I
would have to pass by their house where they would all hang out every day
on my way home and to and from school, and they would always give me a
bunch o f shit. ‘Hey white boy,’ this this this, take your bike, and I would
end up fighting every day. It sucked you know....(Skinhead Interview )., 6 /
16/02)

or
I wasn’t really prejudiced necessarily, except when I was getting in a fight of
course, in seventh grade I went to, I was living in La Habra [Orange County]
and like I said I wasn’t necessarily racial then but there was a lot o f fights
constantly with the Mexicans and there were niggers there too you know.
O f course when you get into a fight it comes out, ‘fuck you niggers,’ you
know, ‘fuck you beaners,’ you know, they are calling you ‘white boys,
fucking honky, white trash,’ Yeah, there was a lot o f fighting, the white kids
that ganged up on the fucken beaners were punk rockers back then. Punk
rockers were at the local high school and they would come down and they
would get into fights with the Mexican gangs, they would be stabbing each
other and all that kind o f shit you know what I mean. (Skinhead Interview
q., 7/22/01)
In another instance a skinhead explains his “racial awakening” in relation to how he saw
his white peers at school treated:
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I was barely 15 years old, white kids and white youth were being
harassed...and all the black music, the rap music and break dancing was in
and everybody wanted to be Negro. They [white kids] were ashamed of
their heritage, they were ashamed to be white you know and I just rejected
all that, ‘hey I’m proud o f my heritage and I’m proud to be white.’ I was the
extreme opposite o f what all these other white kids were doing and they
were cowering and they had no spines, it was my way of rebelling against
the liberal society. (Skinhead Interview 1., 3/17/02)
Some observers may dismiss these claims as simply “racist propaganda” without any
bearing on reality. For example, one former probation officer with expertise regarding
skinhead gangs argued that these claims were only excuses fueled after skinheads devel
oped ties with white supremacist organizations. According to this officer, skinheads con
cocted these “stories” to rationalize their views o f racial hatred. However, this ignores a
tradition o f “white” narratives that bespeak o f very similar experiences o f “racial victim
ization”. As the intellectual Irving Horowitz recalls during his days o f growing up in New
York during the 1940s:
We never walked through the side streets o f Harlem. We ran. Only along
the main thoroughfares...did we dare pause to walk” - “Interracial fights
were nearly a daily after-school occurrence until his parents finally decided
to move to Brooklyn, (quoted in Schneider 1999: Pp. 35-36 ).
Unlike the probation officer above, another skinhead gang specialist viewed the issue o f
minority street gangs and racial turmoil as important to the formation o f skinhead gangs:
Both o f those [minority street gangs and racial conflict at school] were
influential in developing the skinheads, we had other gangs here in town,
we had a quasi-Crip gang, some o f the [skinhead] motivations were revenge
against these gangs. That’s a common thing you see in school these days,
the racial aspect. The gangs were not on the scale o f LA by any means but
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they were enough to help with the genesis of the skinheads here... the kids
already in gangs would go to school and see all the nice stuff they had and
beat up the white kids, not that the white kids didn’t provoke it. (Law
Enforcement Interview d., 1/29/99)
Regardless o f the accuracy o f die stories depicting racial antagonism and violence
directed toward white youth, these narratives offer a powerful framework for explaining
why some individuals embraced the skinheads. From this perspective, the formation of
skinhead gangs was defensive in nature. “We [skinheads] were like a defense mechanism,
you had all these nons [nonwhites] moving in aU over southern California and we got sick
o f it, we saw everything our parents worked for going down the shitter, right down the
fucking drain” (Skinhead Interview a., 8/13/00). While the media fueled fears about the
threat o f Los Angeles street gangs (see Moore 1991), other sources o f threat were circu
lated through word-of-mouth networks and other informal channels o f communication.
This resembles Turner and Killian’s (1972) discussion o f “rumor” which characterized
communication in collective behavior. Rumor circulates information and is “the process
through which emergent norms develop to give direction to the activities o f the collectiv
ity” (P. 32). White youths used personal experiences, first-hand observation, and informa
tion channeled through rumor to assess potential risk factors, which in turn informed their
decisions about strategies for “self-defense”. This process was not purely intellectual, but
was significantly affected by strong emotional tides as well. Rumor provided information
along with an emotional framework to interpret it. Stories about a “gang” o f black students
beating a lone white student are more than “neutral” descriptions; they have an intended
emotional referent that makes the stories far more powerful.

Skinhead Organizational Characteristics
In contrast to some research which argues that skinhead gangs are largely unorganized
(Moore 1993), a more accurate characterization that reflects the complexity o f skinhead
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organization is captured by the notion o f labile. This term refers to social groupings whose
membership fluctuates frequently, creating relationships between members that are charac
terized by fleeting associations and coUage-like identities (Moore 1994). Skinheads form
and re-form their relationships as these dissolve quickly. This pattern o f association is
characterized by clusters o f close relationships amidst a sea of weaker ties, some o f which
are “bridging” and thus provide links between clusters. These clusters are what maintain
the skinhead identity and solidarity to interests that transcend specific group formations.
“Weak ties” (Granovetter 1973) describe the links in a network that are not rigidly
bounded and maintain fluid participation. These ties provide access to a wide array of
information and available resources through people beyond one’s “inner circle”. The lack
of loyalty that tends to typify “weak ties” provides subcultures with an important compo
nent in terms o f longevity o f groups. While weak ties may prevent greater cohesion, they
also diffuse conflicts. When a conflict occurs in a subculture marked by intense and strong
ties, people are forced to “take sides” as there is little room for “fence sitting,” but with
groups marked by weak ties, conflicts can be resolved through more creative resolutions
that are possible due to adaptability. For example, a gang like La Mirada Punk that is racist
in ideology, but multi cultural in membership creates spaces where racist discourse is
acceptable and other spaces where racist discourse is prohibited. Although members are
not tightly bound together nor are they especially loyal to each other, this flexibility seems
to be an effective organizational characteristic as the gang has existed for close to two
decades.
Skinhead core beliefs have grown unevenly precisely because o f the widespread and
decentralized development o f skinhead groups (Moore 1993). Far from homogenous,
skinhead gangs constitute a widely diverse subculmre with varying interests. Yet, inclusion
in the subculture is a bond that ties otherwise disparate organizational forms together. The
mere act o f defining oneself as a racist skinhead creates linkages, irrespective o f other
specificities. Similarly, the spaces shared by different skinhead organizations allow for the
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d e v e lo p m e n t o f friend sh ip ties that o fte n p ro v e stron ger than th e d esire for id eo lo g ica l

continuity. In some cases, a single skinhead gang may represent this significant diversity by
drawing members from incongruent organizations and even disparate demographic back
grounds. For example, the skinhead gang Crossfire was formed by renegades from several
other skinhead gangs including the South Bay Skinheads, the WAR Skins, and the Ameri
can Front. The first wave o f Crossfire started around 1992 and had about 40 skinheads,
while the second wave had about a dozen members. One o f the key leaders, “Spider” was
“half black” and a former South Bay Skinhead, however Crossfire members later accused
him o f theft and scraped his tattoos off with a razor after severely beating him. After that,
African-Americans were no longer allowed in the gang. Crossfire was ninety percent white,
and the remaining members were Hispanic. Most of the Crossfire members went to prison
in 1994 after a “slew o f random violence that finally caught up to us” (Skinhead Interview
t. 8/03/00). After being released from prison in 1998, two o f the core members tried to re
organize Crossfire. They recruited several skinhead youths, each o f whom received
Crossfire tattoos, however, several leaders were sentenced to prison following an incident
o f gang violence that resulted in attempted murder charges. Shortly after this. Crossfire
disbanded.
Despite some skinhead efforts at creating a territorial imperative, they were much less
successful than traditional street gangs, where sentiments attached to turf sometimes
extend across two or three generations (Moore 1993). As one skinhead characterized this
issue: “For a while, skins did some o f the gang territory thing, but we quickly realized that
a more political stance was more effective and could help us achieve our goals and that
fighting over some street you don’t even own is pretty stupid (Skinhead Interview a., 2 /
19/99). Seth refers to a process o f politicization that seemed to mitigate the need or desire
for territory, offering the powerful possibility o f identifying with a globally united Aryan
race. His comment also reveals the importance o f structural constraints and the effects
these have on group formation. Part and parcel o f skinhead politicization was a growing
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racialization: a worldview where racism was not simply “common sense,” but part o f an
intricate explanation o f the social world. As skinheads became politicized, their identity
became more structured and their racism radicalized. In this sense, race was propelled to
the core o f the skinhead identity, serving as a symbolic anchor. Over time, the centrality of
race resulted in a transition from various forms o f style as identity markers toward a
committed form o f “lifestyle politics”. This transition dialectically combined skinhead
involvement in traditional political activism (marches, rallies, etc.) and increasing racial
antagonism.
Early skinhead gangs contained the seeds for both political and economic gangs, as
racism and Nazism existed, but was far more episodic. Over time, race changed from an
implicit and loosely guarded reservoir to an explicit and narrowly defined identity marker.
In addition, some early skinhead gangs were involved in illegal drug use and smalltime
distribution, while others were involved in a whole host o f non-specialized criminal activi
ties (e.g. petty theft, burglaries). Eventually these elements developed into relatively
organization criminal enterprises.
In this chapter I discuss the first phase in the early formation o f skinheads and their
genesis toward social gangs, which began around 1978 and lasted until about 1984. I argue
that stylistic interests were the primary impetus for the first skinheads. The Hardcore punk
trend and punk gangs influenced the transition from style to social gangs, where skinheads
were bonder by organizational affiliations, ritual initiation rites, and participation in non
specialized criminal activity. Skinhead social gangs protected their turf and engaged in a
pattern o f conflict with other gangs, law enforcement, and the general community. From
the beginning, whiteness was important to skinhead identity but not their raison d'hêtre.
Early skinheads emphasized the importance o f “subcultural affiliation” which was in
formed by a broader notion o f ethnic/racial suitability for participation. While early
skinhead gangs incorporated some elements of racism, many also included Hispanic
members and occasionally an African-American member. During the first phase, skinheads
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h eld a range o f racial v iew s, b u t o n e o f the m o s t im portan t w as th e p erc ep tio n that w h ite

youth needed to defend themselves from minority street gangs. This perception would help
facilitate the transition toward skinhead political gangs that I discuss in the next chapter.
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Notes
' This discussion o f punk is not intended to be comprehensive as I am only emphasizing
certain aspects that are related to the skinheads. For research that concentrates on the
punks see Hebdige 1979; Dancis 1978; Marcus 1989.
^ See Wood 1999 for a similar argument regarding the emergence of the skinhead phenom
enon across North America.
^ This style typically includes creased Khakis or denim jeans (a hold over from detention
center clothing), plaid dress shirts sometimes worn with only the top buttons fastened,
white t-shirts, pants are often worn “baggie style” also known as “sagging,” and sometimes
bandannas or hairnets are worn over the head (see Vigü 1988: 109-113).
The topic o f the “Suicidais” like punk gangs in general is worthy o f a study specifically
focusing on this topic. The Suicidais first developed in Los Angeles County and were
multi-ethnic, however another Suicidal set developed in Orange County (OCST) and were
exclusively white and extremely racist. Interestingly though they were also extremely anti
skinhead and in frequent conflict with various skinhead gangs.
^ For research on the N F see BiUig 1978.
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CHAPTERS

POLITICIZATION
The biggest impact [of the skinheads] is scaring the hejesus out of the anti racist
groups. It has shown the groups like Anti-Dfamotion League and the government
itself that we are capable of attracting si^ble numbers ofyouth to our cause which is
obviously something thatfrightens them very much (Metzger interview 9/26/00)

I f there’s afuture for the right wing, [skinheads] will be the first racial wave. They’re
what N a fi stormtroopers were in the early ‘20s (Robert Miles quoted in
Klanwatch, Decade o f Review, 1980s)

[Skinheads are] certainly prepared to do their part to bring a new social order to
America... (Spotlight 1986)

This chapter analyzes skinhead politicization, a phase spanning from 1983-1994. By
politics, I mean the use o f intrigue or strategy to gain power. The transitional process
toward the use o f politics is what I refer to as politicization, which includes adopting a set
of political ideas that were expressed through new forms o f talk (e.g. the Z O G discourse)
and participation in various types o f political activism (e.g. marches, leafleting, and rallies).
Politicization diminished the importance o f previous interests such as territoriality, by
introducing relatively abstract notions o f space (e.g. state power as opposed the neighbor-
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hood) (Brotherton 1999). I argue that politicization stemmed from two sources: (1) internal
changes in the skinhead subculture and (2) external network links to adult white suprema
cist organizations (e.g. White Aryan Resistance (WAR), Aryan Nations (AN), Ku Klux
Klan). These sources helped generate one o f the skinhead subculture’s most important
changes: the increasing salience o f race as a core component o f members identity. The
culmination o f this process was an indigenous organizational development: the
Hammerskin Nation (HN). Changes in organizational form also corresponded with new
racialized political practices. I conclude this chapter with a discussion o f the damaging
criminal and civil trials that targeted the White Aryan Resistance (WAR) in 1988 and 1989.
Along with policing efforts, these trials ultimately encouraged a type o f “strategic abey
ance” (Simi and Futrell 2002) where skinheads maintained ideological allegiance and
network relations without highly visible public displays o f activism. I argue that this move
toward covert resistance remains a potent strategy for sustaining collective identity, but
with important limitations for public-level mobilization.
As I illustrate in chapter 4, the early skinheads were stylistic innovators directly tied to
the punk subculture. Influenced by Hardcore, punk gangs, and a splintering punk subcul
ture in the late 1970s and early 1980s, skinheads became an increasingly distinct subcul
tural formation. Skinhead subcultural autonomy led to the formation o f social gangs, not
unlike some o f the white gangs o f the 1950s in New York, Chicago and Los Angeles that
coalesced around the desire to defend “racial territories” (Schneider 1999; Davis 1993;
Short and Strodtbeck 1976; Suttles 1968'). It is possible that had skinheads never encoun
tered adult white supremacist organizations, they would have remained white gangs that
were comparable to the history of gang conflict infused with racial antagonism. Like these
earlier white gangs, the skinhead’s sense o f racial territoriality was initially a result o f local
struggles and did not include a broader interest in national or global affairs.
Beginning in the mid 1980s, skinhead racism began changing from episodic to consis
tent and within a couple years this change had become pervasive. Along with changes in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

88

sk inh ead racism , claim s to lo c a l territory w ere b e c o m in g irrelevant as org a n iza tio n s su ch as

White Aryan Resistance nurtured a “Pan-Aryan” philosophy that concentrated upon racial
boundaries as opposed to geographic ones. The wide-scale adoption o f the name “WAR
Skins” reflected skinhead gangs' de-territorialization, as WAR Skins were active in multiple
counties across Southern California. Related to this de-territorialization, skinheads discov
ered the “ZO G discourse” (Kaplan and Bjorgo 1998). This new ideological current was a
major impact in creating a new racial formation, which sought to link racial activists across
the globe by a unity belief in a Zionist conspiracy to wipe out the white race. This ideo
logical change partly included embracing Nazism, a move that helped catalyze skinhead
political activism. During the initial formation o f skinhead gangs, race was situationaUy
important. When local neighborhood boundaries were crossed, skinheads drew upon racist
sentiments to enforce a racial status quo built upon a local and national tradition o f visible
segregation in Los Angeles and across the United States (Tischauser 2002; Bonilla-Silva
2001; Davis 1993). Although race was clearly important, it had yet to become a “collective
action frame” (Snow and Benford 1992; 138) that provided a clear identification o f prob
lems and whom to direct grievances toward.
As racism became central to the skinhead identity, skinheads became less concerned
with claiming territory. Skinheads were building a collective identity that extended beyond
the local neighborhood, and increasingly rested upon a globalizing racial discourse epito
mized by the theory o f ZOG. For some skinheads this translated into support for creating a
white homeland (e.g. the Northwest Imperative^), while others embraced relatively abstract
“utopian” visions o f a “race war, racial cleansing, and death to ZOG.” Skinhead gangs
concretized these ideas with “catchy” slogans emblazoned on pamphlets and stickers
including: “White Revolution is the only Solution” and “Get Out! Jew Pig!” (Anti-Defama
tion League 1988). Still other skinheads felt a large-scale, non-violent “white resistance”
that abolished affirmative action, gay rights, and other programs associated with liberal,
multi cultural ideals would at least stem the tide. Brotherton’s (1999) study of
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politicization among New York City gangs also notes how politicization alters the salience
o f a gang’s interests: “As they build their organizations into nations, the pertinence of
parochial boundaries is lessened. As a result, the members and leadership tend to have a
much broader vision o f their organization’s aims” (84).
The increasing virulence o f skinhead racism marked the transition from social gangs to
political gangs. The emerging ties between skinhead gangs and older white supremacist
organizations helped facilitate this change. With this in mind, I aim to answer the following
questions in this chapter: how did the skinheads become politicized? More specifically,
what were the factors that enabled politicization and what were the effects of
politicization on the skinhead subculture? As discussed in chapter 2, the politicization of
gang subcultures is a relatively unexplored question.
By the mid 1980s, skinhead gangs were becoming increasingly political, a trend which
included a radicalization o f their racism. As a result, skinhead gangs began a process of
“racial purging,” and o f narrowing what constitutes whiteness. As racism became a consis
tent element o f the skinhead identity the few black skinheads and the slightly larger
number o f Hispanic skinheads and other “non-white” skinheads were “asked to leave.”
Skinheads became increasingly aware o f and sensitive to consolidating gangs around a
narrower conception of whiteness. Purges coincided with increasing contact between
skinheads and domestic and international white supremacist groups as well as changes in
skinhead beliefs. Skinheads justified the purges as a rational choice resulting from negative
experiences with minorities, leading to a realization that minorities were simply not suitable
to affiliate with.
However, the purges were never completed entirely and they raised questions about the
efficacy of restricting the pool o f potential recruits by narrowing the racial criteria for
membership. Purging also resulted in asking core members to exit because o f new rigid
membership guidelines, yet the bonds o f pre-existing relations were often stronger than the
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impetus to “purify” the ranks. For example, in the summer of 1987, a Los Angeles Times’
article featured the Huntington Beach Skins (HB Skins), who were quoted as saying.
We’re American children. We’re not wetbacks or blacks or nothing like that.. .we
formed because we wanted some unity. We don’t like people invading our territory. When
you live in HB (Huntington Beach), it’s considered more high-class than Long Beach and
stuff and a lot o f gangs come down here and want to move in on us. We write our name on
a wall and they cross us out. That’s when it starts (quoted in the Los Angeles Times, 1/3 0 /
87).
Ironically, one of their core members, “Pee Wee” was Hispanic, a holdover from the days
when skinhead gangs were accepting o f some Hispanic members. Huntington Beach Skins
had purged several other Hispanics, but “Pee Wee” was a long-time member and a leader.
His heritage was overlooked in order for the HB Skins to maintain a semblance o f group
unity.

The Transition toward Politics, 1984-1989
Typically, the skinhead transition toward racist politics is explained as part o f a fascist
conspiracy to infiltrate white youth culture (see Wood 1999). Proponents o f this view
argue that until far-right political organizations made a concerted effort to recruit them, the
skinheads were unremarkable in terms o f racial sentiments. Accordingly fascist organiza
tions used youths who were already far-right adherents and “planted” them in the punk and
skinhead scene, instructing them to recruit others who might be attracted to a racist
program. This account bears remarkable resemblance to the theory o f “outside agitators”
that was used to explain the emergence o f the Civil Rights Movement and more recendy
the growth and diffusion o f urban street gangs (Hagedorn 1988). For example. Skinheads
Against Racial Prejudice (SHARPs) argue, “racists are a splinter group who pervert the
skinhead way o f life” (Wood 1999:139).
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The explanation o f outside agitators and “untrue” skinheads implies greater distance
between racists and anti-racists gangs than actually exists (Blazak and Wooden 2001).
Further, this explanation also ignores the evidence suggesting that high levels o f tolerance
toward different skinhead factions marked the skinhead subculture. During this time, their
most important characteristic was shared subcultural affiliation. Interestingly, as discussed
in chapter four, my research indicates that one o f the first anti-racist skinhead gangs in Los
Angeles was a splinter from the Northside Firm, which was a gang that combined a variety
o f racial sentiments, including racist beliefs. The splintering of the Northside Firm pro
duced a host o f branches, some o f which were political and racist and others that
struggled against racism.
Opponents o f racist skinheads may find comfort in explanations that attribute this
phenomenon to individuals outside o f their respective communities. While bits and pieces
o f these accounts may have some truth, they are over-simplistic. Further, these explana
tions ignore the relationship between external and internal group dynamics, resulting in
mechanistic theories o f racial formation. My approach emphasizes the complexity o f
subculturual development and the effects o f both internal and external dynamics on the
mobilization o f racial sentiments.
By the mid-1980s, the skinhead subculture was changing and many skinhead gangs
were taking a “political turn.” This process o f politicization included subcultural changes
in terms o f beliefs, practices, and organizational form. During this time, various larger and
adult-based white supremacist organizations began recruiting skinheads (Dobratz and
Shanks-Meile 1997). Some claim this strategy reflected more established organizations’
hopes to use skinheads as “foot soldiers” in the “battle to save the white race” (Intelligence
Report 1997; ADL 1995, 1989). However, skinhead gangs did not universally agree that a
close relationship with white supremacist organizations was the most appropriate route.
Some skinhead gangs viewed these efforts as manipulative, while others were uninterested
in participating in traditional political activism (e.g. leafleting, marches etc.). Nonetheless,
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many skinhead gangs developed ties with domestic and international white supremacist
organizations, and such alliances constitute a crucial milestone in the career o f skinhead
gangs.
Early Los Angeles skinheads were stylistic innovators. Like skinheads all over the
globe, they were influenced by the cultural diffusion generated by a British youth style.
During the initial formation, international links were almost exclusively the province of
isolated attempts at using the skinhead style to create a new and different signature within
a stagnant punk scene. Individual youths would hear about the “new” style in England
from friends who had just returned from the U.K. to California or more frequently, would
see a British skinhead band’s album cover in a music “zine” depicting the skinhead style
(see also Moore 1994; Moore 1993). Although organizations or groups with a specific
political intention did not purposefully engineer these encounters, these elements provided
seeds that were necessary for the skinheads’ move from a stylistic trend to social gangs.
Experimentation with new styles led to conflicts with other subcultural participants
and authorities, each of which served to reinforce the allure of the skinhead identity. Like
Hagedorn’s (1988) study o f African-American gangs in Milwaukee who began as breakdancing groups, skinhead gangs started as youths who coalesced around Hardcore music
and the social spaces where live music shows occurred. The fierce rivalries that developed
among these break-dancing groups emerged as a result o f the fights that often occurred
after dancing competitions. Skinheads fought with punks and each other, which helped
them achieve a sense o f purpose beyond stylistic experimentation. Such conflict produced
an awareness o f the distinction between “us” and “them” and developed a sense o f soli
darity. While Hagedorn’s gangs were born on the street corner where “break-offs” typically
took place, skinhead gangs were born in the venues that allowed these Hardcore bands to
play. This difference helps explain the skinhead’s tendency toward transience. These
venues were often closed down and the consistency o f shows varied greatly. There was
little available space for skinheads to adopt as their own, leaving many to wander about
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lo o k in g fo r oth er p ock ets o f skinheads and th e n ex t m u sic show . D e s p ite this instability,

skinhead gangs attempted to claim turf in their local neighborhoods such as parks and
other hangouts.
Eventually, as enough southern California youth (although still a relatively small
minority) experimented with this style, the skinhead became a recognized fixture in the
punk subculture. By the early 1980s, skinheads were no longer isolated pockets submerged
within the punk subculture; but had emerged as a distinct subculture o f social gangs. If the
transition from stylistic innovation to social gangs marked a significant change, the
skinhead gangs were about to experience another important development. Soon skinheads
would become known for more than their shaved head and aggressive dancing, they would
become unequivocally associated with far-right politics and an explicit endorsement of
neo-Nazism. Exactly how did this transition occur and was this transition pervasive, as
many observers claim, or was it only partial? Did all o f the skinhead gangs that came to
embrace explicit racism and elements o f neo-Nazism also embrace political activism? Was
the radicalization o f skinhead racism synonymous with becoming political or are these
separate processes? If these processes are autonomous, in what ways are they linked
together?

International Links
The concept o f “linkage” provides insight regarding the concrete ties that influenced
the generation o f political skinhead gangs. Weinberg (1998) uses this concept in his expla
nation for the recent revival o f adult right-wing extremism in Western Europe and the
United States. Linkage includes two components, emulation and penetration. Emulation
involves a group or organization in one country copying the name, style, strategies and
organizational structure o f an organization in another country. N o direct communication
need take place for emulation to occur. Emulation bears resemblance to stylistic innova
tion, except that it includes a purposive political intent that innovation does not. Examples
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o f emulation include American groups adopting neo-Nazism or European racists designat
ing their group as the Ku Klux Klan. Penetration involves direct contact between members
o f groups from different countries. Examples include Tom Metzger’s visits with the British
National Front or more recently the German white power music band, Radikall’s “tour” of
the U.S. where they spent time associating with the Aryan Nations, Hammerskins and
various other American white supremacist organizations (Simi and Brents 2002). Resulting
from either emulation or penetration, linkage depends upon conscious efforts in order to
stimulate greater mobilization or organization.
While penetration was less common than emulation during the 1980s, in recent years,
this pattern has begun to change, with decreasing costs of international communication.
Today, skinhead organizations from countries across the globe are able to consistendy
communicate with each other via the Internet, faxes, cell phones, and face-to-face contact.
In the mid 1980s, as Southern California skinheads became increasingly familiar with the
connection between British skinheads and the National Front, they began emulating the
National Front’s politics. The British racist skinhead band, Skrewdriver, was one of the
most important mediums that presented National Front politics. Skrewdriver was a house
hold name among Los Angeles skinheads and their articulation o f racist politics and neofascism was unequivocal with song titles like “Nigger, Nigger.” Skrewdriver provided a
model for southern California skinheads who saw the band’s open denouncement of
foreign immigration and fearless affirmation o f whiteness as refreshingly bold.
...I remember the first time I heard Skrewdriver, every skinhead can tell
you about that, it was a bootleg o f a bootleg o f a bootleg, the sound wasn’t
worth shit, but it was still magical, it was instantaneous - you felt some
thing, you could hear the pride in his voice.. .after that, we all wanted to be
like Skrewdriver, we really started paying closer to the political aspects you
know not just the style and music; that was only part of it. We realized that
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w e n eed ed to start ed u catin g o u rselv es m o re a b o u t N a tio n a l Socialism and

our white heritage

(Skinhead Interview k., 7/14/00)

Los Angeles skinheads’ desire to model themselves after their British counterparts also
influenced their selection o f “enemies” and organizational names. As Los Angeles
skinheads began developing a consistent set o f racist beliefs and practices, they borrowed
one o f the British skinheads’ most widely known characteristics: “distaste” for Pakistanis
(Hebdige 1979). By the mid-1980s when Los Angeles skinheads were asked about their
grievances, they often referred to the “problem” o f Pakistanis:
We’re here to save our land from all this nonwhite invasion.. .they’re pour
ing the Pakis in and the niggers and trying to mix all the colors. (Skinhead
Interview u., 1986)
and
They’re coming from everywhere and it makes me sick to see it, I just get
sick...the spies, niggers, the Pakis, all of 'em just keep comin.’ (Skinhead
Interview t., 1986)
White racism in the United States is typically associated with anti-black sentiments (Blazak
and Wooden 2001; Blee 1996; Wellman 1993). While this has certainly been the case in
southern California (Davis 1990), the large proportion o f Hispanics has also meant that
they too become a target o f white racism (Almaguer 1994). Yet, skinheads were routinely
mentioning “Pakis” in addition to these other more familiar “foes”. Although this may
seem relatively insignificant, it reveals that skinheads were borrowing an ideological facet
that otherwise had little direct relevance in their own lives, and using it to support notions
o f a “non-white invasion”. This ability to make sense o f and use “foreign” ideological
trends was especially helpful when skinheads were introduced to the “theory” o f ZOG.
Blee (2002) argues that when racists become active in the white supremacy movement,
they have little previous knowledge regarding anti-Semitism. Since the ZO G theory is
premised on the idea that an international “cabal” of Jews intend to eradicate the white
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race, less ideologicaUy-experienced skinheads needed to learn how to interpret rapid social
changes, that at times, seemed to disfavor middle and working-class white males as a result
of a “Zionist conspiracy”. Skinheads' ability to incorporate the ZO G myth into their
repertoire proved an important development in their growing politicization. Thus, borrow
ing the British Skinheads’ resentment o f “Pakis” helped prepare skinheads for their later
adoption o f ZOG. As a former skinhead explains it, the eventual adoption o f the ZO G
myth facilitated by their hatred against various groups: “By the time most of us found out
about ZOG, we were already so angry and filled with hate, it made sense to extend it some
more and start really focusing on the so-called root o f evil you know, we ate it u p ...”
(Skinhead Interview c., 6/25/02).
Another example o f the Los Angeles skinheads’ emulation of the British skinheads was
their usage o f the term “firm.” Some o f the British skinheads used this term to identify
themselves as followers o f particular soccer clubs. In some cases, these firms were associ
ated with the widely publicized acts o f “hooligan” violence (Buford 1992). Similar to the
punk gangs that formed around music bands, British skinhead gangs often formed around
sports teams (Moore 1993)^. With a U.S. sporting culture that had little resemblance to
England’s, Los Angeles skinheads adopted the term, but emphasized its subcultural aspect,
and tied it directly to skinhead life. “Oh yeah, back then the firm thing from England was
the big thing, everyone wanted to name their group like that, you know, Northside Firm,
American F irm ...” (Skinhead Interview d., 4/17/01). Again, we see how Los Angeles
skinheads imported and emulated facets o f the British skinhead culture.
Although direct contact with international sources was less frequent, there were some
important exceptions. Contacts with international white supremacist groups were inten
tional efforts to mobilize youth and helped skinheads organize around racial politics. These
contacts solidified the emulative efforts o f skinhead gangs by providing face-to-face
relations and practical advice on organizational issues. For example, the following is a
description o f how a collection o f racist punks and skinheads mutated into the American
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Front. In the spring o f 1984, at a house party in West Covina (southeastern Los Angeles
County), a recruiter from Britain’s National Front Party and Bob Heick, the organizer of
San Francisco’s American Front, encouraged local youths to organize a southern Califor
nian-based American Front (AF). Shortly thereafter, about twenty punks and skinheads in
Los Angeles County began holding regular meetings as well as adopting uniforms to iden
tify their new organizational affiliation. N ot completely original, the American Front began
wearing brown shirts to mark their presence. The affiliation with the National Front helped
these skinheads re-orient themselves to a new organizational model.
That’s what got us all thinking we needed to do something.. .when we
talked with the recruiter from the NF, he gave us, talked to us about ideas
on how to get new members involved and how to organize ourselves. He
helped direct us in the ways o f fascism, I mean we were already racial, but
none o f us knew much about politics or anything and when the N F sat
down and talked with us, he stressed reading Hitler, learning about Euro
pean history that kind o f thing....(Skinhead Interview i., 8/9/99)
Troy’s description reveals how international links helped forge new identities that ex
pressed the importance o f integrating racial and political sentiments. Simply rebelling
through style and music were no longer considered enough. Further, international contacts
were helping Los Angeles skinheads learn to incorporate European-born elements such as
Nazism to expand their organizational interests. Skinheads used these lessons to re-define
their interest in race beyond local or even national borders, an effort that became critical to
the organization o f political gangs. The National Front advised these skinheads and
warned about the destructive potential that “non-white” immigration poses for national
and racial “integrity”. “They told us what happened over there [the U.K.] with aU the
fuckin’ Pakis...and that we needed to fight off the illegals over here” (Skinhead Interview
k, 8/9/9?).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

98

Early organizers o f the AF indicate that a rapid increase in non-white populations,
such as Hispanics (via immigration) and African-Americans (via school busing programs)
devastated what was previously a predominantly white working and middle-class “en
clave.” According these accounts, such an increase led to a proliferation o f “non-white”
gangs and other social problems, leaving white youths litde choice but to organize them
selves as proto-typical vigilantes committed to “cleaning up their community.”
In that a major increase o f multi cultural integration, we get the riots in ‘68
and before that we get multi cultural relationships, black and white people
getting together, you know, free love, you know love is blind, this shit...so
something had to be done, we couldn’t keep having that kinda shit every
where so we started organizing, we met with the NF [National Front] and
listened to their ideas and started having our own meetings, talking about
what we needed to do around our community to get things cleaned u p .. .We
would see people spray painting we would beat them up and then we would
get it off the wall.. .we were dealing with the minor crimes, spray painting,
graffiti, gang fights.... (Skinhead Interview p., 6/21/00)
While these social changes Josh mentions made many people uncomfortable, most did
not actively pursue efforts to counter them. Josh offers a glimpse at one o f the factors
crucial to understanding how the American Front became politicized. The British National
Front served as a mentor to these Angelino youth, helping them realize the potential that
collective action holds in confronting social forces. Holding certain ideas or grievances is
itself not enough to generate collective action (McCarthy and Zald 1973). Network ties
have consistently been shown to be one o f the most significant factors in explaining how
individuals come to participate in social movement activity (McAdam 1988, 1982; Snow,
Zurcher, and Ekland-Olsen 1980). The direct international contacts that helped build
these networks may have been infrequent, but the British National Front’s efforts were
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aided by the music o f Skrewdriver. This indirect international contact helped crystallize the
National Front’s politics for a younger generation across the Atlantic.
We started listening to bands like Screwdriver. We’d listen to the music. It was
extremely violent and it was about white power. So that was our influence
and then other racial groups started giving us literature and we just adopted
the white power philosophy and started kicking the Hispanic kids out of
the group. And then our targets became the minority gangs - Mexican gangs
and black gangs. (Skinhead Interview j., 3/22/01)
This quote illustrates Los Angeles skinheads’ emulation o f the British skinheads through
the medium o f music bands, such as Skrewdriver. International culture and organizations
encouraged political formation, which in turn led skinheads to sharpen their focus on race.

Domestic Links
Far more predominant than international links during the mid and late 1980s, network
ties to the U.S. white supremacy movement provided skinheads with invaluable political
socialization. Before forging these ties, skinhead gangs were racist, but not politically
active. For example, the Order Skins embraced a racist ideology, but never participated in
any traditional forms o f political activity. By 1984, the Order Skins’ numbers were growing
through the consolidation of other smaller skinhead gangs, yet remained primarily con
cerned with claiming turf and fighting rival gangs. However, their organizational strength
quickly began to weaken as much o f their core membership splintered due to drug use and
incarceration. As a core member who avoided these problems described it, “all the older
guys were getting busted, going to prison, getting into drugs, things just started to fall apart
and go in directions that we didn’t want to be part o f...” (Skinhead Interview o., 11/17/

02X
In the wake o f a crumbling infrastructure, several Order Skins were trying to develop a
new organization. Before the Order Skins completely fragmented, one member received
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W h ite A ryan R esistan ce (W AR) literature o n h is fam ily’s fron t p o rch . H is fam ily’s h o m e ,

like all o f the other homes in the area were flooded by a WAR literature drive. A dialogue
about w a r ’s political agenda ensued between a few of these Order Skins and soon they
arranged a meeting with Tom Metzger in Fallbrook (just south o f Los Angeles). In this
instance, WAR’s recruiting effort was successful; in 1986, these skinheads began to orga
nize themselves under a new banner and with the direct assistance from WAR. They called
themselves the WAR Skins and were based around the cities o f Orange, Fullerton, and
Anaheim'*.
The emergence o f the WAR Skins marked a turning point in the skinhead subculture.
The insularity that typified earlier skinhead gangs had given way to a trend toward links
between skinhead gangs and adult white supremacist organizations. This was a major
accomplishment, as struggles ensued between both sides challenged the efficacy o f this
relationship. Some skinheads felt that a relationship with WAR or other white supremacist
organizations would lead to internal conflict and division among skinheads:
You know one thing that pisses me off about the Skinhead Movement in
the last few years is that my comrades are all sucking up to these ‘Move
ment Politicians’. I’m talking about people like Metzger, Butler, Miles,
etc...! That is causing a lot o f stupid turmoil between Skins because of
influence from these older Racists who have been fighting each other over
stupid reasons for years. (California skinhead quoted in Kaplan 1995: Pp.
73-74)
Simultaneously, some adult members o f white supremacist organizations questioned the
reliability o f these young “punks” who just “wanted to get drunk and cause trouble” (see
also Anti-Defamation League 1988). Despite some degree of conflicting sentiments,
significant efforts on both sides were invested to create these alliances. While skinheads
and adult racists created links that eventually became pervasive, they were never complete.
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I will explore these “loose ends” in the next chapter, but for now we wül concentrate on
how these ties were built and their effects on the skinhead subculture.
Some observers (c.f. Hamm 1993) tend to overstate the importance o f Tom Metzger’s
White Aryan Resistance in recruiting skinheads into the white supremacist movement. For
example, Hamm neglects the earlier indigenous skinhead gangs that existed before WAR’s
contact with skinheads. Metzger was doubtlessly important to the skinheads’ development.
When the Order Skins fragmented and reformed as the WAR Skins, Tom Metzger had
already been communicating with skinheads for a year. Friends working with the National
Front in the U.K. convinced Metzger that skinheads were ripe for organizing. As one WAR
correspondent put it, “The race movement was blessed with a miracle [the punk move
ment] in the late ‘70s but we let it slip between our fingers.. .and if we blow this miracle
[the skinheads] we don’t deserve to survive” (quoted in Moore 1993: 90). The associations
with the National Front led Metzger to contact British skinheads via mail. Aided by TV.
appearances, leafleting, a computer bulletin, “word o f mouth,” and his tape-recorded
phone hotline; by the mid-1980s, Los Angeles skinheads had become aware of Metzger. As
Metzger’s reputation for “representing white people” grew, he began receiving letters and
phone calls from frustrated white kids,
who came from middle and working-class backgrounds and were getting the
heU beaten out of ‘em at school, where they had become the minority. I told
them organize, if you’re in a school and being screwed by the gangs then
you’re going to have to organize your own and if you have to walk home
with a half a dozen guys, you gotta do it. Your parents won’t help you,
school won’t help you, then it’s survival of the fittest. (Interview Tom
Metzger, 2/20/99)
For example, the following is one o f the letters Metzger received from one o f these frus
trated white youth:
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...I always have problems with negroes “niggers” I walk down the street
with braces and boots and ‘crips’ jump me but I won’t stop fighting for what
I believe in. My parents do not believe what we believe in and that causes
problems but my grandpa is from the south and he was in the K.K.K. I
want to know if you guys can get me in the skinheads. I’m only 12 but I’m
down for the skins. I would like to hear from you soon if you can write to
me. White Power, Derrick - p.s. could I have some information from WAR.
(Skinhead letter 1987)
Many Los Angeles skinheads expressed similar grievances when explaining the attraction
o f Metzger’s WAR:
In the 80’s they [white kids] gravitated towards us because they [white kids]
wanted to fight back and put a stop to it but there weren’t enough people
fighting back In the 80’s they [skinheads] were going to fight, skinheads are
openly racial, they’re [society] pushing the kids to it, they sit there and they
want to squash it, they’re pushing, they’re pushing us....(Skinhead Interview
a., 3/31/02)
Metzger wanted white youth who felt disenfranchised from a rapidly changing world to see
WAR as an ally and a resource. To do this he realized that “politics as usual” would not
attract the kids. Coplon’s (1989: 82) description captures WAR’s new efforts:
Where the Old Right was aging, isolated, rural-based and mindlessly patri
otic, Metzger’s New Right (WA.R.) would be dynamic, hip, urban, and the
champion o f a white working class against a treasonous white ruling elite. It
would be a place where alienated skinheads could feel at home.
One indicator o f Metzger’s success is that by 1988, the WAR Skins numbered as many
as 200 youths in the Los Angeles area. The WAR Skins were primarily active from 19861989 and they used several different recruiting techniques. For example:
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.. .we’d go to jock parties and just regular high school parties you know. We
had a good response that way. We would put a Htde application out, just
like I did, I filled out an application and filled out the information and sent
it off and they got in contact with me and we go to these parties and hand
out literature and a month later we were going to go meet with one o f these
kids that was at that party that got the information so that really helped
morale and helped us we would say we’re actually going out and doing this
stuff. Certain people would go out and pass out literature on school campus
and it was not legal but we would get response back from that as well.
(Skinhead Interview a., 3/20/01)
or
We’d stick business cards and white power literature in everyone’s locker.
And we’d know that within a day or two the Black kids or Hispanic kids or
Asian kids are going to be so pissed off that they are going to attack a white
kid, they’re going to beat him up. So a day or two later we’d go back and
we’d say ‘I heard about all this racial violence you guys have been having
here. All these minority groups beating the hell out aU you white kids. Did
you guys know there’s a group out there for you. Did you know there are
skinhead groups around that can help you. They can stop this against you
guys. We can help you.’ (Leydon quoted in T im 8/19/96)
At other times, recruitment was less purposive, and seemed to follow a seamless process:
I first became aware o f the skinhead movement, my elder brother whom is
three years my senior, he was a W.A.R. Skinhead...I spent a lot o f time with
my elder brother Donnie and his friends so I was pretty much adopted by
them. They took me everywhere with them and they were my fiends and
mentors. I began by emulating them and ended up becoming fully immersed
in the movement by the end of the summer. I was brought in by WA.R.
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Skins so I became a WA.R. Skin myself.. .1 went everywhere with my
brother, parties, rallies, and gatherings, from distributing literature to
reciting propaganda to others....(Skinhead Interview n., 9/13/02)
In the first instance, social spaces where white youths gathered were purposively targeted
for recruiting purposes. WAR Skins used literamre and informal interaction to generate an
interest in racial politics among these potential candidates. In doing so, WAR Skins were
avoiding complete insularity and detachment from non-skinhead youth culture. In the
second instance, recruitment occurred through family socialization. This should not be
surprising since the family is typically the primary site o f socialization.
WAR Skins originated from various geographic areas including Los Angles, Orange,
San Bernardino, and Riverside Counties as weU as regions beyond the Los Angeles area
(San Diego, San Francisco and states outside o f California.). At its peek, WAR Skins were
closely connected with other smaller skinhead gangs, which WAR attempted to consoli
date. For example, the Reich Skins who were located in Los Angeles County near the San
Fernando Valley and counted about fifteen members eventually merged with WAR. In
other cases, skinhead gangs remained separate from WAR, but worked closely with them.
For instance, the American Firm (San Bernardino and Riverside Counties) who counted
about 50 or 60 members helped the WAR Skins pass out flyers and set up phone hotlines.
Skinhead gangs such as the Huntington Beach Skins (Orange County) and Public Enemy
Number One (PENI - Orange County) also had significant contact with the WAR Skins. In
the latter case, however, this contact was primarily social and rarely included assistance
with political activities.
As noted in chapter four, these overlapping associations exemplify the skinhead pen
chant for organizational arrangements that are relatively fluid and able to adopt rapid
change. Multiple affiliations are also explained by the frequent consolidations o f skinhead
gangs. These mergers provided skinhead gangs with the opportunity to pool their resources.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

105

an especially im p ortan t task, g iv e n their relatively sm aller n um bers co m p a red to larger

minority gangs.
The WAR Skins’ most significant development was their turn toward political activism.
The WAR Skins became adept at leafleting various areas o f Los Angeles, Orange, and San
Bernardino Counties with white power literature, including the Disneyland parking lot
(ADL 1990).
Oh yeah, back then every weekend, everyone would show up at my house
and we’d start folding flyers, rubber banding, all that stuff, no drinking, we
put the cases o f beer in the frig, and got to work, no bullshit. We picked
different areas and kept track which were new and which we’d done before
and by the time we put out all the literature, it was eleven or twelve and we
went back to my house and partied the rest o f the night. (Skinhead Inter
view a., 6/11/01)
Typically, Metzger helped facilitate these political activities through the sharing o f re
sources (e.g. giving them WAR flyers) and the cultivation o f leadership and organizational
skills (e.g. inclusion in WAR strategy meetings and assistance with rallies). Sometimes
these activities were aimed at voicing specific grievances. For instance, Tom Metzger and
about a dozen WAR Skins rallied outside the California State Legislative Building in 1988
to protest discussions o f hate crime legislation (Hamm 1993). At other times, these activi
ties were aimed at voicing specific, but rather expressed a broad range o f sentiments. These
activities were often held in public parks, and included food and a “fanuly-friendly” atmo
sphere. Leaders gave speeches, literature was distributed, and informal networks were
sustained.
By the late 1980s, WAR Skins had reached the height o f their public notoriety, appear
ing on television talk shows across the nation. As with the leafleting on the parking lot o f
Disneyland, skinheads used talk shows to create spectacles that assured them a large forum
for their views.
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Appearing on the television program, ‘the Oprah Winfrey Show,’ Tom
Metzger, founder o f White Aryan Resistance (WAR), accompanied several
Orange County WAR Skins. More skinheads from the surrounding Chicago
area joined the show in the audience. After Oprah asked one o f the WAR
Skins to explain the skinhead philosophy, he replied: ‘What makes a
skinhead? Attitude. White power. Cause Niggers suck. Niggers and Jews.
They’re half monkeys. They should aU be killed.’ This was followed by
chants from the audience, ‘Yea!’ ‘Fuckin’ right on!’ and ‘Go for it!’ When
Oprah cut to a commercial, one o f the other WAR skins on stage called her
a “monkey” and a skinhead from the audience called her a ‘nigger whore.’
As cameras returned, the skinheads marched off the set, arms clenched in a
Nazi salute. After the show, Oprah told a Chicago reporter: ‘I have never
seen such hatred in all my life’. (Klanwatch 1989; ADL 1988)
Yet, this exposure was both a curse and blessing. O n the one hand, talk shows were effec
tive as recruiting vehicles (Hamm 1993; Moore 1993). As Metzger recently claimed, “after
Oprah and Geraldo our recruiting went up one hundred percent at least...” (Interview
Tom Metzger, 3/30/99). Others agree that Metzger set the standard for inventive recruit
ing when his son, Jon, insulted Roy Innis of the Congress o f Racial Equality during a
Geraldo Rivera show, and started a slugfest. Rivera arose from the melee bloodied and nose
broken, but still standing. “After that, when somebody said he joined in 1988, we knew he
was a Geraldo skin” (Leydon quoted in Time 8/19/96).
O n the other hand, this high level o f publicity drew the attention o f social control
agents who sought to repress skinhead activities. The WAR Skin who called Oprah a
“monkey” explained that:
When we came back [from Oprah] skinheads were the nation’s favorite
villain...the Oprah Show made it hard for us, the police really started
gunning for us, before that there was some police who didn’t mind us too
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much, but after that everyone wanted to take the skinheads down, the Jews
were really putting a lot o f pressure on the local authorities to take care of
us. (Skinhead Interview o., 12/9/02)
The WAR Skins’ growth did not last long, as their numbers quickly dwindled. When
new recruits realized the challenges or “high risks” (McAdam 1986) which accompanied
the life o f a skinhead activist, many drifted to less demanding subcultures. A long-time
skinhead in Orange County says that, eventually, groups like the WAR Skins became more
concerned with the quality o f membership and less concerned with quantity.
We learned that it was more important to have quality over quantity. It
didn’t help us if we had a bunch o f scumbags, we wanted people who were
dedicated to their race, not just partying and getting laid...It’s not about the
numbers, I mean, today. I ’ve got a small circle o f friends that I can count on
and we learned that back with WAR that was more important. (Skinhead
Interview a., 1/29/99)
One o f the founders o f the WAR Skins explained the high rate o f skinhead attrition as
resulting from pre-determined individual inclinations, “most people who shit out (leave]
never had it in their hearts, they were never really true racists; it was only a matter time”
(Skinhead o., 12/9/02). Facing this trend, core members began to closely scrutinize new
recruits. With the WAR skins developing “higher standards,” their numbers continued to
slowly diminish.
The formation o f the WAR skins marked two changes in the skinhead subculture.
While the early skinhead gangs expressed territoriality in much the same way as the larger
culture o f street gangs (Schneider 1999; Moore 1991; Vigil 1988), during the 1980s
skinhead politicization diminished the importance o f physical territory by introducing
relatively abstract notions o f space (e.g. state power as opposed the neighborhood).
Skinhead de-territorialization was also related to their relatively small numbers and lack of
ties to their communities. Instead o f claiming street corners, WAR Skins began participat
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in g in p olitical activism , w h ich w as p rev io u sly u n seen a m o n g so u th ern C alifornia

skinheads'*. Second, WAR skins embraced a framework that was supra local, as exemplified
by the ZO G discourse. By providing a common language with an easy “villain” to identify,
the Z O G discourse became a powerful tool that could easily unite racists in disparate
locations with vastly different experiences.
The skinhead movement took an even harder turn then [late 1980s] and
that’s when it really became anti-Semitic. That’s when it started believing
the conspiracies of the World Bank and the conspiracies o f Judaism, that
they’re behind everything. They own all the banks, they own aU the
media...(Leydon quoted in Time 8/19/96)
Skinheads did not embrace the ZO G discourse by osmosis. Organizations such as
WAR provided important tutelage in this learning process. Metzger’s monthly magazine as
well as his other literature provided “informative” reading material that consistently
portrayed anti-Semitic images and discussed the role o f the Jewish people in world affairs.
Skinheads consider these materials as critical in their “intellecmal development”:
WeU, in terms o f ZOG, I mainly learned about this from Tom and aU o f his
information. I ’d heard a Uttie about the Jews before that but not much, I
wasn’t educated about their history and how they’ve managed to fuck-up
every society they move to. But reading WAR’s stuff and some of the other
organizations like AN [the Aryan Nation] and others, that’s where I got a lot
o f information and also learned about books that I should read that give an
even more in-depth explanations.... (Skinhead Interview a., 7/14/02)
External influences such as international and domestic links with white supremacist
organizations were critical to the poUticization o f the skinhead subculture, yet, we should
be careful about explaining this process as solely the result of external influence. There
were also important internal subcultural changes that helped spawn an indigenous skinhead
social movement organization; the Hammerskin Nation (HSN).
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Internal Dynamics: Skinheads Develop
an “Aryan Identity,” 1989-1994
Throughout the 1980’s, skinheads moved toward greater organization, developing
linkages to older white supremacist groups like the White Aryan Resistance, the Aryan
Nations, the World Church o f the Creator and various branches o f the Ku Klux Klan.
According to many observers, this alliance has been one o f the most significant develop
ments to occur in recent years (Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997). These trends marked the
diminishing salience o f local territorialized identities and the attempt to infuse a truly
international identity into the racist skinhead subculture. However, the internal dynamics
that helped nourish the success o f these ties have been overlooked.
While organizations like the Northside Firm and the Order Skins were not politically
active, they were extremely important in producing a stable group o f racist activists who
helped direct skinheads toward politicization. In fact, many o f these skinheads went on to
develop the first branch o f the Western Hammerskins almost ten years later. The WAR
Skins were another important transition in the organizational development o f skinhead
gangs. WAR Skins’ influence reached beyond their immediate members as they were one of
the first southern California skinhead gangs to embrace political activism as part o f their
strategy. Political activism and consolidation also helped generate a feeling among WAR
Skins that they were the “vanguard” o f the skinhead subculture.
By 1990, the organizational structure o f the largest skinhead gangs in southern Califor
nia had pretty well dissolved (Simi and Brents 2002). Rather than resulting in complete
fragmentation, however, a significant portion o f the skinhead subculture coalesced around
the effort to organize a Hammerskin chapter in southern California (i.e. the Western
Hammerskins). According to one o f the founders o f this organization, the creation o f the
Western Hammers brought previously divided factions o f skins together, and helped
encourage a global outlook by increasing direct international ties with skinheads from
multiple nations:
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O h yeah after w e organ ized the H a m m ers ou r co n ta ct w ith sk inh ead s from

all over southern California and even other countries definitely increased,
we had contact before, but being part o f the Hammers helped us in the
direction o f seeing other skinheads as international brothers fighting for the
same cause...we didn’t really have email back then, but we would tele
phone and fax and they would come over to visit especially during events
like ‘A ryan Fest’. (Skinhead Interview d., 3/13/02)

Birth o f the Hammerskin Nation
Inspired by Pink Floyd’s The Wall., a pair o f criss-crossed hammers emerged to represent
a new trend in the skinhead subculture. The first Hammerskin group, the Confederate
Hammerskins, formed in Dallas, Texas, sometime between 1987 and 1988 (Anti-Defama
tion League 2000). HN made strides toward increasing their “nation’s” members by open
ing more branches (Eastern Hammerskins, the Northern Hammerskins, and the Western
Hammerskins) by helping coordinate racist events such as the Aryan Fest, and by sponsor
ing “white power” music bands. These branches have now been united under the umbrella
of the Hammerskin Nation for more than a decade.
What is distinctive about the Hammerskins is their explicit attempt to bridge interna
tional barriers and their greater degree of organization. According to imprisoned
Hammerskin Jimmy Matchette, and HSN founder, international unity is an important
Hammerskin goal: “Our mission has drawn all o f us from the four corners o f the earth.
The winds o f destiny have drawn us and have carried us across geographical boundaries
and from various ethnic branches o f the White Aryan race to graft us into one Nation.”
(Anti-Defamation League 2000).
While early skinhead gangs tended to be rather loosely organized with frequent changes
in leadership, Hammerskins sought to develop a stable organization with clearly delineated
goals and responsibilities. Tom Metzger, who maintained close contact with Hammerskins
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stated, “they [Hammerskins] have more or less elected leaders, post-office boxes, websites,
and newsletters” (Interview Tom Metzger, 2/20/99). Additionally, H N branches typically
screen applicants and place new members on a probation period during which their partici
pation is highly monitored. And as opposed to the more gang-like ritual o f “jump-ins” to
initiate new members, Hammerskins have utilized a form o f “hazing” that resembles the
military or fraternal organizations (e.g. pro-longed periods o f physical exercise etc.).
By 1990, the Western Hammers were the newest addition to the HSN family. With
southern California’s relatively large number o f skinheads, it seemed that the Western
Hammers might become the largest and more successful H N branch. During the first half
o f the 1990s, there was evidence that the Western Hammers were following the Southern
California skinheads’ political emphasis. For example, in 1994, the Western Hammers
organized the “Aryan Fest” which took place in San Bernardino County, and, was at the
time, one o f the largest white power music shows in the United States.
Similar to the WAR Skin’s sudden demise, by the mid 1990s the Western Hammers
began experiencing a downward spiral. The main cause seemed to be internal strife. Strife
was evident especially among the leadership, and by 1996, several key leaders had left (one
went on to law school, and wanted to move into mainstream politics, and another made a
very public defection from the racist movement that included “anti-hate” commercials
aired on the Music Television Channel (MTV)). Another received a near fatal injury during
an altercation with several Hispanic youth at a small grocery store, and others drifted away.
One former WAR Skin who briefly experimented with the Hammers described their forma
tion and eventual decline in the following marmer:
Well the Western Hammers that were here, don’t remember when that was,
early 90’s I guess...Got involved with them and I don’t know, maybe 6
months, did a quick stint with them but it never completely flourished the
way other Hammer chapters did, we did a couple o f barbeques.. .It was
alright, there was a lot o f good people involved and there’s a lot of scum
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bags too, I find out now, snitches and whatever so you get involved in the
organization, you're taken chances...you never really know....(Skinhead
Interview c , 6/12/01)
Another former WAR Skin who never joined the Hammers but maintained close
contact with them, described their problems as arising from a “superior attitude and look
ing down on other skinheads” who were not Hammers.
Although the Western Hammers continue to maintain a presence within the Southern
California skinhead subculture, they remain the weakest o f the American HSN branches.
Their decline reflects the transient nature o f the skinhead subculture and the difficulty
maintaining commitment over long periods o f time. With such a large influx, organizational
stability and continuity is extremely difficult to maintain. Instead o f continuity, change is
the skinhead organizational trademark.

The Waning o f Public Political Activism
Even before the Western Hammers' decline, efforts at directing the skinhead subcul
ture toward hidden forms o f resistance were well under way. In 1989, after White Aryan
Resistance came under scrutiny for a raciaUy-motivated murder in Portland, Oregon, Tom
Metzger requested that the WAR Skins no longer use this organizational identification.
Although the WAR Skins changed their name to Aryan White Separatists (AWS), members
eventually abandoned an official organizational title, opting for other less visible forms of
affiliation.
We disbanded WA R. Skins back in early '89 at the request o f someone we
respect a great deal. Those who didn’t turn traitor scum formed other
organizations. A lot of us ex-WA.R. Skins still hang out to this day. The
scene in So.Cal. goes through constant changes. (Skinhead Interview o.,l 1/
7/02)
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Hammers were also realizing that public activism was an extremely costly tactic that may
not be worth the risks. According to Dobratz and Shanks-Meile (1997:66), “they
[Hammerskins] question the need to march and place their faces in the limelight and would
rather be low-keyed, trying to find like-minded people to associate with”.
This move toward less visible forms o f activism portended a larger trend in the white
supremacy movement. Eventually, calls for “leaderless resistance” (Beam 1992) became a
commonly advocated strategy for coping with an extremely hostile external environment
(Simi and Futrell 2002). Metzger was no longer content with skinheads serving as “street
soldiers,” but was now also encouraging them to
grow their hair o u t.. .1 wanted them to get jobs and go to school, build
careers and many o f them listened and now they’ve gotten in the military
banks, schools, corporations, government. I told them that hanging out on
the streets beating people up, making yourself an easy target for the police,
getting hauled into jaü, that’s no way to fight a war like this. So now they’re
working their way into the system, getting themselves into strategic posi
tions and preparing for the inevitable —a white revolution, a race war. (Tom
Metzger Interview, 5/17/00)
Metzger claims these covert strategies have been quite successful, and points to a process
of maturation that he supposedly helped channel:
We have advised all the skinheads that will listen to make sure they get a
good education, get into real sensitive spots, whether its business, govern
ment or whatever keep your mouth shut but still maintain your ideas and
thoughts. That scares them more than anything because they wonder where
the skinheads go. We got a cartoon that shows a guy in court, he takes of
his hairpiece, he’s got a suit, briefcase. A lot o f the kids that joined me back
in the 1980s are now married and have families and you wouldn’t know
they had ever been skinheads. (Tom Metzger 5/17/00)
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One o f the most important questions that a de-emphasis o f public political activity
raises is whether this unobtrusiveness simultaneously weakens political sentiments or
whether this change is a “holding period” (Taylor 1989) that nurtures racist sentiments and
will ultimately help generate another wave of public mobilization? I argue that, although
this de-emphasis leads some in directions that ultimately neutralizes their ideological
sentiments and political commitments, as a whole, de-emphasis is a strategic adaptation
that provides important shelter during hostile times.
With political gangs disbanding, moving underground, and infiltrating various social
institutions, other skinhead gangs that never embraced public politics suddenly were more
visible. This visibility increased as gangs that had previously been involved in non-specialized delinquent activity (e.g. vandalism, fighting, and minor theft) transitioned toward
specialized, profit-oriented criminal activity (methamphetamine trade, counterfeiting, and
identity theft). This transition was facilitated by the experience o f incarceration. As law
enforcement agencies were increasing their efforts to repress skinheads by the late 1980s, it
was increasingly common for skinheads to be treated as gangs, and police departments
were tracking skinhead affiliations and activities. The opportunity to arrest skinheads was
considered an important part o f the strategy to disband these gangs. Once incarcerated,
skinheads began developing ties with the Aryan Brotherhood, the largest white prison gang
in the United States (Earley 1992). By 1980s the AB had been certified by the California
Department o f Corrections as a prison gang and confirmed members were subject to
secure housing units (SHU). SHU’d inmates are denied access to the “yard” and segregated
from the general population. The AB needed white inmates to serve as “middlemen” for
their criminal operations, and skinhead gangs were a good resource. Instead o f serving as
“foot soldiers” for the “white revolution,” these skinhead gangs were helping further the
goals o f organized criminal activity.
The shift from social to political gangs corresponded with a shift from episodic to
consistent racism. Skinhead beliefs were changing. But while the transition toward explicit
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racism was important, it was only one piece of the larger process o f politicization. This
transition from an unstructured to a relatively structured ideological system featured the
adoption o f the “ZO G ” discourse, which signaled a “Nazification” o f the skinhead sub
culture (Southern Poverty Law Center 1995), and the incorporating o f new practices most
evident in skinheads’ new-found involvement in political activism (marches, rallies,
leafleting). However, the radicalization o f skinhead racism and politicization are relatively
autonomous processes. While the mobilization o f racism may be a component of the larger
process o f politicization, the increasing virulence o f their racism did not always translate
into political activity. We cannot assume that because a skinhead gang is racist, it is there
fore also political. Politicization was neither a foregone conclusion nor was it ever a com
plete shift for all skinheads.
However, to the extent that social gangs did not vanish after politics became the
dominant subcultural emphasis; the recent shift toward economic gangs does not imply a
“de-poMticization” o f the skinheads. We need to recognize that politics and profit-oriented
crime co-exist as important currents. Sometimes these currents conflict and compete with
each other, at other times; they converge and complement each other, and much o f the
time, they simply co-exist. It is these points o f agreement and disagreement that help shed
light on what directions the skinhead subculture may take in the future.
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N o te s

’ Although Short and Strodtbeck’s did not directiy observe racial conflict during their 2
years o f fieldwork, they do reference earlier reports that provide evidence o f this issue.
^ The Northwest Imperative is a proposal to create a white homeland using the states of
Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana (see Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997).
^ British sport culture is rooted in the neighborhood where tradition ensures a fan-base that
often extends across several generations within the same family. The relative density of
Britain makes following your club logisticaUy much less expensive compared to the U.S.
(Moore 1993).
^ This is not to say that WAR Skins never claimed specific areas or used graffiti markers to
identify their presence, but their primary organizational emphasis was directed toward
political activism.
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CHAPTER 6

CRIMINALIZATION
This chapter tells the story o f the transition from the political to the economic phases
in skinhead gangs. Between 1979 and 1984, skinhead gangs were primarily organized
around style and music and drinking and fighting. Whiteness was important, but not cen
tral; however, skinhead gangs underwent another transition that changed this. Between
1984 and 1994, racialized politics became skinheads’ central subcultural emphasis and
skinheads were constructing a program which strongly encouraged global ideational ele
ments and participation in political activism. Social networks that linked skinheads to
international and domestic white supremacist organizations facilitated these changes. Yet,
by the early 1990s, the trend toward highly visible public activism was giving way to an
emphasis upon hidden forms o f resistance. This transition involved a move from
unspedalized, garden-variety delinquency prominent during the initial formation of
skinhead gangs and the racially-motivated violence prominent during the political phase to
specialized criminal activity and links to profit-oriented crime. This third phase in skinhead
subcultural development, is the hardest to locate in a specific time-period, because an
economic emphasis has always been present but in more muted forms than present today.
In this third phase, skinhead gangs are also racist but their primary interests surround
profit-oriented criminal activity. They neither participate in political activism nor are they
as well connected to the white supremacist movement like earlier political gangs. The
relationship between racism and criminal activity varies depending upon the specific
organization and factors such as the surrounding community. The change to an economic
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em p h asis w a s facilitated b y three factors: (1) the w a n in g o f political gan gs, (2) m em b e rs’

experiences while incarcerated, and (3) the growth o f the methamphetamine trade among
skinheads.
The shift toward economic criminal activity dovetailed with the retreat from public
political activism, as both efforts necessitated secrecy in order to avoid detection by forces
of social control. While there is a general tendency for skinhead subcultural change to
occur rapidly, this transition toward economic gangs was gradual. When many of the
skinhead gangs were turning towards politics, other gangs maintained a less politicized
“street” mentality.
Yeah, in a nut shell what I will say is that we are a gang, we make no
pretense about it, we’re a gang, plain and simple...when people say gang
they think blacks and Mexicans and shit like that but whatever—
(Skinhead Interview k., 8/12/02)
One o f the most important differences between the gangs that became politicized and
those that did not was the latter’s lack o f ties to adult white supremacist organizations.
Gangs that did not become political never developed strong ties to political organizations
external to the skinhead subculture like WAR, remaining insular and largely autonomous.
Although these skinhead gangs associated with politicized skinheads, they rarely partici
pated in activist-oriented practices such as leafleting, marches, etc. They embraced racism
and elements o f Nazism, but also retained a framework that simultaneously encouraged
pursuing non-political interests (petty theft, drug use). Further, they did not incorporate the
ZO G discourse in the way that politicized skinhead gangs did. Therefore, their racism
remained less structured and did not include a global conspiratorial framework.
The specific origins o f the various economic gangs were separate, but they maintained
close contact with each other. These gangs included the Nazi Lowriders (NLR), Public
Enemy Number One (PENI), the Norwalk Skins, La Mirada Punk (LMP), Crosstar, the
Insane White Boys (IWB), Vicious Circle (VC) and Notorious Youth (NY).
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T h e A n tec ed en ts o f E c o n o m ic G angs:

the Early Days, 1979-1986
Before shifting toward an economic emphasis, these gangs were best characterized as
social stylistic gangs. As discussed in chapter four, social gangs were primarily based upon
fraternal relations, stylistic interests, and cafeteria-type delinquency (e.g. non-specialized
violations that included graffiti, fighting, under-age drinking, theft etc.). Although many of
these skinhead social gangs developed ties with the white supremacist movement, adopted
political stances, and participated in racial activism, some did not follow this subcultural
current. Instead, they remained insular, keeping a low profile and interested in immediate
local matters (e.g. conflict with punks gangs like the Suicidais, LADS, and other street
gangs).
The difference between an economic gang like the NLR and a political gang like the
WAR Skins is best described by a continuum with political ideology at one end and crimi
nal enterprise at the other. The WAR Skins clearly fall toward the political end o f the
continuum, while the Nazi Lowriders fall at the other end. Within this continuum, gangs
like PENT fall toward the criminal end, but are more committed to racist ideology than the
NLR. These ideational differences reflect the diverse organizational histories that exist
among separate skinhead gangs. For example, unlike most skinhead gangs discussed thus
far, the NLR originated as a prison gang in the early 1980s among white youths incarcer
ated in the California Youth Authority (CYA) (ADL 2001). The gang’s name reflects the
skinhead ability to integrate seemingly incongruent cultural streams (National Socialism
and Hispanic car culture). California prison officials claim that the NLR started as a “de
fensive” gang to provide young white inmates with protection from minority inmates who
are often the numerical majority in California correctional facilities (Law Enforcement
Interview f., 3/20/00).
Initially, NLR members embraced a generic white gang identity, sometimes referred to
as “Peckerwood”. Although the exact etiology o f this term is unknown, it Is commonly
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used within the penal system to refer to white inmates (ADL 2001; 2). The NLR’s
Peckerwood origin pardy explains the trajectory o f their ideology, which as stated above
tends to be less interested in traditional political activism. Although political activism has
never been part o f the NLR’s repertoire, racist ideology is still important. As one former
member indicates, racial exclusion provides the gang with some sense o f “elitism”. This
member notes the NLR’s membership policy, which strictly prohibits the inclusion o f
African-Americans: “You must have at least half white blood but no black blood” (quoted
in ADL 2001: 3). However, the NLR tends to subscribe to a relatively broad notion of
whiteness, considering some Hispanics as acceptable for membership. Seen from outside
skinhead organizational norms or from only one group’s perspective, the existence o f the
NLR seems unbelievable and contradictory. Yet, this ignores the history of skinhead
subculmral development that has always been far from homogenous, often integrating
wide-ranging and contrasting cultural elements. The NLR also highlights the ambiguous
racial status o f Hispanics among skinhead gangs that I discussed in chapter fouti. Al
though many skinhead gangs express deep animosity toward Hispanics, there is a tenuous
subculmral precedence for cooperation with Hispanics and even inclusion within some
skinhead gangs.
At the same time that WAR Skins organized themselves, another group o f skinheads
adopted the name Public Enemy Number One. PEN I’s origins were comparable to many
o f the punk gangs already mentioned. A local Hardcore band. Rudimentary Peni had
established a reputation for extremely “edgy” music that caught the eyes o f a few southern
California youths. The first were a group o f punk kids from Long Beach who named
themselves Public Enemy Number One Death Squad (PDS). Like other punk gangs, PDS
was formed around members’ favorite band, providing the band with security during
shows. Another clique o f youths in the Anaheim and Huntington Beach areas became
familiar with PDS and was impressed with the gang. In the mid 1980s, “Scottish,” an
unaffiliated skinhead living in Huntington Beach began “tagging” the word PENI on
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various spots across Orange County because he thought, “it sounded cool”. Scottish hung
out with several skinhead gangs at the time including the Order Skins. In 1986, Scottish
and several other local skinheads in the Anaheim area, most notably, “Popeye,” decided to
make PENI their official moniker and formed a skinhead gang. PEN I’s goal was relatively
simple: to develop a street reputation and provide white kids with defense from other
gangs. According to another early member, PENI was aU about “white boys banding
together to protect themselves” (Skinhead Interview j., 5/22/02).
Starting with a relatively small number, PENI developed ties with the skinhead subcul
ture in Orange County. Although PENI was less interested in politics than the WAR Skins,
the two gangs maintained significant ties with each other. Some o f the more politicallyoriented skinheads o f the mid-1980s claim that initially PENI had a fairly peripheral status
and were thought o f as a “bunch o f young punks,” however, other skinheads report that
although PENI was clearly uninterested in the political aspects o f racism, they were
respected and welcomed by more political skinheads.
During the same time that PENI was forming, the NLR’s membership also remained
relatively small and little was heard about them beyond the California prison walls. O n the
streets, the NLR hung out, but they were not remarkable. As one Huntington Beach Skin
remembers,
well, the NLR, they were around back then [1980s], hut they weren’t any
big thing, they weren’t special or anything. They just were another skinhead
gang, some o f 'em were pretty good people, but they had a lot o f fuck-ups
you know

Skinhead Interview m., 6/22/02)

Other gangs like the Norwalk Skins and La Mirada Punk also originated during the
mid-1980s as a means o f defense. Both of these gangs hailed from racially/ethnically
diverse areas, where Hispanic gangs were the most prevalent. Skinheads from these areas
explain their emergence as directiy relating to self-protection from “non-white” gangs:
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Well the city o f Norwalk itself is a very dark city, there are some white
neighborhoods but it’s a relatively rough area so you got yourself a group of
skinheads who are all from the same area and it’s a pretty tough place to
live especially to be on your own when there are so many other gangs there
who are going to whoop on you if you don’t have any sort of, if you don’t
have anything to fall back on, so in response to necessity or get beaten on a
regular basis forming a gang possibly works. (Skinhead Interview k., 9 /2 0 /
02)
How did social gangs primarily concerned with a defensive orientation and protection from
subcultural opponents, transition to an economic emphasis and involvement in sophisti
cated organized criminal activity?

The Waning o f Public Political Activism
By the dawn o f the 1990s, the Southern Poverty Law Center had successfully sued and
won a multi-million dollar civil judgment against Tom Metzger and Jon Metzger’s White
Aryan Resistance for the organization’s alleged incitement o f a racially-motivated murder
in Portland, Oregon (Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997). After coming under scrutiny for the
murder, Tom Metzger requested that the WAR Skins no longer use this organizational
affiliation. The WAR Skins agreed and opted for other less visible forms o f activism. The
civil suit against WAR was strong proof that highly visible political activism and easily
identifiable organizational affiliations were no longer effective tools. While these activities
helped skinheads gain notoriety, they also led to significant repression. In the epicenters of
skinhead activity (e.g. Huntington Beach) police departments and other community
organizations (e.g. the Orange County Human Rights Commission) began paying more
attention to these gangs. In response to these efforts, many skinheads were questioning the
effectiveness o f maintaining a highly public status. The result did not necessarily mean a
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de-politicizadon, but rather a de-emphasis on visible political activity. This de-emphasis
helped create a subculmral space for another current to emerge.
By the late 1990s, some law enforcement officials responsible for tracking skinhead
gangs were convinced that political skinheads were “a thing of the past...the traditional
political skinheads are no m ore...” (Law Enforcement Interview f. 3/20/00). Looking
backwards, the strategic shift from public protest to less visible activism helped create the
perception that political skinhead gangs no longer existed, and when the activities of
criminally-oriented skinhead gangs grew, they appeared to be the only ones left. Further,
with political skinheads desiring a quieter existence, the interests o f economic and political
gangs coalesced. Both emphasized covert strategies to avoid agents o f social control,
which served to reduce the social and ideational distance between economic and political
gangs. While this shared interest in covert strategies has not erased all the cleavages that
exist between political and economic gangs, the “vanguard” attimde and activism that
characterized political gangs during the height o f their notoriety lessened. Political
skinheads seem more willing to let other skinheads “do their own thing” even if it seems to
conflict with their version o f the skinhead ethos, which may be related to the skinheads
being severely “outnumbered” by minority gangs and their realization that certain accom
modations and alliances are going to be necessary. Secondly, the willingness to “look the
other way” may be an attempt by political skinheads to create a greater degree o f subcul
tural homogeneity, where differences that might otherwise cause conflict are simply over
looked and not mentioned.

The Experience of Incarceration
With greater police attention directed at skinheads, it was inevitable that more
skinheads would be incarcerated. This was the second factor that facilitated the change in
organizational emphasis. By the late 1980s law enforcement agencies were stepping up
their efforts to repress skinhead activities and disband these gangs. Law enforcement
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authorities w ere largely su cc essfu l as a sign ifican t n u m b er o f skinheads w ere incarcerated

for a wide-variety o f offenses. Surveillance and arrests forced skinheads to curtail their
activities. For example, In Los Angeles County from 1988-to-1989, arrests o f skinheads for
violent-related incidents increased by 50 percent, while this same figure increased by 33
percent in Orange County between 1989 and 1990. Several law enforcement officers
described the growing awareness among police departments about skinhead gangs:
It took us a while to get a hold on things, but by 87, 88 and on we realty
cracked down on 'em. We weren’t gonna let them get by with anything and
when they staged an event, we were there and we busted people for any
thing we legally could. Didn’t matter if it was violent or not, we picked
people up on PVs [Parole/Probation Violations], suspended licenses didn’t
matter. If there were a bunch walking around downtown, we stopped
'em .. .found out who they were running with that kind o f stuff.... (Law
Enforcement Interview d., 1/29/99)
The experience o f incarceration helped forge new organizational ties with the Aryan
Brotherhood (AB), the most powerful and notorious white prison gang in the United States.
The AB’s origins date back to California’s San Quentin State Prison in the 1960s (Earley
1992). The AB is a racist prison gang, but their first objective is maintaining a high status
in the prison system. Because white inmates in the California correctional system are
severely outnumbered, the AB found it necessary to cultivate an alliance with the Mexican
Mafia prison gang. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the AB began recruiting young white
inmates from the California Youth Authority to assist with their criminal operations. These
recruiting efforts increased during the 1990s as greater numbers o f skinheads were incar
cerated. Since then, the Nazi Lowriders and Public Enemy Number One have developed a
close working relationship with the AB. The relationship with the AB has been comparable
to other skinhead gangs’ relationship with the White Aryan Resistance (WAR). Like the
channeling process toward political activism that resulted from network ties to the white
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supremacist movement, the same has been true for this shift toward profit-oriented crime.
While WAR preached political sophistication, the AB preached economic sophistication.
Although the AB exists beyond prison walls, its primary organizational base is on “the
inside”. In a recent indictment, the Los Angeles County District Attorney explains the AB’s
search for assistants: “To maintain control over the Caucasian prison population, the
Brotherhood needed to give authority and power to another group that had the accessibility
and mobility to continue committing crimes in prison” (quoted in the Los Angeles Times
2001: 1). The NLR and PENI were exactiy what the AB needed.
While PEN I’s relationship with the AB is more recent, the NLR has a long history with
the AB. By the early 1990s, the California Department o f Corrections (CDC) had managed
to upset and stifle the AB’s criminal activities through segregated housing units used for
high-risk inmates. The AB desperately needed a gang with access to the “yard” (prison area
where general population inmates congregate) in order to carry on their business operations
and mete out needed punishments. While the segregated housing units created a significant
barrier for the AB, it propelled the NLR into a strategic position. The NLR was quickly
rising to the top o f the white prison gang hierarchy in California, but the NLR was just
beginning to experience an accelerated growth in membership. In 1996, there were 28
confirmed NLR members, but by 2000, there were as many as 1500 members in the
California prison system and 400 members in San Bernardino alone. By the late 1990s, the
NLR had spread beyond California (e.g. Nevada, Colorado, and New Mexico and as far east
as Illinois, Indiana and Florida) (ADL 2001).
However, like the WAR Skin’s rapid growth, the NLR’s did not last long. By the late
1990s, the NLR’s numbers were skyrocketing and their starns was increasing, which
encouraged a small number o f NLR members to start a faction called the “FTB” (Fuck the
Brotherhood [Aryan Brotherhood]). FTB was obviously defiant o f the deferential role that
the NLR was expected to play and felt that it was necessary to sever ties with the AB and
establish a completely autonomous starns (Skinhead Interview, f., 6/27/01). The FTB
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quickly floundered, unable to match the numbers, tenacity, and tradition o f the AB, leaving
those who opted for this organizational experiment to either “beg forgiveness” or “debrief”
(leave the gang and seek institutional protection). Ultimately, the NLR could not sustain
such rapid growth which resulted in organizational deterioration and declining membership.
Simultaneous with the NLR’s faltering; PEN I’s relationship with the AB has grown
stronger over the last few years. Peni’s improved status with the AB is not only a result of
the NLR’s problems, but also because PEN I has traditionally maintained a tighter opera
tion, with a smaller and more cohesive leadership basis. Further, the NLR’s origination
inside the Califomia youth prisons, allows the CDC to classify the NLR as a prison gang,
which can then be used to segregate its members from the general population. However,
PEN I’s street origins prevent this classification, thereby minimizing the level o f security
that prison officials can use. This is another reason why the AB is attracted to PENI: as the
AB’s power relies upon access to the prison yards, its relationship to PEN I may be further
strengthened if one o f PEN I’s founders who recently received a “life sentence” is
“patched” (initiated) into the AB. If this should happen, there are several other core
members being groomed to fill his shoes as the “shot caller” (i.e. the primary leader) (Law
Enforcement Interview b., 3/20/02).
Over the last several years, large numbers o f PENI members have been incarcerated,
which has led to a quasi-hybridization o f PEN I’s organizational form. N o longer just a
street gang, they now maintain a significant presence in the prison system. In both the NLR
and PEN I’s case, incarceration has played a significant role in shaping their organizational
form and maybe more importantiy, their organizational interests.

The ‘Meth’ Connection
The skinhead relationship with methamphetamine (meth) is the third factor that
influenced the move to an economic emphasis. Traditionally, skinheads have often held
anti-drug stances, not withstanding their notoriously large amounts o f alcohol consump-
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don. Although some skinhead gangs have been vehement about their anti-drug stance,
other gangs have been either ambivalent or unopposed to certain drugs. Next to alcohol,
meth seems to be the skinheads’ drug o f choice. Some skinheads claim that the use of
methamphetamine is part o f the larger Nazi tradition they belong to and are seeking to
maintain (Hamm 2001). These claims serve important rhetorical functions that may reflect
attempts by skinheads to mold particular public personas as opposed to accurate descrip
tions o f the significance o f the drug. My interviews and observation with skinheads reveal
the symbolic connection to German Nazis thru methamphetamine was rarely discussed
and appears to have little direct relevance to skinhead participants. What seemed far more
important was “getting high” and finding a means to survive (e.g. theft, drug distribution,
fraud etc.).
Although skinheads’ involvement in the distribution of methamphetamine was ex
tended after developing ties with the AB, skinheads were fond o f this drug before they
became connected to the AB. The use o f methamphetamine has never been as prevalent as
alcohol, but some skinheads have used (and sold) this drug since the beginning o f the
subculmre. Although exactly how widespread the use o f methamphetamine is among
Southern California skinheads is unclear, it is not surprising that given the substances’
effects (e.g. heightened aggression, extreme anxiety and paranoia, and fast-paced living
style) (Hamm 2001) a homology would exist between skinheads and methamphetamine.
There is substantial previous research that demonstrates subcultures typically favor drugs
that reflect their core characteristics. The fact that Hippies preferred marijuana is no
surprise given their relaxed and laid back posture and their orientation toward the impor
tance of peace (WiUis 1990; Pearson 1987; Brake 1985; Burr 1984; Moore 1978).
Skinheads have found that participation in the drug trade is also extremely profitable, as
meth is no longer simply favored for its high.
The manufacturing and distribution o f methamphetamine has been skinheads’ most
notable involvement in criminal activity. The NLR and PENI are the skinhead gangs most
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closely linked to the meth trade, and both organizations have links to motorcycle gangs
(the Vagos and the infamous Hells Angels) who are responsible for a significant proportion
of the manufacturing o f methamphetamine (Spergel 1995). The NLR and Peni have also
conducted business (trading methamphetamine for guns) with minority gangs in Southern
California. One recent case involved a methamphetamine ring with distribution that
stretched aU the way to New York. During the investigation, some 16 methamphetamine
laboratories in the Antelope and San Fernando Valley were shut down. Additionally, more
than 45 pounds o f methamphetamine valued at over $2 million, scores o f firearms and
more than $500,000 in cash were confiscated. Approximately 30 percent o f the drug ring
was affiliated with either the NLR or other white supremacist prison and street gangs (Los
Angeles Limes 3/31/01).

Drugs and Crime: Cleavages
in the Skinhead Subculture
The increasing emphasis upon economically-oriented criminal activity has not been
without its detractors inside the skinhead subculture. Some skinheads feel that “real
skinheads” do not commit non-political criminal activity. These skinheads will sometimes
refer to criminally-oriented skinheads as “scumbags” or “white trash” or offer statements
such as: “blacks can’t help it, it’s part o f their genes, but these guys know better and they
do it anyway” (Skinhead Interview 1/15/02). The criticism of criminally-oriented
skinheads is further illustrated by another skinhead who also argues drug use as a racial
characteristic not suited for “members” o f the “white race”:
Skinhead is not about using drugs. There is no justification for it. Look at
the heroes o f our race and movement; Adolph Hitier, Rudolf Hess, Bob
Mathews, George Lincoln Rockwell, Ian Smart. These men dedicated and
gave their lives for our movement and race and none of them needed drugs
to fight for our cause. Why would any self-respecting White man or woman
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disgrace themselves, our race, our movement, and the memory these great
men by soiling themselves with drugs? What’s more unfortunate is there are
a lot o f Skinheads out there that could be productive people in the move
ment, but put smoking dope ahead o f their race and comrades. (Skinhead
Interview f., 7/28/99)
Another skinhead sees these trends as reflecting poorly upon the entire subculture:
Over the past year or two it’s kind of been inundated with drug use and
gang mentality. This unfortunately gives the Southern California Skinhead
movement a bad name around the world. There are a lot o f good Skinheads
in Southern California and you can’t let a few bad apples spoil the bunch.
(Skinhead Interview o., 11/17/00)
However, others who maintain a political stance see the possibility o f strategically using
economic gangs to the advantage o f promoting the white supremacy movement. For
example,
Nazi Low Riders, I think there is probably a bridge in some cases political
and criminal. Mostly because we need money to operate. Like the left wing
they use drugs to get money and o f course some o f the right wing have
done that too. The Nazi Lowriders have non white Mexicans and stuff in
there, that don’t work with us, they can cause confusion and upset the
system, that’s fine. Making a strong link with a mixed up group.. ..I think
the means justify the end if it works, it ok with me. If you feel your race is
in that big o f danger than there would be nothing you probably wouldn’t do
to save it. There are guys out there that are both racial and criminal I think
probably they will become leaders some day because it’s going to be, I mean
the shits really going to get bad, it’s going to get mean and it’s going to take
some people that are ruthless, I don’t think I ’m ruthless. I never had to be
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but there is a new breed coming on. Who knows, it’s amazing how things
start to evolve. (Interview Tom Metzger, 6/17/99)
Sometimes the same individual simultaneously holds contradictory views related to these
differing subcultural emphases. For instance, the same skinhead who stated that true
skinheads do not engage in drug-taking and other criminal activity, on another occasion,
wagered that there might be room for different types o f skinhead organizations and that in
fact, these differences might be useful:
they got their way o f doing things, I don’t personally agree with all of it but
a lot o f those guys are goods guys you know they back each other up and if
one 'em goes down they all go down...sure there’s scum out there that call
themselves skinheads, but I do think it’s possible for us to work together,
maybe some o f these guys wiU be good on the frontline, we’re gonna need
as many as we can get....(Skinhead Interview o., 11/15/02)
There is a possibility that economic gangs may provide a “radical flank” (Haines 1988)
diverting attention from political skinheads and enabling adult white supremacists to work
more quietly. Political skinheads willing to appear as “moderate” may use these economic
gangs to position themselves as the “less o f two evils” in order to gain concessions.
The cleavages surrounding drugs and crime illustrate that subcultural phases o f devel
opment are not the result o f group consensus; but instead, reflect tenuous changes that
result from struggles between different factions. This last shift toward economic gangs has
been the most contested, revealing serious cleavages within the skinhead subculture. Yet,
in the face o f these seemingly insurmountable differences, skinheads and their gangs find
ways to bridge these divisions. Some o f these efforts are individual “band-aids” to heal
sore points within the movement, while others are large-scale strategies designed to
“squash” conflict and strengthen alliances.
It would be wrong to view skinheads as only passive receptors determined by these
larger organizational divisions. Skinheads understand the importance of forging alliances
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with each other. Skinheads have recently formed the “Southern California Skinhead Alli
ance” which is led by the PENI Skins and the NLR, but also includes the Norwalk Skins,
La Mirada Punks (LMP), and other skinheads from across Southern California (ADL 1999).
In spite o f reservations about the accuracy o f a wholesale alliance, there is clear evidence
that alliances are forming. However, the effectiveness o f these efforts is severely limited
due to continuing skinhead factionalism. Some skinheads view this factionalism as an
asset. I have heard many skinheads discuss this issue, even sarcastically appropriating the
phrase, “diversity is our strength” (borrowed from the anti-racist movement) to illustrate
that differences among skinheads do not necessarily weaken the subculmre. Instead, many
skinheads opine that as long as skinheads remain racist, other emphases are not as impor
tant. Further, these differences may also have some strategic use in confusing social control
agents, and disrupting their efforts at monitoring skinhead activities.

Racism and Economic Gangs
The most difficult aspect o f economic gangs to describe is their racism. There is a
tendency to treat these gangs as either fully immersed in the white supremacy movement
and ready to lead a Nazi revival or as purely a-poUtical gangs whose racism matters little. It
is hard to avoid these poles, but the fact o f the matter is that although economic gangs
place profit at a premium (especially as compared to social and political gangs), their
racism also remains important. Although like the political gangs, the skinheads who form
these economic gangs experienced a radicalization of their racism in the mid and late
1980s, they simply choose not to participate in political activism. Nonetheless, they often
experienced an indirect effect o f increasing politicization, and although they did not meet
with Metzger or other adult white supremacists, they still encountered the literature these
organizations distributed. As one of PEN I’s first members describes.
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no we didn’t have you know regular meetings to talk about politics and that
kind o f stuff, but it came up informally. We’d look at War’s literature and
talk about sometimes. (Skinhead Interview q., 11/19/02)
Although these gangs may operate for profit, they are organized around whiteness.
Therefore, we should view the subculmral emphases that characterize different phases as
influential, but not deterministic. Further, these emphases are not automatic, but must be
struggled for. Participants successful in pushing the subculmre in one direction may find
that detractors are able to conjure support and resources needed to push in another direc
tion. These emphases result from these pushes and should be viewed as accomplishments
necessitating nurmrance and re-enforcement.
While the popular conception o f skinhead gangs associates them with bias-motivated
violent attacks (i.e. “hate crimes”), the type o f skinhead violence varies according to these
subculmral phases. Some organizational affiliations constrain certain behaviors and pro
mote others. For example, during the second-half o f the 1990s the Antelope Valley (north
eastern Los Angeles County) was struck by a spate o f racially-motivated violence. Mem
bers from the local branch o f the Nazi Lowriders were responsible for much of the vio
lence that resulted in a host o f attention directed toward the gang. Law enforcement,
including the Federal Bureau o f Investigation, the media, schools, and civic organizations
placed these incidents under a microscope in an effort to deter further violence and dis
band the NLR. NLR leaders asked their members in the Antelope Valley to “cool it” as the
racist violence was disrupting their more lucrative operations related to the methamphet
amine trade. O n the one hand, the NLR’s racial violence helps infuse the skinhead identity
with concrete material practices that sustain views of racial supremacy. On the other hand,
this violence hinders their entrepreneurial oppormnities by bringing unnecessary attention
from law enforcement and the larger community. These tensions also reflect the internal
gaps surrounding organizational interests that often exist between leaders and the rank-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

133

and-file. These phases are never completely homogenous, there are always co-existing
emphases moving in different directions.
Another example o f internal organizational struggles is illustrated by recent develop
ments within PENI. Although PEN I seeks a high level of respect with their street savvy
and growing connections with several criminal organizations, they also maintain a deeper
commitment to racial politics than the NLR and are more “selective” regarding racial
criteria related to membership. For example, while the NLR has bestowed membership to
individuals with Hispanic backgrounds membership, PENI does not consider Hispanics
“truly white”. In spite o f these membership requirements, however, PENI is willing to do
business with Asian and Hispanic gangs. The lines PEN I develops that define who they are
as an organization is not always clear.
In 1999, PEN I went through a period o f discussions regarding whether they should
move away from their “white power” philosophy and open up their ranks to “nonwhites”.
Others wanted to move in the opposite direction and not only maintain their racist ideol
ogy, but embrace a more political stance and scale back their criminal operations. As of
now, they remain a racist gang with a “whites only” membership policy, but continue to
cultivate criminal operations including doing business with minority gangs. According to
several o f PEN I’s core membership, two factions co-exist within the organization: those
who seek a political current and those who want to continue with the economic one.
Because these are on-going developments, it is difficult to gauge the organization’s future
directions. One possibility is a continuing co-existence o f political and economic interests
that will eventually coalesce and become strategic and purposive as opposed to incidental.
In this chapter, I have examined the third phase of subcultural development, which is
the most recent transition toward economic emphases. Over the course o f a little more
than two decades, the skinhead subculture has experienced significant changes. During the
second phase skinhead gangs were taking to the streets, “spreading the word” and urging
“white people to unite” and “take their country back” or build a new “white homeland”.
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Marches, leafleting, recruitment on school campuses and television appearances marked
the political phase, but it was not long before serious repression ensued and skinheads were
faced with a strategic choice: continue highly visible forms of activism or opt for covert
means o f resistance. Many opted for the latter and it would not be long before another
subcultural current began growing. Thus the shift to economic gangs was facilitated by the
waning o f the previous phase.
As law enforcement steeped up their efforts to disband skinhead gangs, increased
arrests ensued and a growing number o f skinheads faced incarceration. This experience
was pivotal to paving the way for the shift to economic gangs. Once incarcerated, skinhead
gangs began developing ties with the AB and helping them with their criminal operations.
Most notably, skinhead gangs became involved in the methamphetamine trade. The in
volvement in the meth trade not only represents the influence of the AB, but also a long
standing relationship between the skinhead subculture and methamphetamines.
What can we learn from this trend toward economic gangs? Well, as one gang specialist
put it, “N ot all swastikas are alike.” There is significant diversity among racist skinheads
and in the dynamic social processes that have marked their emergence and genesis. Some
people characterize skinheads as solely political and use terms like “neo-Nazi” which helps
perpetuate perceptions of fascist “stormtroopers” working for the “white revolution”. This
ignores the existence o f economic gangs. There is an important distinction between adopt
ing grievances directed toward minority populations (racism) and adopting a far right
political program. The latter refers to the process o f politicization, which for skinheads
includes a racist identity, but also includes ties to and participation in the white supremacy
movement. Currently economic gangs maintain a racist identity, but are not politicized.
However, if skinhead subcultural development tells us anything, it teUs us that this may
change relatively quickly.
Like previous stages significant subculmral diversity continues. N ot all strands devel
oped an economic emphasis but instead retained a political orientation, while others
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periodically moved between the two emphases. Still others rejected both the overt political
stance because it was typically associated with neo-Nazism and economic orientations,
because it has been associated with dealing drugs and prison. Instead, some skinheads may
be characterized by an emphasis upon cultural style. These skinheads developed an ultrapatriotic, nationalist posture and sought to maintain the “integrity” o f the skinhead way of
life. Skinhead subcultural development has neither progressed in a continuous direction nor
has it ever been completely dominated by one particular emphasis (although, as I argue
distinct developmental phases are definitely apparent).
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N o te s

’ This ambiguity miffors the larger culture’s uncertainty about how to define whiteness and
the often changing boundaries diat correspond with racial categories (see Allen 1994;
Roediger 1991).
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CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION
I have argued that the Southern California skinhead subculture has been marked by
three phases of development. These phases are characterized by distinct organizational
emphases: social, political, and economic. Despite each phase having distinct emphases,
they do not simply result from subcultural consensus. Instead, they reflect struggle and
contention between different skinhead factions. Opposing ideas about what is important
restrict the dominance o f any single organizational emphasis.
In chapter four, I discuss the first phase in the early formation o f skinheads and their
genesis toward social gangs, which began around 1978 and lasted until about 1984. Stylis
tic experimentation fueled this early development, but was quickly transformed into a
collective identity built around shared organizational names, ritual initiation rites (e.g.
jump-ins), fraternal relations, semi-hierarchical social roles, and non-specialized, “gardenvariety” delinquency (e.g. vandalism, under-age drinking, petty theft). From the beginning,
whiteness was important to skinhead identity but not the primary focus. Race became the
core organizing principle as skinheads started developing links with domestic and interna
tional adult white supremacist organizations. In the earliest phase, gang members held a
range o f racial views, but one o f the most salient revolved around the perception that
white youth were increasingly victimized by a host o f social forces, such as minority street
gangs, educational curriculums characterizing whites as historical “villains,” and changing
demographics that would eventually make whites a minority.

137
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In chapter five, I examined the transition to political gangs, which occurred between
1984 and 1994, as skinhead identity became increasingly anchored in race. During this
phase, shifting internal dynamics and budding relationships between skinhead gangs and
factions of the white supremacist movement (e.g. the White Aryan Resistance [WAR])
helped mobilize episodic racism into a consistent and relatively structured ideology. While
earlier skinhead gangs expressed racism, it was not tighdy coupled to a political
movement’s ideology. Part o f what helped strucmre skinhead racism was their participa
tion in white supremacist political activism. Skinheads began to channel racist sentiments
in an organized fashion that made sense given the framework skinheads were learning
through ties with pre-existing white supremacist activists. Political gangs developed as
members constructed a powerful racist ideology that, at least partially, included neoNazism, and introduced political currents beyond the neighborhood, township, or city. For
instance, while social gangs were focusing upon boundary crossing at the local level (i.e. a
member o f a rival gang entering their turf), political gangs began to embrace the ZO G
discourse, which explained their grievances by invoking the myth o f a worldwide Jewish
conspiracy. Politicization diminished the importance of previous interests such as territori
ality, by introducing relatively abstract notions o f space (e.g. state power as opposed the
neighborhood) (Brotherton 1999) and connected skinheads to a broader global white
supremacist movement.
The alliance between skinheads and other white supremacist organizations has been
successful, but not perfect. Some leaders o f adult white supremacist organizations have
“privately referred to skinheads as ‘punks’ and grumble that they are potential troublemak
ers” (ADL 1988: 29). Divisions aside, the skinheads have infused the white supremacist
movement with youthful activists that were sorely lacking. Yet, the move toward
politicization describes a general shift in skinhead subculture and it is not intended to
describe a wholesale change that some researchers have implied (c..f. Hamm 1993; Moore
1993). N ot all skinhead gangs embraced a political stance. There were outlying currents
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that embraced strident racism, but not political activism. Others splintered and formed
anti-racist gangs. Still others were ambiguous about race, favoring a “pro-American” ultranationalistic stance that often included racism, but veered away from the trend toward neoNazism. Despite these outlying currents, the period between 1984 and 1994 coincided
with the politicization o f the skinhead subculture.
In chapter six, I present the most recent phase in the skinhead subculture: economic
gangs. The time-period o f this phase is the hardest to specify, but a clear shift toward
economic gangs is evident by the late 1990s. Economic gangs combine aspects o f both
social and political gangs: they are also racist but their primary interests surround profitoriented criminal activity. While social gangs are more likely to engage in non-specialized
delinquent activity, economic gangs bond around a profit-orientation and specialized
criminal activity. This movement toward criminalization distinguishes economic gangs’
higher degree o f organization and emphasis upon instrumental goals. They neither partici
pate in political activism nor are they as well connected to the white supremacist move
ment as earlier political gangs. The relationship between racism and criminal activity varies
depending upon the specific organization and other factors like the surrounding commu
nity. Like political gangs and unlike social gangs, economic ones de-emphasize the impor
tance o f physical territory. However, while political gangs desire a re-distribution o f power
and the creation o f new political states (i.e. a white revolution), economic gangs cultivate
markets in order to expand business operations. These changes in emphasis were facilitated
by three factors.
First, by the late 1980s, highly visible political activism by racist skinheads was draw
ing notoriety and repression. Police departments and other community organizations began
paying more attention to skinhead gangs, using surveillance and arrests to curtail their
activities. In response to these efforts, some white supremacist organizations began advo
cating covert resistance strategies as a way to deflect social control agents. Many skinheads
were questioning the effectiveness o f public-level activism and opted for less organized or
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easily traceable affiliations. The result has not necessarily meant a de-politicization for aU
skinheads, but rather a de-emphasis on highly visible political activity. This de-emphasis
helped create subcultural space for another current to grow. The increasing emphasis on
profit-oriented crime has also created the misperception among some law enforcement that
political skinhead gangs no longer exist. Also, with political skinheads desiring a quieter
existence, there has been a coalescence o f interests between economic and political gangs.
Both emphasize secrecy to avoid social control and this survival interest has reduced the
social and ideational distance between economic and political gangs.
Second, increasing rates o f skinhead incarceration inadvertently helped facilitate the
change to economic gangs. Law enforcement agencies stepped up their efforts in the late
1980s to halt skinhead activities and disband their gangs. This was largely successful and
resulted in the incarceration o f a significant portion o f skinheads for a wide-range of
offenses. Incarceration helped forge new organizational ties with the Aryan Brotherhood,
who wanted to recruit young white inmates from the California Youth Authority to assist
with their criminal operations. The AB’s efforts led to a relationship with skinheads, which
is comparable to skinheads’ earlier links to WAR. Both the AB and WAR provided
skinhead gangs with important network links that influenced their organizational emphases.
However, while WAR preached political sophistication in the sense o f adopting a global
outlook and organization, the AB has preached economic sophistication with an emphasis
upon participation in the highly profitable methamphetamine trade.
The third factor that led to economic gangs involved skinheads’ paradoxical relation
ship with methamphetamine. Although skinheads’ involvement in the distribution of
methamphetamine grew as ties with the AB developed, there is precedence in the skinhead
subculmre linking them to this drug. The use o f methamphetamine has never been as
prevalent as alcohol, but some skinheads have used (and sold) this drug since the begin
ning o f the subculmre in Los Angeles during the early 1980s. Together, the pre-existing
subculmral affection for methamphetamine, the AB’s mentoring, and the potential for high
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profits have led some skinhead gangs to establish themselves as significant “players” in the
methamphetamine trade.
Although a predominant focus on economic gain has developed among skinhead gangs
in Southern California, significant subculmral diversity continues. Like previous phases
that I identify, not aU skinhead gangs developed an economic emphasis, some retained a
political orientation, and others periodically moved between the two emphases. StiU other
skinheads emphasize culmral style, rejecting both political gangs because they have typi
cally been associated with neo-Nazism, and economic gangs, because they have been
associated with crime. Changes in the skinhead subculture have neither progressed in a
continuous direction nor has the subculture ever been completely dominated by one
particular emphasis (although, as I argue, distinct developmental phases are apparent).
There are distinct phases, but we should not confuse these phases with the assumption that
all skinhead gangs fit neatly into the same category. During each o f the phases I identify,
some diversity remains. It has been my goal to explain why and how these phases occurred
and the implications for the future o f skinhead subculmre and, more generally, the implica
tions for how we understand subcultural change.

Skinhead Dynamism
There is both continuity and dynamism in organization of subculture (Hatch and
Schultz 2002; Takenaka 2002; Zeuner 2001; Moore 1994; Glaser 1968; Becker and Strauss
1956). For example, research on policing subculmres reveals that some traits o f this
subculmre have remained consistent for over five decades (Zhao, He, and Lovrich 1999).
While findings that direct attention toward organizational continuity are important, we
should not assume that organizational culmre is always marked by high levels o f perma
nence. Some observers suggest that to assume organizational stability is to privilege
permanence over the ephemeral. For example, gang smdies tend to concentrate on those
gangs that have achieved some level of organizational success. Yet, most gangs do not
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survive much past their initial formation, quickly dissolving, leaving members to find other
pre-existing organizations or attempt to create new ones (Klein 1995). In his studies of
collective behavior and social movements, Melucci (1989) argues that researchers have
perpetuated a myth of the “unified empirical datum” which “supposes that individuals’
behavior forms a unitary character or gestalt...” (1989: 18). According to Melucci, there
has always been more dynamism than studies focusing upon stabilizing patterns have
implied. Melucci (1996, 1989) suggests that the prevalence of organizational change is
related to important socio-historical-economic changes that occurred in the latter half of
the 20* century. The acceleration o f social change leaves organizational forms more
susceptible to instability (especially non-institutionalized organizational forms). While
scholars have studied and theorized the impact that macro-structural changes (e.g. immi
gration shifts, new technologies that alter boundaries of time and space etc.) have on how
people construct gender, racial, ethnic, religious, and youth identities (Seidman 1997;
Castellsl996; HaU 1996; Bauman 1995; Gilroy 1993; Gergen 1991), less attention has
been devoted to how these processes affect gangs. With the de-stabilization o f traditional
binary categories, identity is increasingly “hybridized,” consisting o f a multiplicity o f
overlapping selves with “borderless” points o f distinction (e.g. the notion o f multi-racial,
gender categories that are neither male nor female).
Recendy, observers have noted changes in traditional gang culmre (Starbuck, HoweU,
and Lindquist 2001), which they refer to as hybrid gang culture. Hybrid gang culture refers
to characteristics that, while not completely new to American culture, have clearly flour
ished in the past decade (Starbuck 2000)'. Characteristics that mark hybrid gangs include:
members o f different racial/ ethnic groups participating in a single gang,
individuals participating in multiple gangs, unclear rules or codes o f con
duct, symbolic associations with more than one well-established gang (e.g.,
use o f colors and graffiti from different gangs), cooperation o f rival gangs in
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criminal activity, and frequent mergers o f small gangs (Starbuck, Howell,
and Lindquist 2001: P. 1).
While informed by traditional gangs, hybrid gangs are not simply smaller satellite organiza
tions. For example, a hybrid gang may display a symbol associated with a traditional gang
without forming any concrete association with that gang. A hybrid gang may also form
alliances with rival gangs to carry out criminal activity. These characteristics reflect the
hybrid gang’s pragmatic organizational style that is not bound by a strong set of absolute
codes.
That the formation o f hybrid gangs is related to larger changes in the construction of
identity has yet to receive sufficient theoretical scrutiny from gang scholars or social
theorists. Hybrid identities offer social actors the flexibility to experiment with new previ
ously untried social forms. For example, migrating gang members appear to have contrib
uted to the growth o f hybrid gangs in localities where gangs previously had little presence.
Migrant gang members acted as cultural carriers o f the folkways, mythologies, and other
trappings o f more sophisticated urban gangs (Maxson, 1998:3). Further, hybrid forms of
identity and organization allow seemingly incompatible elements to co-exist without
causing serious conflict. For instance, as noted in chapter six, PENI has traded metham
phetamine for guns with Asian and Hispanic gangs. Sometimes these incompatible ele
ments not only co-exist but also overlap, providing participants with diverse opportunities
for cooperative efforts and even multiple affiliations. For example, skinhead gangs in some
locales have affiliations with African-American gangs (Starbuck 2000). Yet, in terms o f
organizational stability, a high level o f flexibility and diversity simultaneously prevents
stronger coalesence around a central organizing ideology.
While skinhead gangs are affected by larger socio-historical changes, they are also
affected by specific organizational dynamics and characteristics (e.g. changes in leadership,
the incarceration o f core members etc.). Researchers examining individual deviant careers
contend that, in contrast to conventional occupations, instability, non-linear pathways, and
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uncertainty characterize deviant ones^. While “respectable” careers develop slowly and in a
regular progression, deviant careers are rapid, intermittent, episodic, and likely to move in
multiple directions. The characteristics of the skinhead subculture bears resemblance to
individual deviant careers, which helps explain skinhead dynamism. First, like individual
deviants, members o f the skinhead subculture cannot usually depend upon legitimate
institutional resources for support. The skinhead subculture developed in an illegitimate,
non-institutional environment, which is less structured and less stable than legitimate
organizations. Second, variation is also affected by the unforeseen events that skinhead
organizations face (e.g. the incarceration of key leaders). These events destabilize organiza
tions, which in turn, affect the gang’s objectives, resources, and oppormnities (SanchezJankowski 1991). In the absence o f a highly developed organizational structure, these
contingencies become even more destabilizing. The third factor involves the relatively
small size o f the skinhead subculture, which, combined with a lack o f instimtional stabil
ity, has meant that a highly structured and regimented organizational form never developed
in the way that it has with organizational forms Uke policing subcultures or even larger and
older gangs. Consequently, skinhead gangs never developed into “quasi-institutions”
connected to their respective communities (Moore 1991) the way that gangs have in East
Los Angeles or Chicago (Venkatesh 2000).
One cause for this lack o f institutionalization is that skinheads have never received
high levels o f community support. In fact, skinheads often experience high levels of
conflict with their local communities, including battles with other subcultures (even racist
ones) and, o f course, social control agents. What these characteristics have facilitated is
great flexibility leading to constant change. Instability, small size, and a hostile external
environment make future trends especially hard to predict. For example, the links between
some skinhead gangs and the Aryan Brotherhood or Hells Angeles may signal an eventual
wholesale departure away from politics, or may lead to a pragmatic fusion between crime
and politics.
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Why is the issue o f skinhead dynamism an important issue to consider? First, empha
sizing skinhead change captures the empirical reality and suggests the need for new con
ceptual frameworks to understand the skinheads (and more broadly gangs in general).
These new frameworks will require longitudinal data as well as a combination o f both
qualitative and quantitative methods (Sampson 2000). However, quantitative methods
alone wiU not provide researchers with the type o f data they need to better understand
gang diversity and dynamism. As Short (1996a: xvii) contends, “systematic and sustained
research...based on local knowledge...is necessary if we are to understand gangs.” Further,
gang researchers would be well served to use the “career” concept in order to improve the
understanding o f gang diversity and dynamism. This concept helps frame the different
trajectories that may develop within a gang subculture and directs attention toward the
relationship between gangs and “macro-level forces ranging from the global to the neigh
borhood.” (Short 1996b: 221-222)
Second, continuing to neglect the dynamic nature of the skinhead subculture prevents
the theoretical possibility o f explaining the processes that lead to the emergence, mainte
nance, and dissipation o f skinhead participation (Sampson 2000). My attention toward
describing and explaining skinhead dynamism follows Lolland’s (1993: 37) suggestion for
“answer-improving” approaches as opposed to “theory bashing,” which he describes as
including the practice o f “professing allegiance to one [theory]...and zealously pursues
campaigns to discredit and banish yet others.” I argue that by examining skinheads and
subcultural change, my project contributes to the larger study o f street gangs by offering an
empirical investigation o f a neglected population (i.e. skinheads) and an understudied
aspect of gangs (i.e. changes over time). My study highlights the need for theoretical
integration than can contribute greater explanatory power (Sampson 2000).
Third, viewing gangs as one-dimensional increases the difficulty o f preventing their
emergence and diffusion. For example, since the skinheads’ transition toward economic
interests, some law enforcement and watchdog observers have posited that political
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skinheads are “a thing o f the past.” The contention that Los Angeles skinheads are no
longer committed to political ideals misunderstands the nature o f change within the
skinhead subculture, confusing a retreat from public-level political activism with a com
plete retreat from politics. This misunderstanding ignores the high level o f political com
mitment that continues to exist among segments o f the skinhead subculture and the
cultivation o f political activism that does not require such public forms o f participation.
A nuanced understanding o f skinhead changes and their phases of development offer the
possibility o f predicting the direction o f future growth and what might prevent these
trajectories from taking hold.

Skinheads and Racism
What is surprising about skinhead diversity and dynamism is that we typically associate
racist groups with right-wing fundamentalism and a desire to create an essentialist identity.
Although skinheads have fundamentalist qualities that resemble what Bauman (1995)
refers to as “neo-tribal,” skinhead efforts at creating an essential identity have been largely
unsuccessful as racism even among skinheads must be continually negotiated. Instead o f a
clearly bounded and concrete identity, skinheads participate in a subculture characterized
by a diverse patchwork o f identities and interests. How does skinhead diversity and dyna
mism help us understand racism? First, even extreme and open racism is far more complex
than we often think. Further, the difference between extreme and “everyday racism”
(Feagin and Vera 1995; Sykes and Feagin 1994; Wellman 1993) may not be nearly as great
as we generally think. The development o f skinhead racism represents the transition or
logical extension o f “everyday racism” where racial epithets are hurled in less extraordinary
ways (e.g. coded, yet racist jokes or comments) to explicit racism (e.g. proclaiming that we
should “ship all the niggers back to Africa”). The former tends to receive far less attention,
not warranting the concern reserved for open racists who make little pretense about their
ideological beliefs but who, like the everyday racists, do not necessarily always remain
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consistent with their racism. Where disapproval regarding extreme racism is relatively
unequivocal, ordinary racism faces a far different set of reactions. This means that social
reactions to racism are as much influenced by the “type” o f racist as opposed to the type
o f “racism”^. Those not typed as racist may be provided much greater latitude to explore
and express potentially racist sentiments without receiving stigmatization. In his study of
racial sentiments among whites in Detroit, Hartigan (1999) argues that to fully understand
and appreciate the complexity of racism, one must observe the manifestation o f the
importance o f race during what he refers to as “racial situations.” These situations reflect
instances where individuals used race as part o f an “interpretive process whereby partici
pants judged the interests, intentions, motivations, and actions that composed such en
counters” (Hartigan 1999: 14). Similarly, the ways in which skinheads interpret the world is
not solely dependent upon a racial discourse, nor are their racial sentiments solely based
upon a universal racist ideology. Much like the “rest o f us,” skinheads often perceive race
through local readings that are unstable, open to negotiation, and change from one reading
to the next. This does not mean that skinheads never engage in absolutist, meta-narratives
to understand their world; certainly, the popularity o f the ZO G discourse contradicts such
a notion, but even ZO G is interpreted in a wide-range o f different ways. The same
skinhead, who emphasizes his/her neo-Nazi affinities in one simation, may describe
himself or herself as merely “proud to be white” and only interested in preserving certain
aspects o f “Euro-American” culture. Readers may react to this claim by attributing these
differences as efforts at “impression management” (Goffman 1959), but we should be
careful about failing to appreciate these distinctions as authentic articulations o f contem
porary trends that allow and encourage individuals to identify with a contradictory range o f
cultural elements and simultaneously the growing anxiety related to losing racial/ethnic/
national roots (Bauman 1995).
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L im itation s and F urther Q u estio n s

This work is the first sociological study o f the skinhead subculture that uses an indepth longitudinal case study approach. As such, several limitations need to be mentioned.
First, I do not include an analysis o f gender. N ot only do I neglect the role o f female
skinheads, but I also ignore the construction o f masculinity within the skinhead subculmre. These omissions reflect my overarching interest in the organizational dynamics of
skinhead gangs and how these changed over time. While the construction of masculinity is
inextricably linked to the skinhead identity and culmre, I was less interested in providing
an in-depth analysis o f the skinhead belief structure. Previous research has already identi
fied the importance o f masculinity to the skinheads and other white racist organizations
(Blee 2002; Blazak and Wooden 2001; Ferber 1998; Gibson 1994). In terms o f the role of
female skinheads, Blee’s (2001) work is the most extensive treatment of this topic, but she
focuses upon racist activists, a concept that does not necessarily include all skinheads.
What is needed is an ethnography devoted to understanding the lives of female skinheads".
Second, I do not provide a sustained analysis o f the class aspect o f the skinhead
subculture. Unlike their British predecessors who came from the low-income and deterio
rating East End o f London, Los Angeles skinheads represent a cross-section o f social class
backgrounds. Many Los Angeles skinheads came from middle-class and even upper-class
families, resulting in a collage of social classes coalescing around an ideal o f the workingclass. The skinhead subculture adopted this working-class identity despite the divergent
individual backgrounds o f its members (Anderson 2001). Once you became a skinhead,
you also became a member o f the working-class (at least rhetorically, and even then,
cleavages would appear at times between those who were really from the working-class and
those who had adopted this position). While the process that allowed for this appropriation
is a key element to understanding the skinhead subculture, like the role o f gender, it is
beyond the purview o f this study.
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The third limitation involves a future direction that I intend pursue. This study’s unit
o f analysis has been the group and subcultural level, a level which necessarily ignores the
trajectories o f individual participants. Adopting an analysis at the individual level would
provide useful insight regarding the process o f affiliation and disengagement as well as the
effect o f participation on a person’s biography, but as I explained in the introduction, I felt
it was important to begin with an analysis o f the subculture^. This type o f analysis would
also provide an opportunity to assess the relationship between age and levels o f participa
tion.
The fourth and most important limitation surrounds the issue o f how representative is
the Los Angeles skinhead subculture. I selected a case study approach in order to provide
the level o f depth typically lacking in discussions o f skinheads. This depth allowed me the
oppormnity to describe nuances that would have otherwise been neglected. While this
approach resulted in a rich collection o f data, the findings are, nonetheless, limited to a
relatively small geographic area. The data I collected for this smdy does not allow me
answer the question o f whether the skinhead subculture in Portland, Oregon, Atlanta,
Georgia, or Detroit, Michigan developed along a similar career path. To answer this ques
tion with much certainty requires comparative data derived from several different locales.
Without such data, we do not know whether Los Angeles’ highly diverse culture and often
trend-setting styles are reflected among other skinhead gangs. A comparative design could
examine whether the career patterns o f skinhead gangs in other locales parallel the Los
Angeles skinheads; whether Los Angeles skinheads are largely a-typical, or whether they
are slightly out-in-ffont, but with skinhead gangs in other locales following closely behind.
However there is evidence suggesting that the most recent patterns I found in Southern
California are occurring elsewhere. For example, skinhead gangs in locales such as Las
Vegas and Phoenix have been implicated in the methamphetamine trade and Hammerskins
recently provided security at a Hells Angels festival, which implies a relatively close
relationship, as HA typically handle their own security*. Despite these limitations, this
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study offers a great deal o f new insight regarding a population that is often misunderstood
and/or omitted from serious academic analysis.

Fumre o f the Skinheads
INTERVIEWER: What about the future o f the skinheads, what do you
see?
METZGER: If we could entice the black gangs and the Mexican gangs and
become more aggressive, they would come out o f their neighborhood and
start attacking more white people, then I think the skinheads would come
back into their home territory. Certain types o f skinheads, that’s what they
want to do is have that warfare like that. Which only adds confusion, which
is ok with me. The system’s idea is to keep those people [minority groups] in
those playgrounds like on a plantation, so its unlikely for a while that they
would come roaring out o f there doing much. I think elements o f the
skinheads, they are going right on up and taking our advice. They email me
aU the time and say, “look I want to do something but I don’t want to be a
skinhead.” Because there is an element o f the skinheads that just party and
drink and fight. That doesn’t get you anywhere (Tom Metzger, 2/20/99).
Metzger’s comments suggest two possible pathways o f skinhead development. The first is
a re-territorialization in response to perceived “non-white” crime patterns where skinheads
serve as vigilantes protecting the “white community”. The second pathway is the matura
tion or the institutionalization o f individual skinheads who maintain an ideological com
mitment to a racist agenda without the problems caused by public affiliation with skinhead
gangs. Both pathways could exist simultaneously. Younger skinheads may be attracted to
the first pathway, embracing the physical aggressive notion of defending territories, while
older skinheads may gravitate towards the second and less active pathway. Social class is
another factor that might influence skinhead decisions about the adoption o f these path
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w ays. L ow er class, ec o n o m ica lly d isen fran ch ised skinheads m ay d esire th e street w arrior
status p ro v id ed b y th e first pathway, w h ile m id d le and u pp er class sk inh ead s m ig h t p refer
the se c o n d pathw ay that em p h a sizes in tellectual and le ss physically d em a n d in g qualities.

However, 1 want to suggest the possibility o f a third pathway that fuses economics and
politics. During the phase of social gangs, most criminal behavior was relatively minor
(fighting, under-age drinking, vandalism) which made the transition towards politics in the
second phase easier. There was little incentive to maintain petty criminal activity as an
emphasis; however, during the third phase skinheads began participating in highly lucrative
criminal enterprises, meaning that abandoning these efforts will be unlikely. Yet, a re
emphasis o f politics does not necessitate altering these profit-oriented criminal activities.
If the political climate remains hostile and political opportunity remains limited, politics
and crime may co-exist as revolutionary action. This would require re-framing street crime
as political crime and cooperation and coordination between different organizational
factions. Skinhead gangs that exhibit a primarily economic orientation would need to feel
that political gangs and older white supremacist organization respect them for “who they
are”. In other words, if economic gangs perceive political gangs as proselytizing, then there
would be little chance for such a merger. This merger also requires a willingness o f sharing
leadership with the purpose o f forming a confederation. While political gangs face the
threat o f being perceived as preaching, economic gangs would need to be careful about
showing the proper respect for members o f political gangs who, in some cases, have been
active skinheads for over twenty years. Most importantly, a merger would require an
ideational convergence between economic and political gangs that recognized the ways in
which politics can be monetarily profitable (e.g. the white power music industry) and the
important role that resources play in supporting political action.
Through emulation and penetration, many skinhead gangs have recentiy evolved into a
global movement with a global identity. Critical to the global spread o f skinhead gangs has
been changes in organizational forms. Yet, despite an increasingly global orientation.
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skinhead gangs remain relatively small in numbers and their organizations remain insular
and detached from legitimate institutions. In keeping with the desire to embed themselves
within hidden networks, much o f the current political participation centers on the white
power music industry. Private house parties, small events at local bars, and larger festival
gatherings on private property provide less public forms o f resistance than marches and
rallies''. These events occur in “free spaces” aimed at sustaining skinhead collective iden
tity and providing an open forum for “identity talk” (Hunt and Benford 1994) away from
the watchful eyes of social control agents and anti-racist opponents®. The skinhead gangs
that pursue an economic orientation by forging ties with the Aryan Brotherhood, motor
cycle gangs, and even business dealings with “nonwhite” gangs also depend upon maintain
ing a healthy distance from the forces o f social control. If the shared interest in maintain
ing distance from social controls can help alter the meaning of doing business with minor
ity gangs into a pragmatic and politically necessary enterprise, then this shared interest may
lead to a fumre merging between these differing orientations and help generate a more
homogenous subculmre.
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N o te s

*Thrasher’s classic study o f Chicago-area gangs in 1927 refers to “hybrid” gangs.
^ For a good review o f this literature, see LuckenbiU and Best 1981.
^ For a similar argument regarding school administrator’s responses to “troublemakers” see
Bowditch 1993.
* I would guess that this project would be most successful if the researcher were female.
Male skinheads would likely be even more suspicious if a researcher were taking a “special
interest” in female skinheads.
^ Criminological studies o f this nature tend to fall under the rubric o f “life course” studies
(see Sampson and Laub 1993), but date back to the Chicago School’s life history approach
(c.f. Shaw 1966), while social movement scholars have also used this type o f approach to
study the lives o f individual activists (c.f. Whalen and Flacks 1989; McAdam 1988).
* This information was obtained during an interview with a gang unit officer from Las
Vegas Metro Police Department, 12/12/02 and confirmed by a source at the Federal
Bureau o f Investigation who analyzes domestic terrorism, 12/15/02.
’ This is not say that marches and rallies never occur, but in Southern California political
skinheads are far more immersed in the white power music industry than in organizing
public political events. Future research needs to address whether this is true among
skinhead subcultures in other locales.
* The concept o f free spaces was originally conceived to discuss left-wing, progressive
social movements (see Evans 1980). Recent theorizing has suggested that researchers
examine the applicability o f this concept to right-wing movements as well (Poletta 1999).
See Simi and Futrell 2003 for research that follows this suggestion.
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